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ABSTRACT  
   
In the studies of public space redevelopment, property ownership has been a 
central field that attracts scholars’ attention. However, the term “privatization” is usually 
used as a stand-in for a more general process of exclusion without an examination of the 
nature of property itself. While taking the universality of law for granted, few studies 
show how that universality is built out of particular spaces and particular times, and thus 
hardly explain the existence of counterexamples.  
This dissertation argues that the counterexamples and theoretical inconsistencies 
are a theoretical gap in current public space privatization studies; this gap is created by 
the metaphorical understanding of public space ownership. This dissertation 
comprehensively answers how property transfer shapes the production of public space. It 
emphasizes the significance of social and historical contexts in understanding the 
meaning of property ownership. It follows the theoretical framework of Lefebvre and 
Pierson as well as Lefebvre’s methodology of spatial dialectic.  
The case in this dissertation is the history of Patriots Park, Phoenix, Arizona from 
1976 to 2007. Public records, archives and governmental plans, historical newspapers and 
online essays, second-hand interviews, speech transcripts and transcripts of interviews are 
four main sources of this dissertation. This dissertation develops a new framework to 
understand the meaning of public space ownership through both the initial construction of 
planning ideology and the spatial evolution through practice and perception, which can 
more comprehensively and consistently interpret the different outcomes of different 
public space property transfer. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation explores how the meaning of public space ownership is 
constructed. In studies of urban redevelopment or downtown revitalization, property 
ownership of public space has been a central field that attracts scholars’ attention. 
Because public space is generally accessible and used by the public, the property transfer 
of public space in urban redevelopment can have an impact on residents’ lives. For 
instance, privatization of public space might intensify social fragmentation/segregation 
(Madanipour, 2003), social inequity (Watson, 2006), and intergroup conflicts regarding 
the rights to use public spaces (Low & Smith, 2013; Kohn, 2004; Gehl, 2011). Therefore, 
understanding what property ownership means for a public space and the logic of 
property transfer is significant to both academic research and practice of urban 
redevelopment. 
In this regard, different schools of thought have opposing responses and 
interpretations: Based on the neoliberalist ideology, the advocacy of privatized public 
space emphasizes that private ownership improves the efficiency, accountability and 
effectiveness of public space management, which will create clean, safe, and inviting 
public spaces (for cases, see Anand, 1987; Sklansky, 1999, p.1188-1189; cf. Stenning, 
2000). However, some critics emphasize that privatization will lead to the “end of public 
space” (Sorkin, 1992) or that because of gentrification and urban redevelopment, 
privatizing public space will finally create the “neoliberal city” with severe regulation 
over public space (Smith, 1996; MacLeod, 2002). Other scholars attempt to understand 
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the complexity of privatized public space in urban redevelopment by employing more 
indicators beyond property ownership, such as the “public space without democracy” 
(Madden, 2010) and “authenticity of public space” (Zukin, 2010). 
However, a critical problem in current studies is that property transfer is usually a 
metaphorical term. As Mitchell and Staeheli (2006, p.148) criticize, “Privatization” is 
merely used in current studies as a stand-in for a more general process of exclusion or a 
limiting of access without a concomitant examination of the nature of property itself. In 
other words, the metaphorical understanding of property transfer usually implies that the 
assumed effects of ownership are general, abstract, and universal. These effects are 
derived from abstract legal rights and power related to the essence of ownership. Thus, 
the effects are beyond the specialties of different cases. The social and historical contexts 
of specific cases are usually not crucial factors in discussions of the effects of property. 
The metaphorical understanding of property and the absence of specific contexts 
of property transfer cause a severe theoretical problem: in current studies, the 
summarized effects of public space ownership, similar to proverbs, can always find 
equally plausible and acceptable contradictory effects in both theory building and 
empirical observation. Because property is metaphorically used, the association between 
private/public ownership and social problems is usually taken for granted. Although 
empirical observation provides contradictory cases related to the results of property 
transfers, current studies have not sufficiently interpreted the reasons and logic that lead 
to contradictory results. If privatization is a synonym for public space improvement or 
detriment, examining the causal relationship between privatization and the supposed 
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results would be unnecessary. Thus, considering privatization as the end or the 
improvement of public space is equally plausible. 
Specifically, this theoretical problem is a paradox: on the one hand, private 
ownership is usually blamed as the direct reason for a series of deteriorations of public 
space, because the property transfer immediately changes the power structure and the 
legal rights within the space. This perspective assumes that the private management of 
public space could be anticipated based on the motivation for maximizing the private 
owner’s interest. Thus, under the same legal system, the owners of similar public spaces 
would have similar strategies and eventually form universal characteristics of privately 
owned public space beyond each specific case. 
However, on the other hand, as the term “property” is metaphorically used, the 
analysis of property transfer is de-historicized and general. The specific natures of 
property are usually absent in the summary of private ownership’s effects. Howerver, 
without specific historical and social contexts of property transfer, we cannot clarify the 
interest of private owners or everyone else’s interest. While some private owners make 
profits by keeping a space inviting, others might be able to make money by excluding 
people. Depending on possible scenarios, both well maintaining and abandoning a public 
space could be possible strategies for maximizing private interest. Without specific 
historical and social contexts, the theories of property transfer are not able to explain 
different empirical results of public space privatization or publicization. 
To fill the aforementioned theoretical gap and develop a more comprehensive and 
historical approach to understand the property transfer in public space redevelopment, 
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this dissertation employs the works of Lefebvre (1991) and Pierson (2004) as theoretical 
frameworks. Both of these scholars analyze property transfer based on the historical 
evolution of public space production. As Lefebvre (1991) argues in his influential work, 
space is produced by dynamic social contexts over time, which encompasses three 
dimensions: “representations of space,” “spatial practice,” and “representational spaces” 
(p.41-52). Specifically, in the field of public space privatization, these three dimensions 
are mostly identified as planning ideologies related to plans, spatial regulation and 
maintenance, and people’s perceptions of spatial norms. In addition, Pierson (2000; 2004; 
2005) provides the approach for analyzing the evolution of public affairs over time. This 
approach emphasizes the evolution that occurs in consequence of routines, tiny changes 
without dramatic conflicts, and the influence of previous policies. These two theories 
form the methodological principles for analyzing space and time.  
In contrast to the metaphorical understanding of property, this dissertation focuses 
on the natures of property in terms of the production of public space. It places the 
analysis of property transfer (including privatization and publicization) back into the 
historical and social contexts of a specific space, namely, Patriots Park
1
, Phoenix, AZ 
from 1976 to 2006. In this dissertation, property will not merely be an abstract legal term. 
The concomitant planning ideologies, spatial practice, and norms in people’s perception 
will be presented and embedded in the historical analysis of Patriots Park’s property 
transfers. In so doing, property ownership is no longer automatically associated with any 
                                                 
1
 In the 30 year history of Patriots Park, the name of this park was not consistent. This dissertation chooses the most 
common name, namely Patriots Park. But, the direct quotation keeps the words in the original documents. That is, in  
this dissertation, all of “Patriots Park,” “Patriots Square,” “Patriots Square Park,” “Patriots’ Park,” “Patriot’s Park” refer 
to the same park. 
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social problem. This dissertation will present a more comprehensive trajectory of how 
property influences the production of a public space. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH QEUSTION AND CONTRIBUTION 
Research Question 
This dissertation investigates how property transfer shapes the production of 
public space redevelopment. This investigation includes three sub-questions: 
1.      How do different ideologies legitimize the property transfer of Patriots 
Park’s redevelopment? 
2.      How did property ownership influence Patriots Park in terms of 
regulatory practices? 
3.      What are the norms of Patriots Park as a “good” public space?   
Contribution  
Answering these questions will make several contributions to the literature. The 
first question clarifies the ideologies of public space in terms of property transfer, namely, 
the space-in-plan. As Lefebvre (1991) points out, space is not only physical but also 
about ideologies (p.116). In terms of urban revitalization policy, the planning ideologies 
toward property ownership are significant in the production of the particular form of 
public spaces. This dissertation compares how the advocacies of public or private 
ownership legitimize the related property transfer in urban revitalization. Through this 
comparison, this dissertation presents how different ideologies interpret the pros and cons 
of public or private ownership in a contradictory way and subsequently blames the 
“inappropriate” property ownership of the space as the main reason for creating blighted 
areas. In this process, property is not only a title but, more importantly, an ideology, 
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which might interpret the same urban crisis in a contradictory direction, forming opposite 
urban revitalization policies.  
The second question clarifies the inconsistency within current studies of the 
relationship between ownership and regulation and explores the factors that influence the 
regulation practice under property transfer but are absent or taken for granted in existing 
theories. In this vein, property means the practice of spatial maintenance and regulation 
practice within space.  
Specifically, in current studies, “regulation” and “maintenance” are two 
prominent issues related to the regulation of privatized public space (Spitzer & Scull, 
1977; Mitchell & Staeheli, 2006; Shearing & Stenning, 1981; Kayden, 2000; Smithsimon, 
2008; Wakefield, 2005). However, as the literature review points out, the current studies 
oversimplify the influences of property and assume contradictory “fixed” outcomes of 
urban processes (Harvey, 1985). Following Mitchell’s (2003, p.50) critics, this 
dissertation examines the influence of public space property within the social and 
historical contexts and expands the understanding of property transfer.      
The third question focuses on the space of users, namely people’s imagination of 
an ideal public space. The imagination of an ideal public space in redevelopment is an 
important representation of “the right to the city” (Lefebvre, 2000; Mitchell, 2003), 
which is “not merely a right of access to what already exists, but a right to change it after 
our heart’s desire” (Harvey, 2003, p.939). In other words, the competition over the right 
to a public space relates to what a public space should be. More importantly, merely 
understanding different perspectives by a dichotomy of economic elite and poor groups is 
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not sufficient to manifest the complexity of people’s “desire” concerning public space 
redevelopment. In exploring this question, this dissertation delves into the perspectives 
from broad ranges of urban residents beyond the current users and developers and finally 
presents a bigger picture of the norms of public space. 
In sum, property transfer studies should not merely include the indicators of 
property title, property laws, and social problems. The ideologies, practices, and space 
users’ perspectives will also significantly shape a space. In this vein, this dissertation will 
examine the same physical place within different periods to promote a historicized 
approach in property transfer studies.   
The answers to these questions will help fill theoretical gaps in the property 
transfer literature, develop a more consistent framework for understanding property 
transfer, and push the boundaries of current studies of property transfer in public space 
redevelopment. They will break through the existing approaches in current studies, which 
metaphorically understand property transfer as a logical premise but overlook the cases 
that challenge this premise. This dissertation will also contribute to the general public 
space studies by illuminating the complexity of the planning purposes of public space 
construction. Because of the diverse “production” process and specific spatial 
contradictions, the meaning of public space ownership is diverse, albeit physical features 
of public spaces might be superficially similar. Understanding the nature of property in 
public space redevelopment, rather than simply assuming that some social problems are 
the effects of property transfer, will provide a more comprehensive examination of public 
space ownership.  
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CHAPTER 3 
KEY CONCEPTS 
As this dissertation is rooted in the specific fields of urban studies and replies to 
several concepts that have various definitions and uses across different academic fields, 
this section will define the key concepts and provide their theoretical backgrounds and 
note the difference between the definitions in this dissertation and other common 
meanings of the concepts. 
Public Space 
Across different research focuses, public spaces have various definitions, which 
make “public space” an umbrella term that encompasses diverse definitions. “Spaces and 
places can have all, some, or just one of the features that we generally label public and 
yet therefore still be considered ‘public space’” (Parkinson, 2013: 300). In this 
dissertation, the term “public space” specifically means the “public space” in master 
plans (comprehensive plans) and other formal urban plans. In other words, all public 
spaces referred to in this dissertation are identified by the formal planning documents. 
Specifically, public space is publicly accessible and for public gathering. For 
example, the Planning and Developing Department of the city of Phoenix explains that 
“public spaces includes streets, sidewalks and trees, street furniture, and parks and plazas” 
(Phoenix Planning and Developing Department, 2008, p. 6-5). The term public space is 
defined in formal urban plans through three approaches, albeit the details of laws and 
requirements are diverse in the US:  
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First, public space might be a specific category in the list of real property land use 
codes. A county might have real property land use codes that establish the land use 
categories and the correspondent code number at parcel level. If the planning data are 
digitalized, the GIS shapefiles will identify public spaces in the county clearly for each 
parcel. The underlying logic of this identification is the method of exhaustion. Because 
the total areas of urban space are limited, if we can identify the category of each parcel, 
the identification of public space would be clear.   
Second, following specific land use codes, the master plans (comprehensive plans) 
of American cities usually categorize urban land uses into five categories. Public space is 
one of them. The other four categories are commercial space, residential space, industrial 
space, and agricultural space. Thus, the master plans of American cities identify the 
specific location and the boundary of the public space parcel.  
Third, some cities might have additional planning codes and criteria for public 
space. For example, the New York City Council (2007) defines the “privately owned 
public space” as that “shall contain an area of not less than 2,000 square feet,” “at least 
50 percent of such area shall be free of obstructions,” and so on. 
In this vein, public space in this dissertation is a term in urban planning. It has two 
prominent differences with other definitions in everyday language: first, in planning, 
definition of a public space does not depend on the property ownership. It could be a 
government-owned or a privately owned real property, as long as the space is identified 
as “public space” in zoning and planning documents. In other words, the “public” in 
public space identifies the zoned use rather than the owner of the real property.  
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Second, public space in planning does not rely upon people’s real activities for its 
zoning identity. Public space is supposed to be a place for public gathering. However, no 
public use or no de facto public gathering would not automatically change its zoning code. 
The urban “lost spaces,” sunken plazas, and poorly maintained public parks are still 
public space in the sense of planning and zoning (Tibbalds, 2012; Trancik,1986). Thus, 
the identification of public space in zoning is different from the definition of other social 
theories that define the term based on people’s social activities. For example, Habermas 
(1989) identifies coffeehouses of France as a “public sphere,” in which citizens express 
their ideas and form public opinion. Similarly, Arendt (1958, p.4) defines a public space 
as a place of appearance, where “freedom can appear” and “men act together in concert”. 
Then, “a private dining room in which people gather to hear a Samizdat or in which 
dissidents meet with foreigners can become a public space” (Benhabib, 1993, p.102). 
However, in urban planning and zoning, the cases in Habermas’ and Arendt’s works are 
definitely commercial and residential spaces, rather than public spaces. 
Spatial Production 
The term “production” of space in this dissertation has a specific meaning. The 
term “production” is derived from Lefebvre’s (1991) urban theory and philosophy. It 
represents the process of forming the meaning of a space.  
As Schmid (2009) illuminates, Lefebvre’s terminology is based on his complex 
and unique materialist philosophy, whose core is “human beings in their corporeality and 
sensuousness, with their sensitivity and imagination, their thinking and their ideologies; 
human beings who enter into relationships with each other through their activity and 
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practice” (p.29). In his philosophy, space is not just a physical place. Neither should 
space be considered as a passive and empty “container” of social structure. Rather, space 
is an integral social reality. All elements within the space, such as physical features, 
social perception, interaction, activities, behaviors, and so on, are undividable. In this 
vein, the meaning of a space is not formed lineally. No feature of the space could be 
“independent” regarding the meaning of the space. All features and elements of a space 
are inter-dependent with each other. Thus, a space is a socially produced reality, which 
highly relies upon the social contexts of the particular space and particular time.  
More importantly, Lefebvre understands the space as a “becoming” process: the 
realization of spatial contradictions to be real without a final finished form. The internal 
contradictions interact with each other and promote the evolution of the space. While the 
contradictions are “transcended” (or in ordinary language, “figured out”), the strategy for 
determining the previous contradictions recreates the new contradictions. Therefore, 
during this constant dialectic process, the social and historical contexts produce the space, 
with its undividable planning, practice, and social perception, as an integrally existed 
social reality.              
Because this dissertation applies Lefebvre’s research philosophy and theories, it 
follows Lefebvre’s terminology that refers to the process of forming spatial meaning as 
“production.” Therefore, the term “production” in this dissertation means neither 
architecture and physical construction, nor the economic “supply” of total public space 
area as the supply and demand analysis in economics. Rather, “production” in this 
dissertation represents the social construction of the meaning of a space. Space and Time 
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are two significant dimensions to examine the evolution of the meaning. More details of 
Lefebvre’s research philosophy will be analyzed in the methodology section. 
Privatization and Property Transfer 
Although privatization is a common term in the discussion of public affairs, it has 
different meanings across different research focuses. This dissertation focuses on the 
privatization of transferring the property ownership of the real estate from the public 
sector to the private sectors. In other words, in contrast to the analysis of public services, 
the privatization of public space occurs in the existing real-estate market, rather in a 
bureaucracy institution. Privatization here means the property ownership transfer, rather 
than contracting out public services. Once a space is privatized, it will become a private 
property. Private owners, thus, will have the property and disposal rights. The laws 
applied to the privatized space are different from the laws ruling governmentally owned 
real property. 
In addition, because public spaces are in the real-estate market, governments can 
purchase real property from private owners. With regard to public space, publicization 
usually includes purchasing private lands, implementing eminent domain power, and 
confiscating real property as administrative penalty. Thus, in terms of public space and 
other real estates on the market, privatization is not a one-way street. There are both 
privatization and publicization related to the change of ownership. In this vein, this 
dissertation applies the concept “property transfer,” referring to both privatization and 
publicization. The difference between privatization of public service and governmental 
real properties will be discussed in the literature review. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research project is rooted in the current debate on the meaning of property 
ownership toward urban public space. This chapter reviews the relevant theoretical 
debates and critiques in three sections. The first section reviews the background of public 
space privatization and the associated debates. The second section identifies gaps related 
to space in the mainstream public administration studies of privatization. This section 
also discusses the practice of privatizing government-owned real property. 
The third section summarizes the current debates associated with public space 
property transfer. Privatization is a prominent topic in public space studies. Different 
schools of thought develop diverse and even opposing evaluations of real property 
ownership. This section reviews these different perspectives, with a focus on their 
specific concerns and the logical deduction and estimation of the effects of private and 
public ownership on public space. 
The fourth section notes the theoretical problems of metaphorically understanding 
real property ownership, which have been recognized and criticized by numerous 
scholars. Following the existing critics, this section examines the theoretical problems in 
the specific field of public space studies and the particular assumptions that create the 
logical incoherence in current studies. 
 The Classic Debate of Privatizing Public Services 
During the last several decades, almost all great metropolitan areas have 
witnessed the movement of privatization in the fields of public affairs (Kettl, 2006; 
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Barzelay, 2001). In this process, privatization has numerous meanings and effects 
through the interpretation of diverse schools of thought. For example, regarding the 
advocacy of privatization, privatization could be understood as a value-free management 
strategy that increases the efficiency and effectiveness of government because it 
introduces market-oriented competition and performance evaluation into the rigid 
bureaucracy system (Barzelay, 1992; Savas, 2000; Osborne, 2002). Privatization is 
supposed to be a universal value-free approach promoted by instrumental rationality and 
a new pattern of public management that promotes the partnership between public and 
private sectors across different political institutions (Hughes, 2012; Savas, 1987). In this 
vein, privatization is a component of the general government reinvention (Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992) and a possible option for implementing public policy and affairs with less 
cost and higher efficiency (cf. Hood, 1995). The government does not necessarily handle 
all particular management or service delivery by its public sectors. It could contract out 
the services to qualified private sectors. In the market, firms compete for the government-
offered contracts by their performance. Then, the most efficient companies on the market 
will deliver services and implement public policy in the best way. One assumption is that 
privatization breaks through the traditional bureaucracy that has to rely upon affiliated 
governmental agencies that lack explicit motivation. 
In addition, privatization could also be a symbol of neoliberalism. This political 
ideology understands the concept of “people” as individuals. Privatization is understood 
as an approach to prevent governments from disturbing “people’s” lives (Harvey, 2007; 
cf. Dunleavy, 1992; Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Starr, 1988). The market system is usually 
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assumed to be the natural system created by people, while government is an outside 
intervention. Government is necessary only when the market system does not work 
normally because of market failures such as monopoly, information asymmetry, and 
externality. As long as private sectors are able to implement policies or deliver services, 
assigning public sectors to replace the market is inappropriate and challenges people’s 
natural liberty. In other words, privatization is a type of liberation that allows citizens to 
control their own public lives without too much control, regulation, or disturbance from 
government.  
Opponents to privatization contend that privatization is a threat to the legitimacy 
and norms of public administration. First, privatization undermines the accountability and 
integrity of government. While privatization transfers policy implementation from public 
to private sectors, it is not a simple cooperation but rather a hollowing out of 
governmental capability and the constitutional basis of public administration (Milward & 
Provan, 2000; Terry, 2005). The key reason is that public administration and private 
business have different legal bases (Moe & Gilmour, 1995). Regardless of the superficial 
similarity, public administration is and should be regulated by public laws, which protect 
the constitutional rights of all citizens, rather than the profitability of private business. 
While private sectors take the place of public agencies, public laws are not applied to 
private sectors. The privatized policy implementation de facto bypasses the requirements 
of transparency, public budgeting, and other regulations toward public agencies, albeit 
these requirements are the basis for protecting citizens’ rights (Peters & Pierre, 1998). 
Without the formal institutional process and control, people would hardly supervise the 
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particular policy implementation and maintain the accountability of public administration 
(Bogason & Musso, 2006). The integrity of government and its system of public laws, 
thus, are damaged by loopholes. The “red tape” in the eyes of a private business might be 
an important requirement of the Constitution.     
Second, privatization sometimes hurts the equity of citizens. Privatization usually 
appraises the value and performance of a government merely through the market or 
commercial cost-benefit analysis, while the government in fact has more complex duties. 
The argument that citizens are not customers is a significant criticism of privatization 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Hefetz & Warner, 2004). Under the superficial low cost of 
privatized policy implementation, citizens who have insufficient purchasing capability 
are usually de facto excluded from public services. According to the considerations of 
fairness and equity within public affairs, giving more weight to the demands of those who 
have more resources is not just. In contrast to private sectors, the requirement of equity 
forbids government to treat the rich better than the poor. Then, the evaluation of 
governmental performance cannot be completely economical or profit-oriented. In 
addition, in many situations, government cannot identify which groups are customers. For 
example, environmental and cultural conservation is serving the future generation, rather 
than the current customers. In terms of the new technology promotion and administrative 
penalty, government activities are “servicing” the groups who usually do not know or 
actively seek the service. While the clients do not directly or actively interact with 
government, the equilibrium between immediate clients’ demand curve and willingness 
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to pay cannot determine the significance of the service to them. The “demand” for 
speeding tickets is almost zero, but that does not mean that speed will not kill.  
Third, privatization does not equal higher efficiency and effectiveness. An 
underlying assumption of privatization is that the competitive market system can 
distinguish the most efficient sectors to deliver public service. However, private sectors 
are not always in an ideal perfectly competitive market, particularly regarding the 
specific field of public services (Van Slyke, 2003). Because the market of public service 
is usually not large enough to maintain numbers of companies to be potential competitors, 
governments might not have plenty of options when they attempt to contract out services 
(Sclar, 2000). The private companies that are able to deliver public services are usually 
associated with governments. Once a service is contracted out to a company, other 
companies would be prevented from winning the contract in the future because the 
market is too small to maintain these companies’ survival until they win the contract of 
public service in the next term. Thus, private sectors might have performance similar to 
public sectors if they step into the field of public affairs. 
The Theoretical Gap in Current Privatization Discussion 
Although scholars have long debated the pros and cons of privatization, the 
dichotomy between the bureaucracy and the market is a usual underlying assumption of 
the debate. Government and the associated public ownership are the symbols of the 
bureaucracy system. In contrast, private ownership represents the market system and 
market-oriented competition. In other words, regardless of the advocacy or criticism of 
privatization, the focus of the debate concentrates on whether bureaucracy or a market 
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system is appropriate to public affairs. Although the criticism of privatization disagrees 
with taking market-oriented competition as a panacea in the field of public affairs, by and 
large the critics still imply that the disadvantages of privatization are derived from the 
market system. Private ownership becomes synonymous with market.  
However, in contrast to the analysis of public services, the bureaucracy-market 
dichotomy created a theoretical gap in the analysis of real property privatization. If 
property transfer occurs in an existing real estate market, both governmental properties 
and private properties are exchanged in the same market system. As the real properties in 
both ownership types should always follow the rules of the real estate market, the 
bureaucracy and market dichotomy would no longer fit the assumptions. For example, if 
a city government leases its shopping mall to merchants, the lease would not create a top-
down command-and-obedience hierarchy under public laws.  
 Few of the dichotomist analysis of privatization realize that a government not 
only plays the role of civil servant but also has many resources and properties within the 
existing markets. It can also purchase properties or invest in the market system similar to 
other private sectors. While government purchases properties in the existing market, 
oversimplifying public ownership as bureaucracy or private ownership as market is 
inappropriate. 
 Government might directly own a hotel (e.g. the Sheraton Grand Phoenix), a 
mortgage loan company (e.g. Fannie Mae), and a large number of real properties. The 
markets of tourism, mortgage and real estate are not created by privatization reform. 
They are existing markets that government invests in. Within the existing market, 
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governmental activities also follow the logic and requirements of the market system, 
rather than bureaucracy, albeit the governmental investment might have consideration of 
general public interests. Government might purchase or sell properties and run a business 
as other private sectors would. From the original meaning of property ownership, 
transferring private properties to government ownership is publicization, while selling 
governmental property to private sectors is privatization
2
. However, the most important 
difference between the privatization of real estate and public services is that the 
privatization of these governmental properties (hotel, mortgage company, real properties, 
and so on) is in the existing market, rather than in bureaucracy. Regardless of whether a 
hotel is governmentally owned or privately owned, the customers of the hotel are 
customers and pay for their services. The governmental ownership does not lead to a 
replacement of the tourism market by a bureaucracy system driven by people’s 
constitutional rights. 
In addition, current studies in public administration rarely analyze the property 
transfer of real property ownership and the associated effects. For example, Sclar (2000, 
p.20-26) provides a vivid case of the privatization related to post offices. In this analysis, 
if a government-owned post office manages its business by itself, this service is public. 
However, if the post office is replaced by a FedEx branch, the service would be an 
example of privatization. The definition of privatization depends on whether the service 
provider is publicly or privately owned, regardless of the ownership of the space.  
                                                 
2 For example, Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the word “privatization” as “to change (as a business or industry) 
from public to private control or ownership.” 
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However, as Harvey (2005) emphasizes, the analysis of a social relationship 
cannot depart from the features of space. The space where the social interaction occurs 
would directly influence the meaning and effects of the interaction. The property 
ownership of an office building does influence its tenants. The same tenant would have 
different legal rights and power when the ownership of the office changes. The right of 
exclusion is a typical case that illustrates this point. 
For example, with regard to private properties, the right of exclusion is derived 
from the law of trespass and the “reasonable access rule” (Gray & Gray, 1999). 
Regarding private property, the values of private properties are also protected by laws. 
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the private owner from arbitrarily 
refusing service to patrons (Singer, 1995), access to private property should be reasonable, 
rather than unconditional. For example, refusing access to patrons lacking adequate 
hygiene to a private property is legal because people’s access should not damage the 
economic value of the property and the right of exclusion is a fundamental constitutional 
right of private owners (Callies & Breemer, 2000, p. 52; cf. Scruton, 1982, p. 375). 
However, regarding a publicly owned property, protecting the economic values of 
property is not always a sufficient reason to exclude people from a government-owned 
building. The exclusion should follow the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and should prove that the exclusion is not a distinction but 
rather a protection of other patrons. Take the case of Kreimer v. Bureau of Police
3
 as an 
example. In this case, whether the public library has the right to refuse the access of a 
homeless man without adequate hygiene is significant. A basic reason why this case 
                                                 
3 765 F.2d 181 (D.N.J. 1991) 
22 
 
would be controversial is because this is a public library in a publicly owned building. 
Suppose that if this library rents its rooms in a private shopping mall, the security of the 
mall might legally refuse the access of any patron with extreme odor at the front gate, 
according to the laws of private property protection and the “reasonable access rule.” All 
applied laws of the same exclusion would be different merely because of the different 
property ownership of the space (the real property). 
Therefore, oversimplifying privatization as a challenge to the bureaucracy system 
or merely focusing on the ownership of service delivery is inadequate to explore the 
whole picture of privatization. Breaking through bureaucracy and constructing a market-
oriented governing structure are merely a part of the meaning of the term “privatization.” 
In terms of property ownership, whenever a private sector purchases a property from a 
government or public sector, theoretically, this transaction would privatize the property 
ownership. In other words, the privatization of this property is caused by a transaction on 
the market, rather than inside a bureaucratic system. For example, if a government sells 
an office building to a private owner, the transaction privatizes the ownership of the 
office building. However, this type of privatization by no means breaks through 
bureaucracy or reengineers administrative processes. The privatization here occurs in an 
existing market, the real estate market. It does not replace the bureaucracy by the market. 
However, although the privatization of real properties is relatively less discussed in 
Public Administration than the privatization of government, the property ownership of a 
space would directly influences the rights and powers of people within it. With regard to 
the same branch of USPS in Sclar’s (2000) case, whether this post office is in a private 
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shopping mall or in a governmental building would immediately change the post office’s 
rights and policies of exclusion. Then, the post office might be as exclusive as a private 
sector post office if it rents private office rooms. The privatization of the space, the real 
property, is as important as the privatization of service delivery itself, albeit the 
privatization in the real estate market arouses less attention in current public 
administration studies. 
The Debate of Public Space Privatization 
In modern cities, the most significant influence of spatial privatization occurs in 
the field of public space. Theoretically, public space is a place for public gathering. The 
main planning purpose is to encourage people to gather in the space and create the sense 
of commons and community. In different societies and periods, the specific strategies for 
attracting people to the public space might be different. Regardless, attracting people and 
encouraging the gathering and use of the space is a usual norm of public space. For 
example, the Central Park Conservancy of New York City changes its policy from 
forbidding people to eat plants in the park to hiring “the Wildman Steve Brill, naturalist” 
to lead the tour of the edible plants. Regardless of the superficial policy inconsistency, the 
underlying purpose of both prohibition and permission of plant eating in Central Park is 
the same, “so that a maximum of uses are legitimized” (Shepard & Smithsimon, 2011, 
p.26). 
However, modern cities have witnessed a special new phenomenon in the past 
several decades. The prevalence of consumerism renders everything, including public 
space, into the commodity form (Sklair, 2010). The architectural icons and all other 
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related manifestations of a public space are turning into specific types of commodities 
(Sklair, 2012). In this trend, even the traditional public spaces, which were once thought 
to have no business value for private investment, have been generally privatized into a 
new form. For example, the High Line Park in New York City is a typical case. This is an 
urban park, but it is owned and managed by private conservancies. In addition, this 
privatized urban park is financially self-sufficient without public funds. High Line Park 
generates sufficient revenue from donations and its commercial activities, such as renting 
space to corporations for private events, operating leases with food vendors, and so on. 
Therefore, public space is no longer a synonym for public ownership. Both public and 
private ownership of public spaces are possible. However, as different ownerships would 
directly change the social structure of a public space, there are fierce debates surrounding 
which form of ownership is appropriate.  
With regard to property ownership of public space, there are debates between 
proponents of privatization and publicization. The advocacy of private ownership 
assumes that the management of privatized public space is more efficient than orthodox 
publicly owned space because private owners can eliminate problems that haunt the 
traditional public space. For example, as Mitchell and Staeheli’s (2006) case presents, the 
advocates of private ownership emphasize that the private control could be free from the 
red tape imposed by governmental agencies because private management is usually less 
bureaucratic and has sufficient funding. Thus, private owners and their managers would 
be able to improve public security and provide clean, ordered and high-quality public 
spaces. Further, the regulation of privatized public space is assumed to be more 
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accountable. The advocates argue that the spatial control of privatized public space must 
establish a positive relationship with ordinary people because their profit comes directly 
from people’s visiting (for cases, see Anand, 1987; Sklansky, 1999, p.1188-1189). In this 
vein, the private ownership would have the direct motivation to respond to people’s 
demands, and the private owners can legally enact the rules that governments could not 
or would not enact. 
In addition, this advocacy is strengthened by the neoliberalist ideology, which 
assumes that private management is a more efficient way for social control with lower 
cost (for cases, see Spitzer & Scull, 1977, p. 24-26; Scull, 1977). When private sectors 
control public spaces, flattened management structures, devolved budgets, and customer-
oriented cultures are emphasized (cf. Johnston, 1999). The survival of a privatized public 
space depends upon people’s visiting and consumption (Kempa, et al., 2004, p.566). 
Rational owners would try their best to protect the quality of public space as an inviting 
space. 
However, the critics emphasize that privatization of public space is designed to 
serve customers rather than all urban residents. Commodifying the proximity and 
regulation of public space would bring two major negative effects: first, within the space, 
private regulation has different legal tools compared to the spatial regulation of 
governmental agencies (Stenning, 2000). The legal relationship between private owners 
and those who are within the restriction is constructed as “private” or “commercial.” 
Private owners of public space are usually able to search people, enforce conditions, or 
exclude and remove people from private properties under the name of protecting private 
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business and property values (Button, 2003, 2007; for the distinction of legal tools among 
different types of properties, see Jason-Lloyd, 2003). Thus, although both the private and 
public spatial regulation might carry out similar tasks, private regulation of public space 
would apply little judicial review or legislation (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011). The power of 
private regulation imposing on public space is thus opaque and not accountable by formal 
governmental regulation (cf. Sarre & Prenzler, 1999). Therefore, ensuring that the legal 
powers of private regulation are not misused is a great challenge (Wakefield, 2003, 2005).   
In addition, the rise of public space privatization might hurt social equity. In the 
process of public space privatization, consumerism is squeezing out traditional public 
spaces and replacing them with consumerist spatial management (Ritzer, 1999). Public 
space, thus, becomes a type of commodity on a market and the competitive market 
system produces a displacement effect. In a market system, the distribution of private 
security and investment is unequal. Even if privatization reduces the crime rate and 
improves the quality of a privately invested space, the public spaces of impoverished 
communities who cannot afford such private upgrades would be more vulnerable (Loader, 
1997a). More importantly, the logic of privatized improvement mostly relies upon 
exclusion, rather than integration (Loader, 1997b; 1999). The order, cleanliness, and 
maintenance are not promoted by the informal observation and regulation based on subtle 
social networks and bonds among diverse users, as Jacobs (1961) and Harvey (1992) 
advocate. Rather, the management of privatized public space deliberately identifies and 
excludes the “risky” groups of people. This strategy intentionally makes specific groups 
of people and their opinions invisible in a public sphere (Von Hirsch & Shearing, 2000). 
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Then, if the private owners consider that some groups of people would deter paying 
customers, private owners would exclude these non-customer groups, who are usually 
poor, young or minority people (Kempa et al., 2004; White, 2011). From this perspective, 
the rise of privatization does not mean the upgrade of public space, but rather the end of 
public space (Sorkin, 1992). 
However, although the aforementioned debates expand people’s understanding of 
the particular consequences of property transfer, both sides of the debates usually have 
the same implication: the features and results of property are assumed to be general and 
universal. To a large extent, property is a metaphorical term. It is merely the stand-in for 
a series of social problems without examining the nuances of property in specific social 
contexts (Mitchell & Staeheli, 2006, p.148). The logical deduction from property transfer 
to the claimed social problems is taken for granted, such as equating public or private 
ownership with a lack of law enforcement or social exclusion of disenfranchised people 
(see the case in Mitchell & Staeheli, 2006; Wakefield, 2005). 
In this vein, the current public space studies of property have a prominent 
problem in their underlying logic: metaphorically understanding property can hardly 
explain the existence of empirical counter-examples. Without distinguishing the specialty 
of social contexts, we can always find an equally plausible and acceptable contradictory 
example regarding each claimed social problem associated with property ownership. For 
instance, while privatization represents the general erosion of public space and social 
exclusion (Sorkin, 1992; Mitchell, 1995), public ownership could also mean the erosion 
of public space because the spatial management follows the willingness and discourse of 
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the government, rather than the people (Drummond, 2000). Some scholars observe that 
private ownership would become a source of power that makes public space exclusive 
(Spitzer & Scull, 1977; Shearing, 1992); other cases illuminate that private owners would 
like to keep their property inviting for maximizing business profits, although they do not 
have to discuss how to make a space inviting with the space users (Madden, 2010). 
Generally, because the existence of counter-examples would challenge the 
persuasiveness of a theory, overlooking counter-examples is logically unacceptable. 
While a theory of public space privatization supposes that private ownership leads to 
more severe spatial regulation (e.g. Spitzer & Scull, 1977), it should be able to logically 
explain why some other private owners lack motivation to manage the public space they 
owned (e.g. Kayden, 2000; Smithsimon, 2008).  
However, explaining the existence of counter-examples challenges the 
foundational assumption that the features and effects of private or public property are 
universal. If we admit that the same type of property ownership would not always lead to 
the same results, we can neither understand the meaning of property merely from abstract 
legal rights, nor assume that the same terms of law would universally bring the same 
outcomes. The effects of property, thus, cannot always be taken for granted or used as the 
premises of the debates related to public space privatization. The further understanding of 
how property ownership influences a public space relies upon a more complex 
interpretation of the relationship between property ownership and public space. The 
absent factors of property transfers that lead to different results are significant to the 
interpretation of property transfer in public space redevelopment. 
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The Absence of Space and Time in Privatization Studies  
As Mitchell (2003) points out, “(traditional analysis) takes the universality of law 
for granted when it should show how that universality is built out of particular spaces and 
particular times and is thus responsive to those spaces and times in ways that may make it 
inappropriate for other social contexts” (p. 50). In other words, space and time are two of 
the most significant factors that shape the particular outcomes of property transfers. The 
social contexts and history of a space are not only a backdrop of property. More 
importantly, the social contexts and history of a space identify the meaning of a space; 
then, they also shape the outcomes of the development of the space (Lefebvre, 1991). 
Without the understanding of specific social contexts and history, the differences among 
diverse public space redevelopment could not emerge merely in the realm of legal or 
economic discussions. In this vein, the counter-examples of property transfer studies do 
not only influence the self-consistency of theory building at the level of basic assumption. 
More importantly, the logical inconsistency of counter-examples is rooted in the specific 
aspects of public space studies. 
First, privatization and publicization are usually oversimplified merely as 
economic phenomena following economic motivation and logic. With regard to the 
property transfer in public space redevelopment, studies usually reduce other factors into 
economic units, focus on the general capitalist system or growth machine (Spitzer & 
Scull, 1977; Logan & Molotch, 2007), and interpret the motivations of property transfers 
through economic rationality. Therefore, the debates of property transfer in urban 
planning are usually associated with attitudes toward the capitalist growth machine (for 
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the pro-public ownership discourses, see Loader, 1997b; Hadfield, 2008; Scull, 1977; 
Sorkin, 1992; for the pro-private ownership discourses, see Johnston, 1999; Kempa, et al., 
2004, p.566; Sklansky, 1999, p.1188-1189). Privatization, especially the privatization in 
downtown gentrification, is a rational result when the land rent of public real property is 
lower than its potential price according to the land rents of the surrounding real estate at 
the same location (cf. Smith, 1979). However, as Harvey (1985) illuminates, if studies 
reduce social contexts and people’s behaviors into “money” or economic logic because 
the same utility is supposed to produce the same outcome under the same economic logic, 
they would transform and fix the meanings of space and time in social life. The 
interpretation of urban process would be increasingly incoherent, while the fixed 
outcomes could not be determined in advance (p.1).  
Thus, simply assuming that public or private ownership is good or bad is not 
persuasive. Public ownership does not always form social integration, while privatization 
does not always follow the logic of economic rationality (cf. Merrifield, 1996). A 
property transfer could not be merely interpreted by an economic dichotomy between 
public and private as an objective phenomenon. The planning ideologies that theoretically 
legitimize property transfers are an important and necessary factor for bringing the space 
and time back into the understanding of public space. For example, the planning ideology 
of Fascism, which exalts “absolute place (the soil, the fatherland)” and violently 
persecutes Jews as the historical symbols of private owners, is definitely different from 
the planning ideology that attempts to increase social equity by publicization and appraise 
human life other than merely through the market, albeit they both criticize the market-
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oriented and economic rationality in planning (cf. Harvey, 1985, p.20). The difference 
between planning ideologies and their rationales that legitimize urban redevelopment 
plans should not be overlooked through the dichotomy between public and private 
ownership. In this vein, property transfer is not only an objective economic phenomenon 
but also the result of specific planning ideology. The same property features do not 
always lead to a fixed outcome from economic rationality. The planning ideology that 
legitimizes the property transfer directly contributes to the complex meanings of a public 
space.    
Second, the specific process of spatial practice within the spatial evolution is 
usually absent. Thus, the different outcomes derived from the cumulative social 
interactions are hard to explain. Space is not stable. It might be constantly reproduced, 
distorted or displaced within the spatial practice (Lefebvre, 1991, p.42). In other words, 
public space studies are not only about the idea in formal planning documents at the 
genesis of the space but more importantly about the practice. In terms of public space, the 
spatial practice produces and is produced by the power relationship and linkages between 
the space owner and those who are regulated (Lefebvre, 1991; Leary, 2013; Soja, 1989). 
The practice of spatial maintenance and regulation continually adjusts the social relations 
within the space, and identifies who has the rights to the space (Zukin, 1996).    
However, while property is metaphorically understood, the characteristics of 
spatial maintenance and regulation are assumed to be associated features or outcomes of 
private or public property. Practice is no longer understood as a process of interaction 
that produces the spatial evolution. In other words, practice becomes one of the “fixed” 
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effects of property transfer rather than the process that identifies the actual meaning of 
property. As such, the dynamics, evolution, and distortion of spatial practice under the 
same property ownership are theoretically excluded. Several studies theoretically assume 
private ownership would cause a more severe regulation or limiting of access than public 
ownership, albeit both publicly and privately owned space could be exclusive (Sorkin, 
1992; Smith, 1996; MacLeod, 2002; Spitzer & Scull, 1977; Scull, 1977). Then, similar to 
overlooking underlying planning ideologies, fixing the meaning of spatial practice also 
creates counter-examples and makes the urban theories incoherent. For example, while 
some scholars criticize that private ownership of public space would make regulation a 
more serious “unremitting watch” (Wakefield, 2005, p.532), Kayden (2000, 2006) 
empirically explores the maintenance and management of the privately owned public 
space in the city of New York and finds that most of these spaces are poorly maintained 
and lack regulation, let alone “unremitting watch.” In addition, Smithsimon (2008) 
further analyzes that “the poor maintenance” is an intentional strategy of the private 
owners because they want the visitors to admire the beauty of the space briefly but not 
stay too long in their properties. The problem here is that if we still consider the 
maintenance and regulation of a space as automatic effects of property transfer, rather 
than a dynamic cause that produces the space, the theoretical incoherency and counter-
examples would not be solved.   
Third, the diverse perspectives of space users and the related competition of 
public space are geographically restricted and oversimplified. Under urban 
redevelopment, scholars have realized the competition between the space-in-plan and the 
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space-in-use (Mitchell, 1995; Smith, 1996). The urban planning and redevelopment 
policy might not always take the perspectives of the users of the space into consideration. 
Especially in urban redevelopment, the current users of a public space (e.g. homeless, 
young, or poor people) are usually the population that the redevelopment policy wants to 
exclude. Therefore, as “revanchist city” theory (Smith, 1996) notes, public spaces under 
urban redevelopment usually experience battles over public spaces. Understanding public 
space redevelopment as a competition between space users and space planners is 
becoming an important approach in studies of public space under redevelopment. 
However, this approach has a shortcoming: it usually implies that public space is given 
and the status quo is right. For example, Smith (1996) implies that the existing homeless 
people in a public space are the users of the space, while the advocators of redevelopment, 
private corporations, bourgeois political elites, and their supporters are invaders. 
However, the competition over public space under redevelopment is much more complex 
than the struggle between the existing users in the space and the ones who want to change 
the space. The potential users who are excluded from the space because of the fear of 
crime, disorder, or dirtiness should not be simply categorized as the supporters of 
bourgeois elites. A public space matters to all urban residents who would like to use the 
space rather than merely to those who are using it. People’s imagination of a “good” 
public space under redevelopment should be more comprehensively examined and go 
beyond the dichotomy between bourgeois elites and poor users. 
In sum, because of the complexity of property transfer, simply assuming any 
social problem as the fixed outcome of property would create empirical counter-examples 
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to the theoretical interpretation and would damage the logical consistency in current 
urban studies. More importantly, the inconsistency is rooted in the research approach of 
current urban studies. Reducing space and time into economic units and logic, 
overlooking the evolution of spatial practice over time, and geographically restricting the 
definition of space users mechanically fix the interpretation of space, and thus hardly 
explain the counter-examples in empirical observations. In this vein, applying a new 
approach to more comprehensively interpret the effects of property transfer in public 
space redevelopment is necessary for expanding the understanding of public space 
property transfer. 
Public Space in Downtown Redevelopment 
Literally, public space is merely the name of a space category in urban planning, 
similar to commercial, residential, industrial, or agricultural space. While a city should 
plan certain space for its residents to work, shop, and live in, in the same way, it should 
also plan space for public gathering and recreation. From the perspective of urban 
engineering and design, the term public space has no more subtle meanings than other 
types of urban spaces.  
To a large extent, the increasing discussion of public space property transfer in 
urban studies is tightly associated with the historical background and urban policies of 
downtown gentrification or redevelopment. The meaning of public or private ownership, 
and the understanding of the cause of urban crises could be diversely interpreted. Then, 
the different understandings will lead to nuanced redevelopments. In other words, 
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property transfer is a significant phenomenon in downtown redevelopment. However, the 
effect of property transfer should not be stereotypically oversimplified:     
Because public space is used by the public, this feature usually connects public 
space with governmental power and public ownership. In the United States, even 
regarding the states that most seriously restrict the exercises of eminent domain power, 
condemnation for creating public space is usually legal. For example, although the 
Supreme Court decided in the case Kelo v. City of New London
4
 that the use of eminent 
domain for private owners to promote local economic development is legal, some states 
completely forbid such a use through State legislation (e.g. the Private Property Rights 
Protection Act in Arizona). However, if a city uses eminent domain power to further 
economic development by creating public space under governmental ownership, the 
redevelopment would be less controversial and much easier in most of the states. 
Therefore, the building of public space provides a convenient approach for city 
government to invest in and adjust to the local real estate markets. It is a common 
strategy in government-driven urban renewal and gentrification. The features of public 
use and public ownership thus support the urban redevelopment plans of government. 
Publicizing private properties into public space might be a city policy in urban 
redevelopment. It is a direct policy implementation representing the local government. 
However, because a public space usually represents the policies and ideologies of 
local government, the conservancy of public space also faces the challenge of 
privatization reform as other government-owned agencies would, particularly while 
public space is a type of real property in the existing real estate market. The advocacy of 
                                                 
4 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
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privatization in public affairs would be easily transplanted to the field of public space 
management. In the perspective of privatization supporters, the blight of downtown areas 
and public space would not be the reason for further public investment and stimulation. 
In contrast, the blight itself would be interpreted as the failure of governmental planning 
and public ownership, rather than of the private market. In this vein, the figure of 
governmental-owned public space is associated with financial deficit and poor public 
space maintenance. Then, privatizing public space is a supposed approach for downtown 
revitalization through attracting people by the high-quality private management and 
investment. 
In this regard, the relation between property transfer and redevelopment is 
complex. Both the public and the private ownership could be used to interpret the reason 
of downtown blight, while both could likewise be assumed to be the solution. Public 
spaces under the same type of property ownership could mean different social realities. 
Thus, reducing the mechanism of public space property transfer into a simple and formal 
format is almost impossible or doomed to be oversimplified. Both public and private 
ownership could be a positive force to create an inviting space or be a negative force to 
exclude impoverished groups. The property ownership cannot be a direct normative 
standard (for the case of publicly-owned inviting space, see Madanipour, 2003; for the 
case of privately-owned inviting space, see Madden, 2010; for the case of abusing 
eminent domain power/public ownership in redevelopment, see Greenhut, 2004; for the 
case of public space privatization undermining public life, see Kohn, 2004). Rather, the 
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meaning of a public space integrally depends on its social contexts, that is the Space and 
Time in Lefebvrian urban theories. 
However, the mainstream analyses have insufficient examination of the social 
contexts in an integral way. This does not mean that the existing studies do not realize the 
significance of space or the history of property transfer. In contrast, current public space 
studies frequently discuss historical cases of public spaces. The key point here is how to 
understand a space as an evolving integral social reality and how to present the 
complexity of property transfer. There are two assumptions that usually lead to the 
metaphorical understanding of property ownership, although they might appear in the 
studies that apply Lefebvre’s theories. 
First, reducing a space and its social contexts to a location; this assumption has a 
long history and great influence in urban studies. From its inception, urban studies have 
attempted to understand the form of city, such as central place theory (Christaller, 1966), 
bid rent theory (Alonso, 1964), and Von Thünen’s (2009) land use model. In these 
studies, space is almost synonymous with location. They focus on what types of facilities 
are located where. Because this theoretical tradition is very influential in urban studies, 
when Marxist urban scholars apply space in their analyses of urban redevelopment, some 
of them also inherit this theoretical assumption: the city is understood as a growth 
machine driven by the power of capital. Different uses of land are competing with each 
other. Eventually, the more profitable use will size the land and locate according to the 
equilibrium between land rent and profit (MacLeod, 2002; Spitzer & Scull, 1977; Logan 
& Molotch, 2007).  
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Neil Smith’s (1979) influential work “Toward a theory of gentrification” and his 
“revanchist city” theory (1996) are typical examples of this perspective. Smith (1979) 
notes that the downtown redevelopment is not promoted by consumers’ preference, such 
as people’s appreciation of urban culture, the low cost of commute, or cheaper old houses 
of downtown. Rather, based on the uneven capitalist development and the capital 
depreciation in the inner city, the land rent curve of the inner city would have a gap 
because the inner city has insufficient capital investment. Then, according to the bid rent 
theory, while the land rent of a specific location in downtown is lower than its potential 
price, the redevelopment would probably happen. Private funds would invest in the 
particular areas and increase the land price to the supposed equilibrium level in the bid 
rent curve. Then, the rent gap between the previous land price and the price after 
redevelopment would be the profit of the redevelopment investment. In this cycle, the 
rationality of investment in the real estate promotes the changes of the city. Or as Smith’s 
(1979) title said, “a back to the city movement” is “by capital, not by people.”  
The assumption of capital-driven gentrification further creates the theory of the 
“revanchist city” (Smith, 1996): public space redevelopment is a capital-driven 
movement, which considers the downtown areas as “the urban new frontier.” As Smith 
(1996) presents in the case of Tompkins Square Park, in the plan of redevelopment, the 
working class and homeless people who previously used the public space are understood 
as a part of the physical environments, similar to Native American people in the Wild 
West. In this downtown revitalization process, the park was redeveloped for a more 
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profitable use and “returned” to the users who can pay more for the new urban lives and 
use the park in the “better” way. 
To some extent, there is a paradox: on the one hand, Smith and other urban 
scholars criticize the “annihilation of space by time” in orthodox Marxist theories, such 
as reducing value to the minimum time spent and assuming exchange would overcome all 
spatial barriers (Smith, 1984). These scholars emphasize the significance of space and the 
geographical implication because social interactions that occur in different places might 
create different meanings. However, on the other hand, when the meaning of a space is 
reduced to location, the social contexts of the space are also annihilated. For example, in 
Smith’s (1996) case of Tompkins Square Park, the regulation practice and policing are 
simplified as the representatives of capitalist force without the examination of the 
policemen’s own thought and experience: because the real estate capital needs this park 
for its profitable redevelopment project, the police thus come and expel working class 
and homeless people from the park. In this description of the park history, policemen 
become a mechanical part of a capitalist machine. The everyday practice, experience, and 
perception of police in the space are absent. Thus, while Smith criticizes the policy 
makers of the park redevelopment for understanding homeless people in the downtown 
park as a physical part of an urban frontier, in his case analysis, policemen and the daily 
regulation practice are treated in the same way.  
More importantly, because space is reduced into location, the space is no longer 
integral or a whole social reality. In contrast, the reduction changes space into a variable, 
rather than the ontology. Without the contexts of the regulation practice and its associated 
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norms and perception, the evolution of the space and the process of the spatial distortion 
and reproduction would be absent. Then, the meaning of a space would be theoretically 
fixed, though the analysis might apply Lefebvre’s urban theories of city rights.  
Second, the ideologies of public space planning are assumed to be universal or 
stable, albeit planning purposes of public spaces could be very diverse. In public space, 
the norms of public space are usually the core of the analysis because the identification of 
spatial norms would directly influence the analysis of the spatial publicness. Thus, 
numerous public space theories delve into the normative analysis of public space, such as 
Zukin’s (2010) analysis of the spatial authenticity, Harvey’s (1992) and Jacob’s (1961) 
analyses of social integration. In these studies, scholars attempt to understand the 
significant social values and functions of public space and then evaluate the 
publicness/authenticity of the particular public spaces in their individual studies.  
An important question is what the norms of public space should be. In most cases, 
the norms of public space come from scholars’ own belief and their observations of the 
public spaces. For example, Zukin’s (2010) description of “a timeless ideal of authentic 
public space that is free, democratic, and open to all” (p. 30) is a typical example of these 
normative beliefs. Scholars might have diverse beliefs and observations of public space. 
However, in their case analyses, these norms are usually taken for granted and supposed 
to be universal features of a good public space across different periods of history. 
However, the belief of “timeless” spatial norms, to some extent, contradicts with 
the spatial dialectic in Lefebvre’s Marxist philosophy. History is not only a backdrop of a 
story it is an evolving process promoted by continual contradictions. That is, the norms of 
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public space are continually changing and dynamic. However, the dynamic of spatial 
norms is usually absent in current studies:  
First, the existing uses of a space are usually identified as a normative use, while 
the existing users would be the legitimized users. This identification implies a simple idea 
of “first-come, first-served”: the one who first came and occupied a space would morally 
claim the right to the space. Then, this implication forms a tricky phenomenon: the 
normative analysis of the same space, to some extent, depends on when the story begins. 
Take Tompkins Square Park as an example; in Smith’s analysis, the homeless people are 
the existing users of the Park at the beginning of the story. Then, the story of 
redevelopment is related to the real estate capital driving homeless people away from the 
park and taking their spaces. However, with regard to the same Tompkins Square Park, 
homeless people’s uses become the symbol of the “bad old day” in Zukin’s (2010) case, 
while her analysis focuses on the privatized park management during a different period of 
the history (p. 145), albeit both Smith and Zukin more or less apply Lefebvre’s theories. 
Second, the diversity and dynamics of planning ideologies are usually overlooked 
in public space studies. This oversight implies that public spaces would have similar 
goals and functions and thus could be evaluated under similar normative standards, that is, 
“the timeless ideal.” However, urban planning is destined to be normatively diverse. In 
essence, urban planning is a field that focuses on the future, which cannot yet be 
experienced. In other words, planning is a type of expectation about what a space 
supposes to be. The description of a supposed future will naturally be normative, rather 
than objective. Thus, the social perception of the future and the planning ideologies are as 
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important as the status quo of a space. Public spaces might have similar physical features. 
However, the question of why we should have a particular public space or what a good 
public space should be does not have a universal answer.  
In this regard, we should not fix the norms and social perceptions of a public 
space. Public space is a social reality created by the people. Thus, it responds to the 
specific ideologies in a society. The examination of its quality or authenticity (Zukin’s 
term) should not depart from the planning ideologies in the specific period. The purpose 
of a public space is much more complex than “a timeless ideal.” Public space with similar 
features might have diverse planning purposes. These purposes might be exalting 
“absolute place (the soil, the fatherland)” as in Fascist planning, appraising human life as 
in Marxist planning, propagandizing the discourse of state, or increasing the sale taxes of 
surrounding businesses (Harvey, 1985, p.20; Drummond, 2000; Smith, 1979). As Waldo 
(1948) points out, without clarifying the goal of an administrative activity, examining 
whether the administration is efficient is impossible. Similarly, without reviewing the 
goals of public space planning, we cannot identify whether this public space is authentic. 
After all, not all societies or eras in history appreciate the spatial features of free uses, 
democratic management, or inclusion. We should not take the currently dominated values 
of public space for granted when we review the history. In contrast, we should examine 
how these values are evolved and raised in terms of a public space. A historical study 
does not merely describe the historical background of a case. More importantly, it should 
represent the dynamic process of the spatial evolution. In the next chapter, this 
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dissertation further clarifies the research questions and how the answers to these 
questions fill the theoretical gap in the existing literature. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter clarifies the methodology for this dissertation: Lefebvre’s (1991; 
2002) theories of interpreting the meaning of a space and Pierson’s theories of “politics in 
time” (2000; 2004; 2005). While capital gradually breaks through the constraint of space 
and reduces time into economic units (e.g. the concept of labor time), the interpretation of 
modern cities and urban social process increasingly relies upon economic rationality 
(Harvey, 1989, 2006). After being reduced into economic units, the characteristics of 
space and time are merely backdrops of economic interpretation. In other words, space 
and time become indifferent factors that are insignificant in the logic of modern 
capitalism. However, Lefebvre (1991) inspiringly criticizes the stance that merely takes 
space as a locus. While a physical space provides the material basis for urban activists, 
the meaning of a space, or the social space, is a social product of urban processes. Space 
is not an independent material reality existing in itself. Rather, it is a social reality that is 
comprehensively produced. This is the fundamental thesis of the methodology in this 
dissertation. The meaning of a space is produced, rather than objectively derived from its 
physical or ecological features.  
In addition, social space and social time are two related and significant aspects of 
spatial production. Social space represents the synchronic structure of the social relations, 
while social time stands for the diachronic evolution of spatial production 
(Goonewardena, et al., 2009). Space is continually being produced and reproduced. 
Through this urban process, the meaning of a space will eventually emerge by 
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comprehensively integrating people’s imagination, sensitivity, ideologies, everyday 
practice and interaction. In this vein, social space and social time are not absolutely 
objective (e.g. physical space) or subjective (e.g. economic units). As Schmid (2009) 
illuminates, “central to Lefebvre’s materialist theory are human beings in their 
corporeality and sensuousness, with their sensitivity and imagination, their thinking and 
their ideologies; human beings who enter into relationships with each other through their 
activity and practice” (p.29). 
More importantly, because the meaning of a space is produced by social space 
and social time and does not exist independently, a space should neither be merely 
understood by its physical or ecological features, nor be reduced to formalized units in 
indifferent curves. The meaning of a space is tightly associated with its contexts of 
specific social space and time. The analysis of a space could not be formalized by 
depriving social contexts. In this vein, the existence of space is integral through the urban 
process of a specific society. Space itself, rather than physical features of space, becomes 
a crucial social reality in terms of Lefebvre’s ontology. 
This dissertation employs Lefebvre’s methodology in the specific research of 
public space property transfer. Following the methodological principles of social space 
and time, this chapter will 1) explain the underlying assumptions and philosophical 
foundations of methodology; 2) the methodological framework of spatial analysis and its 
specific application in the fields of public space studies; 3) the methodology of social 
time and its ties to Paul Pierson’s (2005) approach of “politics in time.”    
Philosophical Assumptions of Lefebvre’s Methodology 
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The core of the methodology in Lefebvre’s spatial analysis is distinguishing space 
with social contexts from geometric, geographic, or economic space. To understand the 
meaning of a space, social contexts are necessary because the same physical place or 
facility in different social contexts would mean different spaces. The Great Wall in China 
as a public park today is different from the same wall as a defensive work last used in 
World War II. The geometric and physical features of a space are not sufficient to define 
the meaning of a space. Whether the Great Wall is a park or a fortification depends on 
how people use it, understand it, and define its role in urban planning.  
This methodology challenges the ecological materialism in urban studies. As 
Wirth (1938) presents, the ecological school of urban studies assumes that people’s 
activities and feelings are derived from the ecological features of the space. People within 
the space would unintentionally and gradually adapt their activities to the ecological 
features and develop corresponding urban subcultures. This underlying assumption is 
influential in urban public space studies. People’s social activities are usually assumed to 
be the result of the space, rather than the reason. For example, the open space that allows 
free access is assumed to the reason of social integration because people will gradually 
become familiar with others who look different (Young, 1990). Thus, the more a space is 
physically open and accessible, the more public the space is (Carmona, et al., 2008; 
Madanipour, 2010). Following this assumption, if an academic study considers the 
activities and feeling of the space users (e.g. social integration) as the result of the spatial 
features (e.g. openness), it de facto excludes people’s activities from the causal factors 
that produce the space. It is a basic logical principle that a supposed result cannot exist 
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before its reason. Social contexts would be insignificant to the production of a space if 
they were the result of the ecological features. 
In contrast to the methodology of the ecological school, Lefebvre (1991) criticizes 
that “nothing can be taken for granted in space, because what are involved are real or 
possible acts, and not mental states or more or less well-told stories. In produced space, 
acts reproduce ‘meanings’ even if no ‘one’ gives an account of them” (p.144). This 
critique illuminates two significant theses of Lefebvre’s methodology in space analysis.  
First, people, the human beings related to a space, create the space and its 
meaning. The geometric and physical features do not automatically create space. Thus, 
space is produced, rather than independently existing. Merely relying upon the ecological 
features has the risk of distorting the meaning of space. A space should not be 
oversimplified as a fixed outcome of physical features. 
Second, people’s acts, including their underlying sensitivity, imagination, and 
ideologies, are social reality. They might not be physical or determined by physical 
features. However, this does not mean that people’s acts are arbitrary or mental. People’s 
acts are a unified and social reality that exists in the society but cannot be measured or 
defined by a physical spatial scale. In other words, people’s acts and the produced space 
are examinable and understandable, but not in a mathematical or physical way. 
In this vein, Lefebvre’s methodology challenges both orthodox materialism and 
agnosticism. Space is more complex than its geometric and physical features. The 
insistence on the primacy of physical conditions for the formation of consciousness is 
insufficient to interpret the production of space. However, the social relations related to a 
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space are not mental; instead, the social relations related to a space are the existing social 
reality with its material basis. Social relations and their material basis are mutually 
produced before forming the existing space. Therefore, space, as an integral whole with 
its social contexts, should be the basic unit of analysis.    
Another philosophical foundation of Lefebvre’s methodology is the dialectic of 
spatial analysis
5
. Generally, the dialectic emphasizes that social reality is constantly 
produced and reproduced by contradictions. The interactions between contradictions 
overcome the previous contradictions, but the resolution of the previous contradiction 
bears new contradictions. Thus, the old contradictions are “transcended” into a new form 
of contradictions at a higher level and promote the evolution of social reality and human 
history.  
Therefore, relations among multiple sides of contradictions and the process of 
their interaction are extremely important. Dialectic fundamentally opposes the principle 
of formal logic that “no proposition can simultaneously both be true and false;” rather, “if 
we consider the content, if there is a content, an isolated proposition is neither true nor 
false; every isolated proposition must be transcended; every proposition with a real 
content is both true and false, true if it is transcended, false if it is asserted as absolute” 
(Lefebvre, 1968, p.42). The production of space or any other social reality with real 
content is a continual and historical process (“movement”) rather than a fixed outcome 
(p.36). The understanding of dialectic is only possible through historical and dynamic 
interpretation of social evolution. Because the so-called “truth” dynamically lies in the 
                                                 
5
 The term “dialectic” only refers to its meaning in Lefebvre’s philosophy. See the different definitions of the term  
“dialectic” among Lefebvre, Marx, Hegel, and Nietzsche’s philosophy in Henri Lefebvre’s Theory of the Production of 
Space (Schmid, 2009)    
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continual contradictions between the negation and the conservation, social reality is a 
“realization,” a process of becoming, rather than a static “real” (p.36). 
Theoretical Framework of Public Space Property Transfer  
Based on the special materialism and dialectic of Lefebvre’s philosophy, the 
analysis of space is specified into three dimensions, which form the theoretical 
framework of the analysis in this dissertation. A space consists of “representations of 
space”, “spatial practice”, and “representational spaces,” all of which have more specific 
meanings in the studies of public space property. All three dimensions dialectically 
introduce the real meanings into a space within a society. 
First, “representations of space” (the planning ideologies); 
“Representations of space” manifest the ideologies of a plan, usually in maps, 
plans, or proposals (Lefebvre, 1991, p.116). A space in society cannot be produced 
without having been conceived in thought previously, although the meaning of space will 
evolve or change (Schmid, 2009, p. 39). Even with regard to a pure natural geography, 
the social meaning of the space still comes after the thought of the space in society. For 
example, regarding the conflicts over the natural rock Devil’s Tower, Native American 
communities consider it sacred, while rock climbers take it as a climbing site (Dussias, 
2000). The planning ideologies introduce the social meaning to a space and are a link 
between planning knowledge and the physical space (Lefebvre, 2000, p.97). The 
conceptualized perception and perspectives promoted by urban planners, designers, or 
policy makers legitimize the meaning and even the existence of a space, namely, the 
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“space in plan.” Then, urban planning forms the conceptual system and legitimacy of 
spatial development (Lefebvre, 1991, p.36).  
In the field of public space privatization, “representations of space” means the 
planning ideologies that legitimize the property transfer and public space redevelopment 
plans (Mitchell, 2003, p.128-130). Regardless of privatization or publicization, property 
transfer would not occur without a purpose. Through legitimizing the appropriate 
ownership of public space, redevelopment plans should construct a formal discourse 
system of the conceived advantages of a certain property ownership and the logic for 
solving the assumed problems of existing space. In this dissertation, the discourses of 
formal redevelopment plans that legitimize public space are summarized as “planning 
ideologies.” These ideologies of plans define the formal reasons, logic, challenges, and 
supposed benefits of redevelopment. They represent the “geographical imagination” of 
the state toward public space (Harvey, 1985, p.200-206) and construct the 
“representations of space.”          
Second, “spatial practice” (regulation and maintenance); 
“Spatial practice” is the routines of everyday practices, which is the “terrain in 
which power is reified, manipulated, and contested” through the continual production of 
space (Springer, 2011, p.544). These practices continually mediate between the 
ideologies of conceived plans and individual experiences (Lefebvre, 1991, p.38-40). 
Practice is not only an activity itself but also an integral material dimension of perceived 
elements that constitute a space. For example, an appropriate spatial regulation or 
policing transfers a physical “open” place to a perceived “accessible” or “inviting” space. 
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People’s interaction and social practice in everyday life shape the practical meaning of 
the space. In this vein, spatial practice is the “experiential deciphering of space” 
(Lefebvre, 1991, p.38).  
With regard to public space privatization, spatial practice is tightly associated 
with spatial regulation and maintenance (cf. McCann, 1999). Private property rights are 
directly related to exclusion, which has an impact on the basis of public space. Thus, 
spatial regulation and maintenance identify who can use the public space under what 
conditions, restrict the rights to the city (Lefebvre, 2000; Mitchell, 2003), and shape the 
production of public space (Light & Smith, 1998). More importantly, regulation and 
maintenance of public space are a comprehensive practice, which is rooted in the didactic 
contradictions between different groups of space users. Although encouraging as many 
people as possible to use the space is a common principle of public space (Shepard & 
Smithsimon, 2011), it does not mean that minimum restriction of access is always good 
because a space that is out of control would also exclude some groups of people 
(Merrifield, 1996, p.62). Therefore, understanding the regulation and maintenance of 
public space is a significant dimension for manifesting the dialectic of social practice in 
public space.          
Third, “representational spaces” (the norms of public space in social perception); 
“Representational spaces” is people’s “thought” that identifies a space. It 
concerns the symbolic dimension of space, rather than the space itself. It is people’s 
knowledge of life experience that is not exhausted, expressed, or analyzed in the formal 
plans or in the dominating planning theories (cf. Schmid, 2009, p. 37, 40). Space users’ 
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perception and understanding of a space are not necessarily the same as the anticipations 
of planners or designers (Staeheli & Mitchell, 2008, p.119). The spatial norms perceived 
and supported by users’ perception is space-in-use (Mitchell, 1995, p.115).  
In terms of public space privatization, identifying the spatial norms is directly 
associated with people’s perception of an ideal public space. In other words, the core of 
“representational spaces” is people’s perception about what a public space should be and 
how a public space should be used. This discourse forms the intellectual basis of the 
spatial competition among different groups and the property transfer of public space in a 
society (Smith, 1996). The production of a public space is “not merely a right of access to 
what already exists, but a right to change it after our heart’s desire” (Harvey, 2003, 
p.939). Thus, understanding people’s desire toward public space is a necessary dimension 
for the interpretation of public space property transfer.  
This dissertation illuminates how different dimensions of spatial contradictions 
(e.g., planning ideology, practices and social perceptions) promote the evolution of space. 
In this research, the contradictions usually occurred during attempts to reshape the park. 
While some people attempted to keep the park aligned with its official plan, others used 
or understood the park in a different way. These contradictions were not personal, but 
rather structural and derived from their historical contexts. In other words, this 
dissertation focuses on the contradictions between planning ideology, practices, and 
perceptions, rather than the tensions between groups of people, albeit planning ideology 
was usually represented by the discourses and actions of city officials and planners.   
Evolution of Urban Policies over Time 
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The interpretation of space is in fact the analysis of a becoming process, rather 
than causal relations in formal logics. Thus, time, the history of the becoming process, is 
also extremely significant for interpreting the production of a space because the process 
of becoming will never end at a specific moment, according to Lefebvre’s methodology. 
Specifically, the process of becoming is not only a timeline that eventually 
occurred, but it also includes uncertainties. The historical process of space cannot be 
sufficiently manifested by its final forms at several moments in time. In spatial analysis, 
time is beyond the definitions of mathematicians and physicists. Rather, time represents 
“the accomplished, the foreseen, the uncertain and the unforeseeable” within a space 
(Lefebvre, 2002, p.231).  
The history of a space does not only mean recording the dramatic events over 
times or drawing “certain outlines for bringing what is empirically real” between 
effective actions and the results of events (Lefebvre, 2002, p.130). The analysis of spatial 
history attempts to illuminate where and upon what the history influences the 
transformation of everyday life. In so doing, the continuity and discontinuity of a space 
are connected. As Harvey (2005) points out, “history and geography cannot be separated. 
All geography is historical geography, and all history is geographical history” (p.13). 
In this vein, the cumulative effects within the historical contexts are significant to 
a space’s evolution. Properties are not merely names on titles and related legal rights. The 
exact meanings of property rely upon the associated historical contexts. The methodology 
of the “politics in time” (Pierson, 2000; 2004; 2005) provided a practical approach to 
understand the historical evolution: In contrast with mechanically organizing dramatic 
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historical events as isolated cases in a timeline, Pierson’s methodology focuses on the 
cumulative effects of tiny changes in routine and illuminates the long term logic that 
associates multiple dramatic events together. Thus, Pierson’s methodology of history 
study is appropriate for illuminating a space as a “becoming process.”    
Specifically, this dissertation follows two important methodological logics of 
Pierson: first, a “moving picture” rather than a “snapshot” can better present the process 
and underlying logics of public affairs. Placing the analysis of a public affair in a time 
dimension is necessary in understanding its logic. The processes through which the 
administrative practices take shape and the ways in which they either endure or change in 
constantly shifting social environments are crucial for interpreting the long-term 
consequences, particularly regarding the effects of urban planning (Pierson, 2005, p.43).  
Second, the “present” to some extent is influenced by the “past,” rather than 
merely on the current choices of administrative actors. As Tilly (1984) points out, “when 
things happen within a sequence affect how they happen”(p.14). Thus, answering how 
questions rely on understanding the timing and sequence of related events. The policy 
decisions at a given point in time constrain alternative policies at later points in time 
(Tilly, 1984, p.14). 
In this vein, a public space redevelopment project should not be considered as a 
one-time-construction but as a continuing development of a space. The logic of property 
transfer emerges in the evolution of the space in historical flow. The description of a 
space and associated events at a time would merely be a “snapshot.” However, the 
examination of the life cycle produces a “moving picture” of the space. In other words, 
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we should not assert the natures of property transfer by a one-time observation of a case. 
In contrast, the long-term history of a case should be examined. Then, the tiny changes in 
time will accumulate and expose the deeper effects of property transfer. 
In addition, the methodological logics of the “politics in time” approach are put 
into practice through Lefebvre’s (1991) theory of space production. This dissertation 
examines public space by following Lefebvre’s (1991) framework. The production of a 
space is not only about the material space. A space should consist of the history of 
ideologies (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 116), the spatial practice of a society (p. 38), and the 
“thought” dominating the space (p. 135). Based on this framework, all these dimensions 
are identified within the particular threads of history. Even the same physical space could 
have different meaning in different periods. For instance, the Great Wall used as a park is 
different from the same physical wall as a military facility. All three dimensions 
introduce the real meanings into a space within a society. This framework is the 
foundational guideline in this dissertation for understanding the changes of a space.  
“Politics in time” approach. 
Why does the history of public affairs matter? As current public administration 
affects our lives more directly and intensively, why should we study the past, rather than 
the present? These are frequent questions regarding placing the analysis of public affairs 
in time. To a large extent, the term “history” could mean two points of view: 
Conventionally, “history” could mean the specific record at a given point in time. 
However, in the study of public policy and administration, “history” means the 
observation of the evolution and constant development of public affairs. Systematically 
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examining public affairs to some extent relies upon unfolding the social processes over 
considerable periods of time (Pierson, 2005). The history of public affairs is not a series 
of separated collections in a museum. In contrast, depriving the influence of the past 
action from current administrative practice is almost impossible. Thus, the analysis of 
history is not only for recording the past events. More importantly, it is for clarifying the 
social process, pushing forward people’s understanding beyond the limit of time, and 
even offering a more persuasive guideline for policy makers (Graham, 1993).   
From “snapshot” to “moving picture” view. 
The “snapshot” view could occur in both qualitative and quantitative studies. For 
example, in many qualitative case studies, the analysis of the cases focuses on the 
dramatic events and the choices and activities of several important actors. Within public 
space studies, the dramatic events are usually the spatial privatization, gentrification, or 
exclusion of specific groups of people. In these cases, the dramatic events are derived 
from the competition for the space. The competitors automatically become the key actors 
in the case. Then, the analysis of the case usually relies on interpreting the logic of 
diverse actors’ activities.  
However, concentrating on the dramatic events of competition has the risk of 
overlooking the evolution or changes that occur as a consequence of routines about the 
use of space. As Derthick (1979) illuminates, the absence of conflict does not signify the 
absence of change. The not-so-exciting routines, “though it may not be interesting to 
analysts at a given moment, is cumulatively very important” (p.9). History is not merely 
the unnecessary backdrop or background information of a case. Rather, the process of 
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evolution is significant to the validity of a qualitative interpretation. A “snapshot” 
qualitative study might miss significant variables or elements of a real story. 
With regard to quantitative study, the “snapshot” view leads to two types of 
public space studies: evaluating a public space affair by data collected at a given moment, 
and using the analytic tools of microeconomics or game theory, which “focuses on the 
‘moves’ of particular ‘actors’ at a moment in time” (Pierson, 2005, p.34). In the 
quantitative study that follows a “snapshot” view, the core concern is determining the 
“variables” that significantly generate the final outcome. These studies are important for 
simplifying the relationship and contribution of diverse social factors. However, the time 
dimension is still necessary for a social science study. The taste of the same ingredients 
would be obviously different if they were cooked in different order, time, or combination. 
Similarly, the same “variables” in different historical contexts might lead to opposing 
outcomes, particularly if we consider the complex social dynamics. In other words, 
without the historical contexts, we might miss the necessary information to understand 
how “variables” contribute to the outcomes. If the same “variables” cannot produce the 
same outcomes, the reliability of the theory building might be challenged. 
In contrast to a “snapshot” view, the approach of “moving pictures” has two 
fundamental principles. First, the sequence of events determines the social process and 
the related outcome. No choices are made without contexts or practical restriction. Urban 
planning and policies are always based on the past decisions. Developments should 
consider the status quo created by the previous developments. Similarly, the current 
planning policy will provide positive feedback to the following policies and lock the 
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evolution of policy into some given trajectories. Because of the existing conditions, the 
cost of switching to another trajectory is usually unacceptable or uneconomic. Thus, 
whether a policy is a rational choice depends on its historical contexts and the past 
policies. Some alternative plans might be options in name, but not in fact, according to 
the practical conditions (Pierson, 2000). Therefore, the sequence of related historical 
events cannot be ignored or changed. Clarifying the influences from each step to the next 
step is crucial to the analysis. 
Second, routines and tiny changes matter. Because social processes unfold over 
time and have specific temporal dimensions, the routines of spatial management that 
seem to be stable are usually dynamic in the historical view. More importantly, the tiny 
and slow changes present the self-reinforcing process of underlying trajectories. The 
approach of “moving pictures” does not consider the periods between dramatic events as 
the time of “equilibrium.” In contrast, the tiny changes and routines without dramatic 
events are the grains of sand that eventually form a heap of sand. In this regard, if a study 
only selects several dramatic moments in a long period of history, it is still a “snapshot” 
view, regardless of the time span between each selected moment. The approach of 
“moving pictures” implements the analysis of routines and tiny changes in everyday 
practices and emphasizes the ties between the routines and the final dramatic events. All 
these routines collectively illuminate a continuous trajectory, which presents the “moving 
picture” of the policy evolution. 
From “actor-centered functionalist” to historical interpretation. 
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Changing “actor-centered functionalist” to historical interpretation is another 
methodological principle of “politics in time” (Pierson, 2004, p.105). The term “actor-
centered functionalism” refers to the underlying assumption that the existence of X (it 
could be a policy, an institution, or a space) is due to its function Y to the key actor Z. 
Function Y is assumed to be a necessary condition for X’s existence (ibid, p.44-46). Then, 
interpreting functions becomes an important approach for exposing the underlying 
relationship between space and people. 
However, “actor-centered functionalism” to a large degree implies that actors’ 
choices and activities are rational for achieving anticipated outcomes. However, in fact, 
outcomes do not always appear immediately after the activities. Between the appearance 
of a key causal factor and the occurrence of its outcome, social processes might involve 
considerable time lags. The final outcomes are not always directly associated with the 
original activities at the moment of researchers’ observation. Rather, the final outcomes 
might be derived from a long “causal chain,” in which a key event leads to an ordered 
sequence of events in the chain. Even if the actors are able to anticipate the process of the 
whole chain reaction in society, this process might still need some time to work itself out 
(Pierson, 2005, p.41). Particularly in urban planning, the outcomes of an urban 
redevelopment might emerge after many years of the redevelopment. Merely focusing on 
the immediate effects at a specific moment might result in misinterpreting the social 
processes. 
In addition, the consequences of planning and urban policy are usually unintended. 
Planners or policy makers always work with high uncertainty. They might be wrong, 
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misled, or forced to compromise. Especially, we should admit that at least some 
outcomes are by-products of the underlying social trajectory beyond urban planners’ 
expectation. For example, it is probably not fair to blame planners and mayors in the 
national urban renewal movement for intentionally starting a racist campaign of “black 
removal” because many of them purely hoped to revitalize downtown areas (Levy, 2000). 
The existence of segregation after urban renewal was a highly complex result of the 
whole social institution and American urban system (Dreier, et al., 2004). Some groups 
of people benefitted from urban renewals. However, merely summarizing urban renewal 
as a self-benefiting strategy oversimplifies the complex causes of segregation. Thus, if 
interpretation is always based on a supposed function, it might lead to conspiracy theories 
or confusing cause and effect. 
Based on the understanding of time lag and the uncertainty of public affairs, 
historical interpretation has three characteristics: first, it takes the historical trajectory, 
rather than “rational actors” as the center of the analysis. Historical interpretation 
emphasizes the existence of historical “stickiness” rather than “functions.” The observed 
outcomes today might be rooted in the past several decades beyond any specific actor’s 
rational choices or demands. This does not mean that the decisions and actions of 
political actors are not significant. The changes of mayors, council members, and other 
important leaders in a city government will definitely influence urban planning and 
management. However, the accumulation of short time changes will create the trend of 
the long-term trajectory, which cannot be simply attributed to any policy maker’s 
individual decision.  
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 Second, the interpreted logic should exist throughout a relatively long period. 
Historical interpretation focuses on historical logic within social process. The 
summarized logic could not be a temporary phenomenon. Rather, it should be valid and 
constantly emerge throughout different periods. In so doing, the changes of political 
climates and other urban conditions over a long period examine the interpretation. 
Third, the interpretation should explain the evolution from “invisible” to “visible” 
changes. The summarized logic should be able to connect routines and the dramatic 
changes and explain how the cumulative outcomes and their slow-moving qualities 
promote the social process of public affairs. The significance of everyday life and 
practice is the methodological basis. Historical interpretation requires research to present 
the evolution of urban process rather than mechanically list the dramatic changes in the 
timeline of a space. 
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CHAPTER 6 
METHODS 
Case Description and Selection 
The case in this dissertation is the 30-year history of Patriots Park in Phoenix, AZ. 
In contrast to considering the urban redevelopment projects as several separate cases, this 
dissertation employs an historical view and takes into account the history of Patriots Park, 
from the first opening of the park in 1976 to the demolishment in 2007, as a whole case. 
The evolution of the “routines” within the park is as important as the physical 
developments of the park. 
Through the life and death of Patriots Park, property ownership played a 
significant role. In the 1970s and 1980s, Patriots Park was an important symbol of 
downtown redevelopment. Similar to many other American metropolises, the city of 
Phoenix suffered from the hollowing out of its downtown in the 1960s and 1970s. In 
1965 Mayor Milton Graham promoted a great redevelopment plan to revitalize 
downtown Phoenix based on the mentality of “we don’t want to be another Los Angeles” 
(Gober, 2006). The development of Patriots Park was a significant project in this plan. 
Based on the downtown redevelopment plan in 1960s to 1980s, blighted 
downtown Phoenix was considered as the automatic result of market-oriented 
competition between downtown and suburban areas. This perspective supposes a vicious 
cycle: if private properties continually offered low-priced accommodations and amenities 
to poor people, the attraction of “undesired” groups would intensify the hollowing out of 
Phoenix downtown. Thus, the building of Patriots Park was expected to “get rid of the 
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pawnshop atmosphere for a whole city block of blight” by publicizing the center of 
downtown Phoenix (VanderMeer, 2010, p.273). As Jim Forsberg, the former downtown-
redevelopment director, explained, “Central Phoenix has been a failure of the private 
sector and, therefore, needs government intervention and assistance…” (Shanahan, 1984a, 
p.A1). 
However, Patriots Park did not exactly revitalize downtown Phoenix as planned. 
For example, as early as 1979, the third year of Patriots Park, Arizona Republic (Crooks, 
1979) reported that the park was a dangerous place and full of homeless people who took 
baths in the fountain. By 1981, the fountain was dry (Hille, 1981). Also in the same year, 
only the fifth year of Patriots Park, this new park was referred to as an example of “civic 
blight” (Editorial, 1981). In 1982, the police department requested that the Parks and 
Recreation Board close Patriots Park because officers had to move homeless people out 
of the park two or three times a day (Manson, 1982). 
Although in the first two decades, the city government of Phoenix constantly 
invested in the park through activities such as redesigning the park, building an 
underground garage, and installing laser beam equipment, Patriots Park was still a 
downtown “blighted” areas that was merely used by homeless people. To many people, 
the park became an unrepaired “eye sore.”  
Beginning in 2004, Mayor Phil Gordon focused heavily on downtown 
redevelopment and advocated redeveloping Patriots Park. This time, privatization became 
the plan for improving this blighted area. Supporters advocated the redevelopment 
through privatization as a way to infuse private investment into downtown Phoenix, 
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upgrade the expensive but ineffective management of city government, and make the 
space inviting (MacEachern, 2007). Based on this redevelopment perspective, Patriots 
Park was eventually replaced by a mixed-use development consisting of residential, retail, 
office, restaurants and hotel components.  
In its thirty years history, Patriots Park experienced the property transfer from 
private to public, then from public to private, as well as three designs. However, all these 
designs were distorted by people’s real spatial practice and perception. Although the 
applied planning theories were changed and the meaning of public space ownership was 
re-identified, Patriots Park remained a downtown “blighted” area with intensive 
investment and intellectual designs. This case is an outstanding window to examine how 
the real public space was evolving beyond the official plans and explore the new factors 
that determine the production of a public space.   
Generally, the case of Patriots Park has three prominent advantages for clarifying 
the underlying logic of property transfer in public space redevelopment. First, this case 
has a full process of property transfer from private to public ownership, then from public 
back to private ownership. Thus, this case can reveal both types of property transfer in 
the same place responding to similar urban problems. This specificity greatly controls 
other possible influences on the comparison of property transfer. In addition, presenting 
both types of property transfer in one case reduces the risk of taking public or private 
ownership as the final correct answer. The continual urban problems suggest that neither 
private nor public ownership is a panacea. Both public and private ownership are treated 
the same in this case. They both need to be carefully examined beyond metaphorical 
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understanding, such as simply labelling private ownership as being exclusive/effective or 
public ownership as being ineffective/inviting.      
Second, plenty of archives and documents are sufficient to support a historicized 
study of the property transfer in this case. The redevelopments and planning of Patriots 
Park continued for over 30 years. This presents the continuous evolution of the same 
space. The ideologies and theories of urban planning are not stable. The principles that 
once were taken for granted by almost the whole society might be considered ridiculous 
or seriously criticized in another period. Thanks to the diverse types of historical records, 
this case is able to reveal how different ideologies rationalize and shape the 
redevelopment policies beyond the intellectual limitation of a specific era.  
Third, the redevelopments were widely discussed in the society by ordinary 
residents of Phoenix. Collecting ordinary people’s perspectives in the history is not easy. 
Even the same person might not be able to keep or express his or her previous ideas after 
10 years. If a redevelopment project is not controversial enough to be a widely-discussed 
topic, ordinary people’s perspectives might be buried in history easily. However, the case 
of Patriots Park has been a controversial topic from its first plan. The published debates, 
the minutes of public hearings, and the residents’ feedback to newspapers or public 
sectors around this project offer rich data to examine people’s imagination about what 
exactly is a good public space. In other words, the wide discussions about Patriots Park 
make examining ordinary people’s perspectives possible. 
Qualitative Case Study 
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This dissertation employs a qualitative case study as a historical research method. 
This dissertation problematizes the logical deduction that property transfer automatically 
leads to social problems and emphasizes the significance of the historical conditions of 
specific cases. In other words, examining the truth or falseness of the relationship 
between general property transfer of public space and social problems is almost 
impossible because specific private owners might have different strategies creating 
opposing business cases. In contrast, interpreting “why” and “how” is very significant for 
understanding the rationales of property transfer, the related changes in practice, and 
people’s perspectives, which are the foundation for pushing the boundaries of public 
space studies (Feagin, et al., 1991). As Yin (2009) notes, the qualitative case study is 
appropriate for exploring the contextual conditions under the superficial phenomena. 
Qualitative case studies analytically generalize theories rather than calculate frequencies. 
In other words, the contribution of a case study relies upon promoting the development of 
theories instead of describing the general situation of the whole population (Yin, 2009, 
p.15). By an in-depth understanding of the underlying logic of the phenomena in cases, 
this dissertation will lead to new knowledge to fill the current theoretical gap. Specially, 
this dissertation uses a single urban park as a case of public space. It examines the long 
term evolution of the space under the influence of property transfer rather than a one-time 
change. The findings of the dissertation are generalizable to theoretical propositions 
rather than to the populations of random sampling or universes. The main purpose is to 
fill the theoretical gap in current studies and develop a new framework to better 
understand the meaning of property to public space. 
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In addition, the case study in this dissertation is historical, rather than 
contemporary, because of the specific characteristics of the research subject, the property 
transfer of a public space. The gradual evolution of a public space usually occurs over a 
long time span. The process of a space’s planning, construction, maintenance, and 
redevelopment might take over ten years. During this process and time, the planning 
ideas, the use of the space, and social perception might be change. Therefore, exploring 
the spatial evolution merely by the contemporary documents and materials is not 
sufficient. More importantly, a historical case study is the study of the relationships 
among issues that have influenced the past and continue to influence the present (Berg, 
2009, p.297). The historical analysis is not simply the collection of facts, but more 
importantly a theoretical explanation, which still responds to the current theoretical 
thinking (Johnson & Christensen, 2007). By organizing and examining the historical 
documents, researchers can systematically recapture the complex nuances, meanings, and 
people’s ideas of the past that have influenced the historical trajectory ( McDowell, 2002; 
Ormrod & Leedy, 2005). This type of recapture is significant for a case study related to 
planning.          
Specifically, the case study in this dissertation has some specific characteristics: 
first, this dissertation considers a park’s history over decades as an integral case. During 
this period, any planning attempt had to consider the previous planning and the fait 
accompli. By unfolding the historical phenomena within the park through examining 
documents from multiple sources, this dissertation investigates these historical 
phenomena within its once “real-life” context. Second, the units of analysis are collective 
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groups, such as the police, downtown business owners, city officials, and so on, rather 
than the specific individuals. Third, the case study of this dissertation is interpretative. It 
focuses on interpreting the underlying logic of historical decisions in order to illuminate 
the meaning of public space ownership.  
In qualitative studies, coding is dynamic and should be adjusted repeatedly. 
Because this dissertation attempts to fill in the theoretical gap between property transfer 
and the related urban problems, the coding hierarchy is developed step by step following 
the logics of property transfer.  
First, as for the questions about ideologies, the analysis of this dissertation focuses 
on exploring the dimensions of property transfer by comparing the interpretation of 
private and public ownerships between neoliberalist and the opposing ideologies. The 
first cycle coding follows the method of “topic coding” (Saldaña, 2013, p.87-91), and 
focuses on the initial categories, such as “existing urban problems,” “the assumed causes 
of the problems,” “the assumed natures of private/public property that would solve the 
problems.” 
In this analytical section, this dissertation presents the foundational difference 
between neoliberalist and opposing ideologies that leads to opposing property transfer 
policies for the same problems. It will break through the oversimplified impression that 
privatization is always a natural reaction to certain problems, such as lack of public 
funding or governmental red tape. For the same urban problems, the interpretations of 
different ideologies can lead to opposing urban policies.  
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Further, this dissertation applies “causation coding” (Saldaña, 2013, p.163-174) to 
manifest the causation’s processes and structural accounts of rationalizing property 
transfer. This coding is appropriate for using qualitative analysis methods (Morrison, 
2009, p.99). Although this analysis focuses on the discourse about causation, it still 
explains “how,” rather than “why.” The main concern is the causation’s processes, rather 
than the empirical correctness of ideologies. The discourse of causation still has its logic, 
structure and follows a specific process. This coding process summarizes the “antecedent 
variables”, “mediating variables”, “outcomes” in the discourses, and finally develops the 
major categories for the logical deduction and the causation model of different ideologies. 
Second, as for the regulation practice, this dissertation explores the variables that 
are absent in current studies, but influence the policing and maintenance of redeveloped 
public space. The coding process focuses on the differences between theories and 
practices. The first cycle coding summarizes the contradictory assumptions related to 
policing and maintenance issues in property transfer of public space. These contradictory 
assumptions form the initial categories of coding. Because the property of Patriots Park 
has been transferred twice, the same space experienced blight and lacked regulation 
under both private and public ownership. Thus, this case can be studied in terms of the 
contradictory assumptions from both sides. By systematically examining the factors that 
drive the regulations departing from the plan, this dissertation further summarizes the 
initial variables that influence the relationship between property ownership and regulation. 
Then, this dissertation uses axial coding to conceptualize the new variables, which can 
explain the inconsistency of current theories. 
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Third, in terms of people’s perspectives and desires, this dissertation applies 
“domain and taxonomic coding” (Saldaña, 2013, p.157-163) and clarifies the concepts 
that people use to interpret their experiences or feelings. At each level, the categories of 
terms are domains, while taxonomies are hierarchical lists of different things that are 
classified together under a domain concept. Thus, the norms of public space are a 
comprehensive conceptual structure rather than a general feature, such as integration or 
accessibility. 
Data Source 
The data of this dissertation will be collected from four main sources:  
First, public records, including governmental documents, such as the minutes of 
public hearings and other related documents; because the development and 
redevelopment of Patriots Park were discussed by the Parks and Recreation Board of 
Phoenix, the minutes of the board meeting as well as the archival documents of public 
hearings are important sources for understanding the opinions toward property transfer, 
particularly understanding the planning ideologies for improving Patriots Park as a public 
space, although a prominent shortcoming of these public records is that all expressions 
are generally summarized. In most of the minutes, we can only know people’s concerns 
and attitudes without the details about how they rationalized their arguments. However, 
public records are still an important approach for widely understanding people’s concerns 
about the development and redevelopment of Patriots Park. 
Second, the essays from local mass media, such as Arizona Republic, Phoenix 
New Times and so on, as well as the comments and discussions online, such as the 
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discussion at the website Downtown Voice, and other related blogs and columns; 
compared to public records, essays from mass media contain more details, which usually 
include reasons, evidence, and analysis, rather than merely raise the concerns, or 
agreement or disagreement with the redevelopment plan. Therefore, mass media essays 
are deeper than public records. Through examining the rationales of the property transfer 
in redevelopment, this dissertation will examine the repeated contradictory arguments. 
The underlying logic of property transfer will emerge in the process of delving into the 
published arguments.    
Third, the second-hand interviews, speech transcripts and cited essays in the 
studies of Phoenix local history, such as Desert Visions and the Making of Phoenix, 
1860-2009 (VanderMeer, 2010); the studies of local history provide more clues than their 
topics. They are the scattered pieces of a big puzzle.      
Fourth, the transcripts of interviews and the public comments collected by 
interviewees, such as the staff of developers and the Arizona Preservation Foundation, 
the social activists, and the previous members of the Phoenix Park and Recreation Board; 
the interviews focus on providing more details of perspectives that are not included or 
discussed in the previous documents, particularly about the interpretations about the 
contradictory assumptions over property transfer in the case of Patriots Park. 
All of these data are in the form of text, which were organized in Nvivo 10.  
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CHAPTER 7 
PROLOGUE: THE DECLINE OF DOWNTOWN PHOENIX 
This chapter analyzes the historical threads before the construction of Patriots 
Park, introduces the historical background, and describes the reason why Patriots Park 
was proposed as a downtown revitalization project. 
To some extent, urban planning is a series of paradoxes: it seems to discuss the 
physical urban spaces, but it also describes an imagination of the intangible future. Urban 
planning usually covers a long-time span. The existing planning might represent the 
planning ideologies of the previous city leaders, but each term of mayors and city 
councils would still be able to reinterpret and implement planning. The planning project 
might be superficially stable, since the buildings and structures might last for a long time. 
However, the meaning of the space might be dynamic and frequently changed. In this 
vein, the analysis of any single planning issue is always associated with the broader 
situation of the city. The historical background of a city beyond the physical border of a 
focused parcel of land is necessary in the analysis of urban space.    
In everyday discussion of local history, because mayors and the city councils have 
a direct influence on the urban policies, classifying downtown revitalization policies 
depending on the terms of different mayors is a common organization pattern. However, 
with regard to urban planning, the line between a mayor’s own contribution and the 
political legacy of the previous mayors is usually blurred. We should not mechanically 
divide each city administration’s planning and policies from each other. Rather, we 
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should realize that an already planned space has been gradually reinterpreted and evolved 
through the everyday tiny changes. 
 The history of Patriots Park is such a planning case. This park was first opened 
in the period of Mayor Hance’s administration in 1976. This project has a hefty dose of 
the urban management policies of the Hance administration. However, oversimplifying 
the creation of Patriots Park as the result of Mayor Hance’s urban policy is to a large 
extent inaccurate. At least as early as in 1957, approximately 19 years before Mayor 
Hance’s term, the discussion and planning of block 77 (the location of the later Patriots 
Park) was publicly published (Lewis, 1957). Thus, to clarify the reason for building this 
downtown park, this review of Patriots Park’s history should go back to the days before 
the park’s grand opening. 
 Consistent with the histories of many other metropolises in the United States 
(Downtown), the city of Phoenix has also witnessed the decline of its downtown areas in 
its postwar days. Although scholars might have diverse interpretations of the reasons that 
led to the decline of downtown Phoenix, such as the relocation of the new shopping malls 
from downtown to midtown (Talton, 2015), the development of automobiles giving 
Phoenicians the mobility to live in the suburban areas (Russell, 1986, p.101-105), the 
“parking crisis” of downtown when more American families owned cars (VanderMeer, 
2010, p.270), and the defense-related industry in Arizona that promoted new economic 
cores (Ross, 2011), etc., there is nearly consensus about the decline of the downtown 
from 1955 to 1985.  
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In this period, downtown areas of Phoenix lost their role as the Central Business 
District (CBD): neighborhood shopping centers and their middle-class customers 
gradually moved to the suburbs. According to the Phoenix downtown study in 1962 made 
by the City of Phoenix planning commission, in 1948 retail sales in the downtown 
accounted for 52% of the total sales of the entire city. In 1954, the number declined to 
38%, and then to 28% in 1958 (City of Phoenix Planning Commission, 1962, p.5-19). In 
other words, the business values of the downtown areas almost shrank by half in merely 
five years, while the economy of the entire city was rising and Phoenix was becoming the 
leading city in the Southwest beyond El Paso (Luckingham, 1989, p.136). Then, the 
decline of retail and the lack of grocery stores further drove downtown residents to other 
areas, which is still an important reason that hinders the growth of the residential 
population in downtown Phoenix today.  
However, in contrast to accepting the urban sprawl and the decline of downtown 
areas as a natural phenomenon, the urban planners and leaders of Phoenix have always 
appreciated and emphasized the significance of downtown Phoenix. Abandoning 
downtown areas without any attempts at revitalization is, to a large extent, politically 
unacceptable in Phoenicians’ perceptions. While the city of Los Angeles has become a 
symbolic figure of the urban-sprawl-caused downtown decline, “we don’t want to be 
another Los Angeles” is a long-standing slogan in Phoenix. Thus, in the planning 
discourse of Phoenix, Los Angeles is not an image of paradise or the California dream, 
but rather an image of the urban problems that a responsible city government has to solve. 
Some typical examples of these discourses are, “do you want this to be another Detroit or 
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New York or, worse yet, another Los Angeles?” by Former Governor Howard Pyle 
serving from 1951 to 1955. “We don’t want to be another Los Angeles. Nobody wants 
that” said Jim Marsh, the former director of Arizona Department of Commerce; and 
“there are things that can be done to stop the Valley’s slide toward becoming another Los 
Angeles” announced The Republic (Artibise, et al., 2008, para. 10-13). Although the 
values of urban planning might be very diverse, it is clear to most Phoenicians that 
hollowing out downtown Phoenix through a Los-Angeles-style auto-centric urban sprawl 
is not legitimate. 
Since the downtown had declined and the model of the city form of Los Angeles 
was illegitimate in Phoenix, downtown revitalization is almost the only reasonable choice 
in city leaders’ policy inventory. However, the key question was how to do that.  
Back in the 1950s and 1960s, the national wide urban renewal movement greatly 
influenced the city officials’ perspectives of downtown revitalization. Physically 
demolishing the “skid rows,” and then replacing the blight structures with high-rise 
buildings was the dominant strategy, which was financially supported by the federal 
urban renewal program. The construction of the Civic Center was the prominent project 
among all renewal attempts. 
The planning purpose of the Civic Center was to a large extent associated with the 
“parking crisis” and the relocation of the Phoenix CBD. Because the original design of 
downtown streets was very pedestrian-oriented, when most Phoenix residents had cars, 
parking at downtown became extremely difficult, in particular compared with the suburbs 
where free parking was usually provided. At that time, only a few of the downtown 
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merchants had their own parking lots. Validated parking would annually cost $ 40,000, 
which was not affordable for most of the downtown stores. Downtown merchants 
believed that the downtown business environment should be upgraded by the government. 
Otherwise, the taxes on downtown merchants were disproportionately high, because retail 
merchants in suburban shopping malls could easily operate their businesses while their 
customers enjoyed free parking (Vanderneer, 2010, p.270). Therefore, merchants urged 
the city government to lobby for federal funding for creating a downtown attraction and 
adequate parking spaces for downtown businesses. 
On November 10th 1957, Leonard Goldman the chairman of the Phoenix Progress 
Committee declared that with federal help, a three-block Civic Center would be built in 
the downtown to spur downtown redevelopment. According to Goldman’s plan, the Civic 
Center was a comprehensive project with new government buildings, a park and 
underground parking facilities spread throughout the area between Central, Third Avenue, 
Washington and Jefferson (Lewis, 1957). After several revisions, in 1965 Mayor Milton 
Graham formally announced the final plans, which included a concert hall and a 
convention facility, and which was expected to increase tourism, attract more people to 
visit downtown Phoenix, and then benefit the surrounding retail businesses. With regard 
to the construction and maintenance costs, the voters approved a special sales tax to help 
fund this ambitious project. 
Theoretically, revitalizing the downtown areas through large governmental 
investments and the associated newly constructed parking and convention facilities was 
reasonable. As a Sunbelt city, Phoenix has its special advantage in tourism. The 
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convention facilities would attract more conferences, concerts, and tourists, whose 
spending would benefit and prosper the downtown economy. Then, the increasing tax 
base of the special sales tax would continually upgrade the quality of the Civic Center. It 
would create a sustainable and virtuous cycle. 
However, there is an important condition for the success of the Civic Center 
project: tourists had to be plentiful and not deterred by the nearby skid rows. Otherwise, 
if the investment could not attract sufficient visitors, the special sales taxes and the cost 
of the Civic Center would create a greater burdens on the local economy.  
Unfortunately, close to the Civic Center, block 77 was such an area of blight, part 
of the rundown “Deuce” neighborhood: there were pawnshop, bars, and flophouses; 
drunken men threw trash barrels into shops. A man who once lived in Luhrs Hotel with 
his family said his mother did not allow him to cross the street to Block 77. As he 
recalled, every morning policemen were present waiting for calls. There were 6 to 7 
police calls a day. Because the wine bottles held by drunken street people (the so-called 
“brown-baggers”) were easily turned into weapons, the police would immediately grip 
the street people’s wrists and take the wine bottles away from them. This type of contact 
created many conflicts in Block 77 (Anonymous interviewee #2, 2016 October 19). As 
Talton’s (2011) describes, 
“The Deuce was a place of lost souls: panhandlers, drunks, men passed out on 
sidewalks in recessed doorways after dark. People who fell between the cracks. It offered 
a panorama of quiet human misery for those staying in the old Hotel Adams and 
happened to have an east-facing room” (para. 11)                            
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In the eyes of city officials, the existence of the old Block 77 was a dangerous 
threat to the entire downtown revitalization. As early as the redevelopment plan in 1957, 
“rehabilitating” Townsite Block 77 was identified as the “key to development of the plan 
or for any other plan for downtown improvement” (Lewis, 1957, p.2). Although the 
federal government refused to subsidize the redevelopment of this block, because the 
estimated $ 1.5 million net cost of the project on such as small piece of land was not 
considered reasonable, Phoenix officials insisted that Block 77 had specifically 
experienced continuous and rapid deterioration. If this block was not cleared and 
redeveloped, the deterioration might spread and hasten the decline of other blocks in the 
downtown areas. 
Although Phoenix officials were determined to redevelop Block 77 for a long 
time, their early plans were not successful in determining how to redevelop the block. 
The city leaders focused more on the significance of demolishing the old buildings. 
However, how to use the space was not very clear. In the discourse of the plan in 1957, 
the future of Block 77 could be “developed for private use by private investors or 
retained for public” (Lewis, 1957, p.2). A parking lot, a new building, or a landscaped 
park would all be possible, yet the chairman of the Phoenix Progress Committee was 
anxious to clear out existing structures in Block 77. This demolition-oriented planning 
ideology assumes that once the dilapidated structures were removed, the city would 
naturally recover, similar to cutting off the necrotic tissues from a patient’s body. This 
planning ideology has brought great changes to downtown Phoenix, which will be 
analyzed in the next section. 
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The redevelopment of Block 77 into a park is subtle in the trajectory of its 
planning process. The 1957 plan did not focus on the specific use of the block. In 1966, 
the block was designed as a business district with high-rise offices and hotels (Arizona 
republic, 1966). On July 19th 1971, Arizona Republic (1971a, p.6) advocated changing 
the plan from a new nine-hole municipal golf course to a park, because a park would 
provide recreation for more convention delegates and residents than a golf course. This 
advocacy probably was the first publicly published article that suggested the construction 
of a new downtown park, rather than commercial facilities. The idea of building a public 
park on block 77 was promoted by Mayor John Driggs. On September 16th 1971, he 
suggested the construction of a park or square, “perhaps like San Francisco’s Union 
Square” to the Civic Plaza Business Association (Arizona Republic, 1971b, p.27). 
To some extent, Mayor Driggs’ proposal of a new downtown park aroused 
Phoenicians’ memories of the city’s past appearance in the 1870s to 1880s, when Phoenix 
was still a small town with a traditional town square at its center (Anonymous 
interviewee # 1, 2016 April 17). The town square was once an important place for public 
gathering and conducting “Wild West Justice” in early Phoenix (Talton, 2015, p.23). 
However, since 1870, the voices of some private interests had been louder and criticized 
that public squares as being “too valuable for governmental or recreational use, insisted 
on subdividing them for business blocks” (Luckingham, 1989, p.27). Then, in 1931, the 
land of the original town square was sold to a private developer for building the Fox 
Theater (cf. Anderson, et al., 2011, p.45). Based on this historical background, when 
Mayor Driggs suggested re-publicizing the “zero-zero point” and bringing back the town 
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square of the city, the proposal of the new public park attained the support of Phoenix 
people. 
On March 9th 1972, the Phoenix City Council approved the use of the Phoenix 
Civic Plaza special tax funds for building a new downtown square. According to City 
Manager John Wentz’s speech, development of an open space, such as San Francisco’s 
Union Square provides, and elimination of dilapidated structures in the vicinity of the 
convention center were two of the legal uses of the funds (Arizona Republic, 1972, p.7). 
Then, in January 1973, the city council voted to acquire the entire downtown city block 
77 and develop it into a park and as an underground parking garage. The condemnation 
of the block involved 10 property owners and 17 tenants. The Editorials in the Arizona 
Republic described the future park that “an open green space in the center of Phoenix, put 
to proper park uses, will be a marvelous asset for the city. It should rival Pershing Square 
in Los Angeles and Union Square in San Francisco” (Editorials, 1973, p.6; cf. Arizona 
Republic, 1973c). 
Sixteen years after the first proposal in 1957, the redevelopment of Block 77 
obtained its funds approval in 1973. But, the proposed cost of replacing an entire block 
by a new park was $ 5.5 million with $ 3 million paid by federal revenue sharing, rather 
than the $ 1.5 million as requested to the Federal Urban Renewal program in 1957 
(Arizona Republic, 1973a; Morin, 1976). In the July, 1975, the Phoenix City Council 
accepted the design of the park as well as the lowest bid of $145,719 from John W. 
Lathmore Contractor for construction of the new Block 77 Park (Arizona Republic, 1975). 
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Then, on April 6th 1976, the Block 77 Park was formally named Patriots by the City 
Council (Arizona Republic, 1976a). 
On April 25th 1976, approximately 10,000 Phoenix residents gathered in central 
downtown Phoenix to witness Mayor Margaret Hance’s announcement: 
“Today, the development of Patriots is symbolic of the continued interest in 
maintaining the ‘open space’ concept in the heart of the city, as well as in our outlying 
areas… In addition, this beautiful park is equally representative of the revitalization of 
our downtown area.” (Morin, 1976, p.A1)    
Literally, Mayor Hance’s announcement is correct. Patriots Park is equally 
representative of the revitalization of downtown Phoenix through its complexity, 
dynamic, and spatial contradictions. Its life and death are an important lesson for us to 
comprehensively understand the meaning of public space in the downtown revitalization. 
The grand opening of Patriots Park in 1976 was the beginning of a big story. In 
the next chapter, the planning ideology of the first Patriots Park will be analyzed. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE SPATIAL PUBLICIZATION IN URBAN RENEWAL 
 This chapter focuses on the production of the first Patriots Park, which lasted 
from 1976 to 1986. Based on Lefebvre’s framework, planning ideologies, spatial 
practices and social perceptions are the significant dimensions forunderstanding the 
meaning of public space ownership. This chapter examines the contradictions and 
interactions among these dimensions through the spatial evolution in the history of the 
park, as well as illuminates how these contradictions finally changed the space from a 
park to a camping place for homeless people; or in Lefebvre’s terminology, the process 
of “becoming.”   
During the planning period of the first Patriots Park, the blighted old town blocks 
were identified as the main reason for downtown’s decline. The poor people who lived in 
downtown Phoenix’s SRO hotels and flophouses as well as the private business that 
served poor people, such as cheap bars, pawnshops, blood-bank and so on, were 
considered the main threats to downtown revitalization. Therefore, in this period, 
demolishing old town blocks and reshaping downtown Phoenix into a modern form were 
significant concerns of the city officials and planners in large part due to the national 
Urban Renewal movement.  
The Urban Renewal program began in 1949 and proposed to help downtown areas 
of American cities to compete more effectively with suburban areas through “slum 
clearance.” Urban Renewal projects were usually a mixture of local and federal funds 
coupled with the power of eminent domain. By the end of the program, the “slum 
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clearance” movement had “demolished approximately 600,000 housing units, forcing 
perhaps 2 million people, most of them having low or moderate income, to relocate” as 
well as “forced the closure of thousands of small businesses, many of which never 
reopened” (Levy, 2000, p.180).  
 In fact, the 1957 plan of Block 77 redevelopment was part of a federal request 
for urban renewal funds. After many adjustments made to the plan, the federal fund was 
still an important source to support the construction of the first Patriots Park. Therefore, 
the redevelopment of Block 77 and the first Patriots Park plan had similar threads with 
the Urban Renewal projects in other American cities.  
“Le Corbusier was instrumental in shaping urban planning in post-World War II 
America. His ideas translated into urban renewal policies”(Hutter, 2007, p.119). City 
officials’ planning ideologies and their understanding of public ownership have some 
characteristics of the time. For example, the prevalent viewpoint of American city 
planners in the post-World War II period was that “the best way to save old communities, 
‘slum’ communities, was to destroy them and replace them through urban renewal 
projects” (Hutter, 2007, p. 114). The complete demolition of the whole “Deuce” 
neighborhood in downtown Phoenix was not an isolated case. The force that once 
demolished ethnic neighborhoods on the south side of Portland and the historical 
neighborhood Society Hill in Philadelphia also existed in the city of Phoenix (Hutter, 
2007, pp. 111, 114). The details of the planning ideologies associated with the first 
Patriots Park are discussed thoroughly in this chapter. 
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However, the downtown redevelopment of Phoenix was not totally the same as 
the cases in Portland or Philadelphia. The specific history and tradition of downtown 
Phoenix shaped people’s practice and perception related to the park, and then finally 
created an uncommon result different from most of the other Urban Renewal projects: the 
city government was not able to force poor people to move out of Block 77, although the 
historical buildings in the block were demolished. Street people continually camped in 
the park, the renewal project, changing it into a de facto shelter even under tough policing. 
This chapter describes how this process unfolded by illuminating how “tiny changes” 
promoted the evolution.  
Planning Ideologies: The Redevelopment Process as Bulldozer  
The word “redevelopment” usually has two dimensions: demolishing old 
structures and then constructing new buildings at the site. To a large extent, in current 
urban theories, the latter part of the meaning, the “construction,” outweighs the former 
part, “demolition.” The motivation of “construction” is usually assumed to be the cause 
of the “demolition”; because developers and city officials want to develop the land into a 
more profitable use than its status quo, they would thus like to pay the cost of clearing the 
old buildings. An “economically rational man” would demolish old structures, only when 
the benefits brought by the new buildings could cover the cost of the demolition. In this 
regard, the engine of redevelopment is the motivation of maximizing economic benefits. 
Based on this economic assumption, almost all current analyses of public space 
redevelopment focus on the different returns of investment through different land uses, 
regardless of the political stances of these theories. From a political leftist view such as 
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“Revanchist City” Theory (Smith, 1996) that criticizes the alienation of public space 
users through profit-oriented planning, to the political right view, such as Bid Rent 
Theory (Alonso, 1964) that considers redevelopment as a natural result of rent bidding, 
the land rent gap between the existing and future land uses is always the core of the 
redevelopment analyses. 
However, if we simply apply these theories to Phoenix’s downtown, we would 
find a prominent phenomenon that is hard to explain: vacant lots. If redevelopment is a 
pure economic decision or a result of rent bidding, downtown vacant land should never 
occur. No matter how low the profit rate of the previous land use was, the profitability of 
the previous use would be higher than a vacant lot that brought no profit at all. Although 
a particular developer might financially have insufficient funding to further develop a 
vacant lot, the rent gap would still encourage other developers to finish the 
redevelopment.  
In addition, the downtown of Phoenix was a CBD, which was fully developed 
historically. That is, the phenomenon of vacant lots was created by demolition, rather 
than original insufficient construction. At least so far (2017), Block 23 is still vacant. On 
this vacant block, the original building of the Fox Theater was demolished in 1975 as a 
part of the downtown redevelopment project, and the JC Penny’s building was 
demolished in 1992. As Talton (2015) summarizes the downtown redevelopment in the 
1970s, “further teardowns began in the capitol district, and the template was set: tear 
down old buildings in the core, even if it left vacant lots for decades” (p.108). The 
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“demolition” itself could also be the main purpose and course of redevelopment, rather 
than the result of construction motivation.    
To a large extent, the reason that current theories cannot explain the demolition 
without construction is because they oversimplify the planning ideologies of 
redevelopment, or as Harvey indicates, they intellectually fix the logic of redevelopment 
in a rigid economic model. However, the ideologies of downtown redevelopments are 
always normatively complex. Promoting economic development, of course, is a type of 
norm in redevelopment, but it is far from being the only force to promote a downtown 
redevelopment. In the case of the Patriots Park project and the associated spatial 
publicization, demolishing the old blocks was the main planning purpose. If we carefully 
examine the way that city officials and planners rationalized the significance of the 
redevelopment, we will find that the demolition itself, rather than the potential economic 
benefit, was actually the planning purpose of downtown redevelopment. This demolition-
oriented ideology has the following representations throughout the discourses of 
redevelopment planning: 
Blights demolition was decided first as the top priority. 
The prominent feature of the planning ideologies for the first Patriots Park is the 
demolition orientation. A typical feature of the demolition-oriented planning in Phoenix 
is that the decision to demolish a building was usually the primary decision for the 
redevelopment project. For example, according to a report requesting federal funding for 
Block 77 redevelopment, demolishing the existing structures in the block was the clearest 
part, while what would be built after the demolition was still open and indeterminate: 
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“the land could be developed for private use by private investors or retained for public 
use” (Lewis,1957, p.2). Underground parking, new buildings, or “beautifully landscaped 
park area” were all possibilities. With regard to the Phoenix Progress Committee, the 
particular land use and its returns on investment were not the most significant issues or 
motivation. Rather, clearing out the old buildings in Block 77 was the top priority, 
regardless of the land use afterward. The supposed reason was that if the city of Phoenix 
did not clear out the blighted buildings, the deterioration “may spread and hasten the 
decline of the blocks to the north, south, and east” (Lewis,1957, p.2). 
The underlying assumption of this discourse is that downtown blight is a self-
producing disease. The business, services, buildings and the “undesired” people in the 
space are organically associated with each other, and then form an entire community that 
spreads the blight and drive people away from downtown through a vicious cycle. From 
this perspective, the most important mission of a city government is cutting the vicious 
cycle by completely wiping out the blight in order to change the atmosphere in the 
previous skid rows areas. Then, no matter how the city uses the land, even leaving it 
vacant, the blight would no longer continue, because the root of the blight was removed. 
Otherwise, if the downtown redevelopment is performed as scattered site projects, “these 
islands of beauty and modernization are only isolated islands in an area of squalor and 
blight” (Arizona Republic, 1971a, p.6). In other words, the demolition itself is important 
and normatively sufficient, albeit a further efficient use would be better. For example, an 
Arizona Republic report of City Hall’s perspective on condition of anonymity is very 
typical: 
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“The big objective of the park, and we don’t publicly say this, is obviously to get 
rid of the pawn shop atmosphere” (Morin,1974, p.A1 ). 
Under the demolition-oriented planning ideology, cheap bars, cheap rooming 
houses, other related cheap services and facilities, and their low-income customers were 
the underlying causes of downtown blight. Thus, demolishing these facilities and “getting 
rid of the pawn shop atmosphere” were the most important, if not the only approach, to 
stop the downtown decline. If a demolition project did not stop the downturn, the 
approach was to demolish more. 
For example, in 1981, merely five years after Patriots Park’s grand opening, then 
Senator Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., announced he would move his office from the Federal 
Building to East Camelback because female staff members feared for their safety in the 
evening (Hrnicek, 1981).  
In the same year of Sen. Goldwater’s move, the editorials (1981) in the Arizona 
Republic criticized the new Patriots Park as a civic blight: 
“Public drunkenness is about all they can be accused of. For that, they’re run to a 
nearby alcohol rehabilitation center, from which they return to the streets—or to any of 
several charitable or commercial flophouses in the area. They subsist by selling blood at a 
nearby commercial blood-bank or panhandling” (p. A6) 
Or as the columnist writer Pat Murphy (1982) said, 
“Unless this proposal [of downtown revitalization] carries with it provisions to 
also relocate facilities that attract skid row characters, cheap bars, blood banks, and 
charity kitchens then the idea is naive. Derelicts will drift back downtown” (p. A6).  
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In this way, the feeling of insecurity related to the first Patriots Park became a 
significant force to promote demolition; not only in Block 77, but also in other downtown 
blocks wherever “flophouses,” “blood-bank,” “cheap bars” and other “facilities that 
attract skid row characters” existed. This planning idea insisted that Phoenix could 
revitalize its downtown only if the city government completely wiped out all these “Skid 
Row” facilities. 
Based on the demolition-oriented planning ideology, public ownership became a 
convenient power for the city government to start and promote the demolition. The 
eminent domain power perhaps is the only approach for completely demolishing the 
entire town block beyond a careful cost-benefit analysis. Publicization of the space, thus, 
was a part of the bulldozer machine.  
The influence of Le Corbusier’s theories. 
Another intellectual source of the 1970s planning ideology in Phoenix is derived 
from Le Corbusier’s theories of downtown redevelopment, which were significantly 
influential at that time. 
In a historical study, understanding the city officials and planners’ beliefs about 
what a good city should be at a given time is important. Oversimplifying planners and 
officials merely as passive representatives of the bourgeois or capital interests is not 
always fair, because the dominant planning ideology during the redevelopment period 
might be different from the later ideologies. At least to some planners of the first Patriots 
Park, the demolition-oriented planning was believed as the right approach to revitalize 
downtown Phoenix. As an anonymous interviewee recalled:  
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“The loss (demolishing Block 77) was catastrophic. But most people, and city 
planners, at the time weren’t thinking that way. They saw it as an eyesore and the future 
as some sterile Le Corbusier ‘brilliant city.’ All that was terribly misguided. It took away 
—and not just in this block—the wonderful, human-scale of downtown, replaced with 
arid superblocks.” (Anonymous Interviewee #3, 2017 January 10) 
In the 1970s, Le Corbusier’s planning theories, particularly his downtown 
redevelopment theories, were prevalent in the U.S. There is evidence that the original 
planning of the Patriots Park was influenced by Le Corbusier’s (1967) “Radiant City” 
theory. Generally, this theory has two significant perspectives toward downtown 
redevelopment: first, historical downtown areas were considered as a chaotic and 
congested space derived from unplanned growth in their history. Thus, downtown areas 
encumbered the city to adapt itself to the conditions of a new modern age. In this regard, 
a modern “Radiant City” should eliminate the historical areas and the pedestrian-oriented 
streets (Hutter, 2007, p. 105). Second, building high-rise buildings for most of the 
residents as well as leaving 95% of the land vacant is the second prominent feature in Le 
Corbusier’s “Voisin” plan for Paris 1922-1925 (Levy, 2000, p. 159). Le Corbusier 
believed that this design made a central city decongested with high density through its 
high skyscrapers and the huge surrounded open spaces. That is, Le Corbusier’s “tower in 
the park” model.  
Although Le Corbusier’s plan was never built in Paris, the 1970s redevelopment 
of downtown Phoenix to a large extent was influenced by this planning ideology:First, 
the historical and pedestrian-oriented town blocks and buildings were eliminated to 
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modernize the downtown Phoenix areas. Because the historical buildings were assumed 
to be merely old structures and eyesores, rather than precious city history, the 
preservation of historical buildings aroused limited interest with the city officials and 
planners. 
As Talton (2013) points out, Patriots Park could have been the bones of a Phoenix 
version of Denver’s Larimer Square; this square preserved the downtown history, rather 
than simply demolishing a block of historic buildings. He states: 
“Several valuable territorial-era structures were demolished to create the desolate, 
sunblasted Patriots (workers discovered an ‘underground city’ from frontier Phoenix that 
had housed opium dens and gambling parlors, protected from the heat in an era before air 
conditioning). These and others lost were precisely the kind of buildings rehabbed in 
downtown Denver into Larimer Square.” (Talton, 2013, para.4) 
Block 77 was the center of the city for a long time. There were Fire Station No. 1 
and dense commercial buildings from different eras and of various architectural styles. 
The famed Saratoga Cafe and Rialto Theater were here. However, because the planning 
ideology considered “old” as “bad,” the buildings were torn down indiscriminately, not 
only at Block 77, but also the adjacent downtown blocks.  
Luhrs’ Hotel was the first example. Since 1887, this hotel had been located on the 
northeast corner of Central Avenue and Jefferson Street. It was adjacent to Patriots Park 
and demolished in 1981 merely six years before its 100
th
 birthday. The oldest hotel in 
Arizona and oldest landmark in the original city of Phoenix was bulldozed under a 
similar planning ideology of the Patriots Park’s redevelopment. 
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On April 13th 1979, Michael Peloquin and Richard Thomas bought the hotel with 
the plan to preserve and operate it as a European style hotel. However, the City Building 
Department and the City Fire Department required many changes to be made (Luhr, 1988, 
p.158). Thus, Peloquin and Thomas found it impossible to go ahead with their original 
plans. They decided to tear down the historical hotel and pave “the way for a modern 
high-rise building,” as well as save the cost caused by the delay of the redevelopment 
(Reeson, 1980, p.C1). 
With regard to the demolition of Luhrs’ Hotel, the discourses of city officials 
clearly presented the perspective that “new” is “good and advanced,” while “old” is “bad.” 
The historical significance was not a key point in the redevelopment, as long as the old 
buildings could be replaced. 
The published speeches of city officials declined the requests for preservation in a 
relatively gracious tone. For example, Warner Leipprandt, the city’s deputy planning 
director, said “city officials are concerned about the loss of the historic site but probably 
will not act to prevent it” (Reeson, 1980, p.C1), while Councilman Ken O’Dell, the head 
of the council’s redevelopment committee, said he doubts that any action will be taken to 
block the high-rise construction, because “if there is a structurally unsafe building in the 
downtown area, historical or not, we will not move to save it” (Reeson, 1980, p.C1).  
A private letter presents the indifferent attitude toward preservation more directly: 
“On July 15th, 1980, George, Jr. wrote Margaret Hance, Mayor of Phoenix. 
‘Enclosed you will find a short history of the Commercial Hotel (Hotel Luhrs). The 
Phoenix Historic Building Survey states that the hotel is eligible for listing on the 
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National Register.’ Mayor Hance replied, ‘The City does not administer any historic 
preservation funds. Those federal funds are administered out of the State Historic 
Preservation office whose address is 1688 West Adams, Phoenix, Arizona, 85007. Thank 
you very much for your interest and dedication over the years to downtown Phoenix’” 
(Luhrs, 1988, p.159).      
Similarly, Fox Theater, another historic building built in 1931 adjacent to Patriots 
Park was also demolished for a bus station. Numerous historic buildings in downtown 
Phoenix met the same fate in the name of downtown redevelopment. While the planning 
ideology believed that “old” is “bad,” “blight elimination” would be a sufficient reason 
for demolition, regardless of the cost-benefit analysis of the future development. As 
Talton (2015) criticizes, Patriots Park was sunblasted and dehumanized (p.108); it is 
surrounded by wide streets and lacking any delightful magnets, while all territorial-era 
buildings were completely torn down. 
Second, “towers in the park” appeared in other downtown Phoenix areas. While 
the city officials attempted to replace the historic downtown structures with modern high-
rise buildings and office towers, they really emphasized to open up downtown areas with 
open space. As Mayor Hance said about the first Patriots Park:  
“One of our most important decisions of the year, in my estimation, was the 
acquisition of a key downtown, block Central to First Avenue, Washington to Jefferson, 
for a park. This block ties the Government Mall to the heart of downtown and the 
business district, and will provide a key ingredient in our urban situation, beauty, open 
space, room to breathe” (Hance, n.d, p.2). 
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Under this ideology, opening up the downtown areas and uniting the surrounding 
redevelopment projects were very prominent points in rationalizing the Patriots Park 
planning. For example, in 1973, City Manager John Wentz envisioned the park as the 
future “focal point” of the downtown and as the “anchor” for the entire Governmental 
Mall district (Arizona Republic, 1973a, p.B1). The report of City Hall’s perspectives also 
held a similar planning ideology of “Radiant City”: “we need outdoor space to open up 
the downtown area. In the process we are eliminating a whole city block of blight” 
(Morin, 1974, p.A1). 
By and large, although the urban problems associated with modernized and 
dehumanized urban redevelopment have now been intensively criticized, demolishing the 
old blocks by constructing office towers and open space was once a prevalent strategy for 
downtown revitalization. In the 1960s and 1970s, the overcrowding and blighted skid 
rows dominated downtown blocks for a long time. The urban planners were anxious to 
upgrade the quality of life downtown by fast-developing modern technologies. For some 
cities adapting Le Corbusier’s planning ideology was a response to this anxiety.  
However, Phoenix planners in the 1970s did not completely follow everything 
from Le Corbusier’s plans. The “towers in the park” design downtown Phoenix had  
specific themes associated with the Urban Renewal movement. In terms of Patriots Park, 
the increasing ideas that promoted social exclusion are a typical example.   
Theoretically, Le Corbusier’s planning encourages social integration, rather than 
segregation. Integration was an important reason for him to promote public property 
ownership and public open space. Le Corbusier believes that “the overall social welfare 
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of society is enhanced if individuals see themselves as part of a larger group” (Levy, 
2000, p.158). However, as Mumford criticizes, a park, vacant space or its public 
ownership cannot automatically promote social integration. If the design of a park 
ignores the variety of human needs and the complexities of human associations, this park 
would intensify exclusion through the spatial segregation of its open space, because it 
cannot produce a community that takes advantage of the space and forms social 
integration (Hutter, 2007, p.106-107).  
Unfortunately, Patriots Park fell into the problems criticized by Mumford after 
physically destroying the previous Deuce neighborhood. The demolition and 
publicization of Patriots Park project also bred the social exclusion perspectives. 
The redevelopment of Block 77 tore down many of the Single-room Occupancy 
Hotels (SRO) that provided cheap residential options for the poorest people in the city. 
However, the redeveloped skyscrapers were not the public houses Le Corbusier expected. 
Then, the poor people who lost their previous residential place overflowed into the 
downtown parks and vacant lands, since these places theoretically welcomed everyone 
(Editorials, 1981, p.A6). Then, the model of “the tower in the park” became towers in the 
“tent city.”  
Therefore, a new problem was in the face of the urban planners: the attraction and 
the public ownership of the space did not help people in the space integrate or identify 
themselves into the same group. Rather, as Mumford (1975) criticizes, the abrupt 
construction of public open space without understanding the complexity of society not 
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only cannot socially integrate different groups of people but rather intensifies the tension 
between working and homeless people.  
In 1982, then Maj. Bennie Click of the Police department suggested closing 
Patriots to address the problem of transients, since the park staff had to clean the park two 
or three times a day and the “transients are running a lot of legitimate users out” (Manson, 
1982, p. B1).  
Under this pressure, James Colley, then parks director of the Phoenix Parks and 
Recreation Board, suggested building a suburban “Hobo” park for homeless people, so 
that the city could separate homeless people and working people into different parks 
(Manson, 1982, p. B1). The “separate but equal” idea appeared in the planning of a 
public space. A publicly owned open space might also foster the thinking of segregation 
and exclusion, albeit the space is under public ownership. 
The self-identification of city government. 
Urban planning is a governmental activity. The ideology of planning in the 1970s 
was thus directly associated with the self-identification of the then city government. The 
understanding of the redevelopment logic and the responsibility of a city government 
deeply influences the planning ideology of downtown revitalization. In other words, the 
attitude of the city government of Phoenix contributed to the specific form of planning 
ideology. 
The current theories of public space redevelopment usually consider all the 
political, economic institutions and governments as a monolithic system, which is 
promoted or controlled by the general economic rationality and the logic of capitalist 
97 
 
development. However, a city government might have a self-identity related to its 
responsibility and specific normative understanding with the logic of urban renewal. The 
specific stance of local government is another important aspect of planning ideology that 
promotes demolition. Levy (2000) insightfully describes how the planning ideologies of 
local government overwhelm the purposes of federal policy: 
“If rundown housing occupied by lower-income households was demolished and 
replaced with commercial development, the municipality solved both a housing and a tax 
base problem. The population that lived in the housing to be demolished would not 
vanish from the face of the earth. But, if that population settled in adjacent communities 
after being dehoused by ‘the federal bulldozer,’ it became someone else’s problem. From 
the local perspective, that solved the problem… Clearly, what constitutes a problem and 
what constitutes a solution vary, depending on whom one considers to be one’s 
constituency” (p. 167). 
In this regard, the redevelopment project would gradually deviate from its original 
design and purpose into a shape that the local government could see its responsibility and 
benefit. In other words, a city government is not an automatic machine. Before any 
redevelopment action of a city government, this government should believe the action is 
right and should be done by itself. The normative decision and planning ideology not 
only influence the planning in its design process but also the specific implementation. 
The redevelopment of Patriots Park had a similar trajectory with the urban 
renewal case described by Levy. By and large, the city government in the 1970s believed 
that bulldozing the old town through eminent domain power was the government’s 
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responsibility, but after that, the redevelopment should be finished by the private or social 
sectors. In short, the economic revitalization of the downtown, or the “construction,” was 
not the city government’s responsibility. This planning ideology also greatly shaped the 
redevelopment into a bulldozer. Specifically, there were two underlying assumptions that 
supported this ideology. 
First, economic self-recovery was a prominent belief. The most important 
underlying assumption of the city government in the 1970s was that the real estate market 
has the capability of self-recovery, while a government should play a limited passive role 
in the recovery process. The blighted buildings in downtown were considered “diseased 
tissues.” Any individual private developer would not be able to excise “diseased tissues” 
in such large areas. However, if the city surgically removed these buildings through the 
use of eminent domain power, the private real estate market would recover by itself and 
reach the supposed equilibrium level of the land rent, as a patient’s body would do. 
Generally, the basic argument of this belief is that downtown Phoenix was a 
developed area with sufficient urban infrastructure. The only disadvantageous condition 
was the existence of the old buildings and the cost for clearing the space. Since the 
population of Phoenix grew significantly in the post-war periods, the demand in the real 
estate market would attract private developers to the downtown and revitalize the space. 
For example, in 1979, a study held by the Central Phoenix Business and Professional 
Association noted that:  
“Downtown Phoenix, with pavements, sewers, sidewalks and other utilities 
already provided, is an excellent place to accommodate the city’s mushrooming 
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population. It will be increasingly attractive for living as the steadily rising price of 
gasoline makes the suburban living overly expensive. Growth in Phoenix is inevitable. To 
channel it downtown makes a lot of sense” (Editorials, 1979, p.A5). 
In addition, downtown revitalization was defined as bringing more business to the 
market of downtown areas (Arizona Republic, 1973b). A city government could provide 
the initial help, such as offering governmental subsidies or even condemning the existing 
private real estates for the development with higher business values. For example, to 
build a 14-story office building to attract more business and working people to the 
downtown, the Central City Redevelopment Agency suggested to the City Council that it 
should condemn private properties for developers, because developers could not reach an 
agreement with the previous property owners at the place, albeit this condemnation plan 
was eventually rejected by the City Council (Turco, 1982b) 
 Second, a city government’s job was identified as expelling undesirable people, 
rather than relocating them. As in Levy’s (2000) aforementioned description, 
demolishing old housings and then expelling poor people from the downtown areas was a 
common phenomenon in the urban renewal periods. However, we should also realize that 
the rationales of this activity were more than “let it become others’ problem,” but also 
about the worry that once a local government distributes social welfare, the poor people 
from other places would rush into the city and damage the health of local public finance. 
Regarding whether Phoenix should help poor people who lost their affordable houses in 
redevelopment, the argument of then Mayor Murphy of the City of Tucson was a typical 
case of the above perspective:  
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“The city wants to ‘do nothing to create circumstances under which we would be 
construed as a magnet community and one which welcomes the professional transient 
who is participating in criminal activities’” (Hall, 1983, p. C2).    
In terms of planning ideology, worry about the potential burden to the city 
significantly shaped the public policy that focused on expelling poor people and 
demolition, rather than helping people settle. People who held this planning ideology 
believed that compared to spending public funding on social welfare and a complex 
relocation project, simply demolishing all amenities that support homeless people’s 
everyday lives would be the cheapest way to revitalize the city. Otherwise, homeless 
people would continually congregate around these amenities, because “certainly no one 
puts out feed for the birds every day and then wonders why so many birds hang around 
his place” (Baird & Plamondon, 1981, p.A6).     
In this regard, “spending less” means “good.” A city government should be 
responsible to the public budget. Demolition is the most economical way to solve the 
“public nuisance,” compared to a complex relocation project. Thus, a responsible 
government should not waste precious public funding to complicate the redevelopment, 
albeit the critics (e.g. Terry Goddard, the latter Mayor of Phoenix) would note that the 
excessive policing might cost more public funding than helping homeless people, because 
“cops are very expensive social workers” (Hall, 1983, p.C2). 
This section summarizes the complexity of planning ideologies in terms of public 
space redevelopment, particularly regarding how the city rationalized the publicization of 
the space and why demolition, rather than construction, became the most prominent 
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element. A city government is not an unconscious tool of the general capitalist machine 
to adjust the land price to the equilibrium level. In contrast, the policy of public space 
redevelopment was derived from the legitimization of comprehensive ideologies.  
As this section summarizes, there were generally three sources of planning 
ideologies that contributed to the demolition-oriented planning related to the first Patriots 
Park and the associated demolition: first, getting rid of “skid row” facilities was once the 
most important concern, because the city officials believed that expelling poor people and 
removing the “pawnshop atmosphere” could be finished by complete demolition. Second, 
the influence of Le Corbusier’s planning theory intensified the idea that replacing historic 
town blocks by office towers and open space was a necessary approach of modernization. 
Thus, those “historic” but “not blighted” buildings had also been indiscriminately 
demolished during this period. Third, the prevalent belief of the responsibility and 
appropriate role of a city government was also relevant to the planning decision. While a 
city government identifies its main responsibility as expelling, rather than helping 
homeless people, the self-identification of government also promoted the demolition. The 
idea of the then mayor of Tucson that a city should “do nothing” to help homeless people 
was once prevalent in Arizona (Hall, 1983, p. C2). Expelling poor people from 
downtown, condemning real estate properties to provide cheaper lands, and waiting for 
economic self-recovery were assumed to be city government’s responsibilities in 
downtown revitalization of Phoenix. The condemnation and the attempt to poor people 
supported the property publicization and demolition in downtown Phoenix.  
102 
 
Patriots Park was merely a portion of the downtown Phoenix redevelopment plan. 
Such a public project was convenient for the city government to use eminent domain 
power and completely demolish all downtown blighted and “old” structures as well as 
expel the poor people who lived in the block. In addition, city officials believed that a 
park would be a good facility to open up downtown areas.     
Literally, ideology means normative identification. The city government had to 
legitimize that the demolition of the block and the construction of a public space was 
beneficial to the city before they implemented the policy. In this process, a public space 
could have complex meanings. It could play the role of a convenient reason for triggering 
condemnation to demolishing the old private structures, a way to exclude “undesirable” 
people, or an economical way to stop the vicious cycle and help the local economy 
recover. In this regard, Patriots Park was far more complex than a simple open space for 
public gathering. It carried the specific expectation of the city government from its 
inception, albeit the practice within the space and people’s perception further shaped the 
evolution of this park’s meaning, which will be analyzed in the following sections. 
The Spatial Practice: The Mirage of “Tough Policing”  
This section examines the spatial practice after the first Patriots Park was built 
under the aforementioned planning ideologies. From any sense, street people are the core 
issue of the spatial practice in Patriots Park. In 1971, when Mayor John Driggs suggested 
the construction of a downtown park, he gave the public an enthusiastic speech about the 
future of the park and downtown Phoenix :  
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“This is something that would greatly enhance downtown. This would make 
downtown a more pleasing place for people to visit. We no longer need to fear about the 
future of downtown. We don’t need to make any more apologies. We’re going to see 
continued activity here at a sustained pace”( Arizona Republic, 1971b, p.27).  
However, diametrically opposed to the Mayor’s perspective, the police stated the 
park would “become heaven for drunks and muggers” during the early planning process, 
yet city planners “say it (the park) is necessary” (Morin, 1974, p.A1). The later 
development trajectory of the park, to some extent, proved the police’s worry: in 1979 
merely three years after the park’s opening, the park had been called “bums’ heaven” by 
the surrounding merchants, because this park “has done nothing but attract undesirables” 
(Harris, 1979, p.A1).  
Then in 1980, a reader’s letter to Arizona Republic complained that “how can 
Phoenix be an All-American City when there were winos sleeping under nearly all the 
trees at Patriots Park (Muskatel Meadows), when Mrs. Carter gave a campaign speech 
several weeks ago” (Woodward, 1980, p.A7). Although a columnist defended that “great 
winos make for a great city” (Kelly, 1980, p.F1), the gathering of street people in the park 
was a phenomenon not to be ignored. Phoenix police even had to arrive early to 
“persuade derelicts who use the park to move on for the day,” so that Mayor Hance and 
residents could celebrate Phoenix’s 100th birthday within Patriots Park (Collier, 1981, 
p.B9).          
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In 1981, the fifth year of the new park, the editorials in Arizona Republic called 
the park, which was the representative of the downtown revitalization by eliminating a 
whole block, a “civic blight” (Editorials, 1981).  
Even the newspapers from other states reported on the gathering of street people 
in Patriots Park. For example, in the Pittsburgh Press, Patriots Park was once described 
“as a gathering place for ‘transients’—hobos and other rootless people” (Bein, 1983). 
More importantly, as time went on, the problem of transients was becoming worse 
in the park. James Colley, then Parks Director, said they were cleaning Patriots Park two 
or three times a day (Manson, 1982).  
At the time, in 1982, the columnist Pat Murphy asked a question: “we didn’t 
tolerate prostitutes why tolerate bums”. He criticized that, 
“They have taken over Patriot’s Square just a block east of City Hall… The 
humiliation and risks to well-behaved users of Patriot’s Square from the new habitues are 
so intense that the city has ordered the park closed by dusk. So, the public gives up more 
ground to the derelicts” (1982, p.A6). 
He posited that since the police of Phoenix could drive prostitutes away from the 
city simply by getting tough and “making their habitat uncomfortable and unprofitable”, 
why could the police not also use the same tactics to decrease the population of homeless 
people in Patriots Park.  
By and large, Mr. Murphy’s comparison between prostitutes and homeless people 
is inappropriate: prostitution is a crime, but not having enough money to rent a room is 
not. However, his argument presents a common belief that tough policing would reduce 
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the population of homeless people in public spaces, albeit the lesson of Patriots Park told 
us that toughness did not always help, because of the particular logic of homeless people 
gathering in Patriots Park.  
This section will review the evolution of the spatial practice of homeless people 
and police. Perhaps, the origin of the transient problem in Patriots Park did have a 
relationship with prostitutes in Phoenix’s history. Without understanding the evolution of 
this space, we cannot understand the logic of practice in Patriots Park. 
The Gathering of Homeless People in Downtown. 
In the perspectives of the city officials and residents who focus on the formal 
urban planning, the interpretation of the causes of homeless people in Patriots Park 
usually concentrates on the destruction of the Deuce neighborhood and Single-Room 
Occupancy (SRO) hotels, deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, and the change of the 
anti-vagrancy laws.  
To a large extent, these policies are significant causes of the rise of the homeless 
population, because these policies moved people from SROs, hotels, and jails to the 
streets. However, this interpretation has a shortcoming that can be easily overlooked: it 
does not include the geography and spatial factor in its consideration, apart from the 
general background of public policies. Although these policy changes were significant 
causes of street people, why these people would stay in the downtown area rather than 
elsewhere has not yet been answered. 
Without clarifying the spatial specialty, we run the risk of oversimplifying the 
problem into a general law enforcement issue and believing that the revision of public 
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policies would automatically solve the problem, since the problem was derived from the 
policy changes. That is, one of the origins of the belief that once police get tough, the 
homeless people would leave.  
However, the emphasis of vagrancy laws, demolition, and tough police in the 
discussion of homeless people is to some extent nostalgic thinking, rather than a fact: 
simply putting “undesired people” in jail did not always decrease the population of street 
people, even in the so-called “good old days”.  
For example, Benny Begay, who was interviewed at the opening day of Patriots 
Park, “had been arrested more than 400 times for drunkenness” before the change of 
vagrancy laws in 1973 (Arizona Republic, 1976b, p.B1). However, he still came back to 
downtown, and thus was interviewed as a representative of transients who lived around 
block 77 (Morin,1976).  
If more than 400 arrests could not stop a man from moving back to the downtown 
area, the belief that tough policing and the old vagrancy laws would simply reduce the 
homeless population in the future is logically doubtful.  
In addition, another important clue from the case of Benny Begay is that homeless 
people lived around block 77 before the construction of Patriots Park. In other words, the 
homeless problem was not created by the construction of Patriots Park. In contrast, 
Patriots Park itself was an attempt to expel the existing homeless people in the old town 
block through complete demolition, albeit this attempt was not very successful. Therefore, 
to understand why the police could not reduce the homeless population in Patriots Park, 
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we should examine the early history of the block before the construction of Patriots Park 
and homeless people’s everyday lives here.  
The spatial evolution before the construction of Patriots Park. 
Why did Phoenix downtown have so many SRO hotels? To answer this question, 
we should examine the city development in World War II. As Bernstein’s (1972) study 
reviewed, because Arizona has a natural landscape for military training, during World 
War II, a large number of servicemen were stationed in the valley. Good or bad, along 
with the rise of the serviceman population, the so-called “hustlers” and “street walkers” 
started to gather in Phoenix’s downtown and created an “open proposition” industry there. 
During this period, hotels had mushroomed all over the area and reached their peak in the 
early 1950s. For example, in 1949, the American Social Hygiene Association indicated 
15 hotels as “houses of prostitution” by a survey (Arizona Republic, 1949), albeit 
prostitution was much more prevalent than merely 15 hotels at the downtown center. 
According to Bernstein’s (1972) interviews and field research, there were 6 hotels, which 
at one time offered prostitution services in the area, still in operation in 1972:  
“Brothels in the study area were apparently very well maintained while they were 
in operation… the buildings always had a nice appearance, as they were freshly painted 
on the outside and always kept clean on the inside. Most of the former brothels had 
cleaning help as well as kitchen help, and generally speaking, the only thing which 
differentiated them from some of the more prominent hotels of Phoenix was the presence 
of prostitution” (p. 69). 
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However, prostitution is a crime that would create more crimes, such as drug 
abuse and sheltering criminals. The crimes related to prostitution aroused the anger of 
Phoenicians. Since 1949, a vigorous campaign was conducted to eliminate “open 
prostitution.” The city council also ordered the police to crack down on the illegal 
operations in the hotels and rooming houses (Bernstein, 1972, p.64). Then as Murphy 
(1982) recalled,  
“The combined use of undercover policewomen posing as prostitutes, aggressive 
arrest policies and a no-nonsense law enacted by the Phoenix city council literally chased 
prostitution off East Van Buren, restoring the street to a semblance of decency and order” 
(p.A6). 
However, in the 1950s, the loss of the servicemen after the war and the campaign 
for cracking down on “open prostitution” created a void for the hotels in the small 
downtown areas. Therefore, these hotels were forced to lower their rates and served 
anyone who would like to live there. Degrading the quality of hotels seemed to be the 
only option for most of the hotel owners at that time. For example, Mr. White, the owner 
of the White Hotel, was once very selective of his tenants before, such as requiring a 
steady employment for a prolonged rent, but even Mr. White lost his interest in the hotel 
business and had to downgrade the hotel into a second-class establishment because of its 
not being competitive. As a result, the transients and other poor people gradually 
gathered downtown, since no other areas in the city provided living options at lower 
prices. 
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More importantly, in contrast to the urban planners’ assumption that several 
particular facilities, such as pawnshops, attracted homeless people to the downtown area, 
homeless people to a large extent gathered in downtown areas because of the specific 
history of downtown Phoenix: downtown was a traditional place for part-time 
employment and social relief. A part time employment agency that served the homeless 
people was located on Second Street, which usually provided jobs that paid $ 1.60 per 
hour in 1972 while the legal minimum wage was $ 2.50. The Salvation Army Mission 
and the anti-poverty agency of Phoenix, LEAP, which was funded by the federal Office 
of Economic Opportunity, were both located in the downtown areas (Bernstein, 1972, 
p.50-51). In this regard, the downtown was also the long-term location of homeless 
people’s community, in addition to other residents. 
The homeless people’s gathering after the demolition-oriented renewal.   
Although the city of Phoenix attempted to get rid of the neighborhood of poor 
people in its downtown, the facilities of social relief were really hard to demolish or 
move. On the one hand, in terms of the city government, it was almost impossible to 
forbid the social relief and welfare provided by charity or federal programs. On the other 
hand, the local residents did not like these facilities. For example, a local resident said it 
directly: “I by no means hate these (homeless) people, but the residents here would like to 
blow that dining hall to the moon” (Morin, 1974, p.A12). 
A particular case about how difficult building a new shelter outside the downtown 
was the proposal for purchasing 4 acres at the site of 16
th
 Avenue and Lincoln Street for a 
shelter in 1983. Although Mayor Hance openly criticized that “Phoenix has a national 
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reputation for our lack of concern for the homeless and dragging our feet … I think we’ve 
earned it” (Tomaso, 1983, p.B1), the Phoenix City Council still hardly authorized the 
new shelter construction, due to the strong protest from legislators and city council 
members who represented the area (Murphy, 1983b). Because of the negative externality, 
new shelter buildings are always difficult no matter where they are located. As Episcopal 
Bishop Joseph Heistand, whose Coordinating Committee for the Homeless urged the 
council to build the new shelter, said “There is no ideal site. I hope the City council has 
the courage to bite the bullet so we can move on” (Schultze, 1983a, p.B1). However, with 
regard to city council members, “biting the bullet” is not something reasonable to do. 
In this regard, the cumulative outcome of a series of policies was a very special 
phenomenon: the city could completely demolish all the buildings in the vicinity of 
several blocks. It could also limit the charity and relief services, suggesting the 
insufficient welfare would squeeze homeless people out. However, homeless people still 
gathered in the downtown areas, although they sometimes had to trespass in closed 
facilities. In addition, donations and help for homeless people continually came into the 
downtown areas because these were the only well-known places that people believed 
could help homeless people.  
Therefore, the demolition-oriented planning ideology faced its direct 
contradiction in the practice of homeless people: although the city could tear down 
anything for blocks, homeless people still trespassed and camped in vacant lots with 
nothing on them. For example, at Ninth Avenue and Madison, there were at one time 300 
street people camping in the vacant lots. The property owner, the Salvation Army 
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Mission, did not actually welcome so many people, but they had no way to decrease the 
gathering: “we have no choice—they’re trespassers. If the city has a plan we’ll assent to 
that plan—but it must have a plan” (Zipser, 1983, para.16). 
One homeless person, who identified himself as “a trespasser at Ninth and 
Madison,” more directly presented the contradiction between planning and homeless 
people’s real practice: 
“I don’t understand how the media can be telling everyone to bring their 
donations to the Salvation Army and the St. Vincent de Paul Society when the Salvation 
Army doesn’t want us on its property because it’s worried about its ‘liability’” (Zipser, 
1983, para.23). 
Andy Zipser, the journalist of New Times, sarcastically summarized the failure of 
demolition-oriented planning in relocating homeless: 
“In the beginning someone created library Park and Patriot Square; and they begat 
the seventh avenue overpass and fort swampy; and then the City of Phoenix begat … the 
corral. Maybe” (Zipser, 1983, para.1). 
Apart from his satiric tone, the “corral” he referred to was not a joke, but a formal 
serious plan for relocating homeless people in a remote farm relatively far from 
downtown Phoenix. The city planned to build “a work farm for drunks” by using the land 
near Sky Harbor airport. The city hoped to remove all the drunkards from downtown 
Phoenix. The planners and city officials hoped that the drunkards could live there, work 
there, drink there, but hopefully not return to downtown Phoenix. Both the city council 
and Federal Aviation Administration approved this plan, although it again lacked enough 
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funding to implement the original plan and faced serious protest from the officials and 
residents of nearby communities (Schultze, 1983b; Sallen, 1983).  
In essence, the failure of the demolition-oriented planning in solving the problem 
of homeless people was derived from two misunderstandings: first, making the place 
uncomfortable to homeless people, such as demolishing all they needed so that they 
would leave; second, mandatorily sending them somewhere other than downtown, so 
they would have to relocate. In almost all downtown revitalization policies in the 1970s 
to the early 1980s, we can easily find the shadow of these misunderstandings, no matter 
whether in the planning of a public park, new shelters, homeless parks, or a remote work 
farm.    
While Mr. Murphy wondered why the police could not make homeless people’s 
habitat uncomfortable and unprofitable, he misunderstood the logic of homeless people’s 
practice in the downtown: 
First, police were not able to make homeless people’s life much worse. The 
reason that homeless people gathered in downtown Phoenix was not because living there 
was comfortable. In contrast, homeless people gathered in the downtown because the 
living condition there was the worst, that is the cheapest, in the Phoenix area. Therefore, 
unless the City of Phoenix could make the living conditions of the surrounding business 
districts worse than downtown Phoenix (of course, that is ridiculous), relocating from 
downtown Phoenix would not be an alternative for many homeless people.  
As a newly developed city that experienced rapid growth, the appearance of skid 
rows in the City of Phoenix had a relatively short history (since the 1950s) compared to 
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other huge metropolises. Since the city was generally newly developed, there were not 
many other skid rows outside the downtown for homeless people to relocate to. Therefore, 
after the City of Phoenix bulldozed the old blocks, homeless people would not become 
“someone else’s problem”, as the trajectory of other metropolises’ urban renewal. The 
homeless people had to stay in downtown Phoenix because they relied upon the 
uncomfortable lives in these old blocks.  
More importantly, the emphasis of tough policing and vagrancy laws has a basic 
implication that the threat of imprisonment would deter homeless people from staying in 
downtown areas. However, those who believe this implication forget that the City Jail 
was once an important shelter for homeless people in downtown Phoenix, before the 
court stopped sending street people to Phoenix Jail.    
“Commonly known as ‘Hi-Fi’ on skid row, the top floor of the Phoenix City Jail 
is usually reserved for vagrants and drunks. Some skid row residents will actually attempt 
to get arrested since the jail may be the only source of food and shelter available to them. 
It has been rumored that are men who will spend their entire monthly welfare check in 
just two weeks, planning the jail for food and shelter until the next check arrives” 
(Bernstein, 1972, p.54). 
While street people were having lives worse than prisoners in jail, arresting and 
imprisoning became a special type of social relief. In this circumstance, even the toughest 
policing could not make street people’s lives even worse or more uncomfortable. That is 
why a person who had been arrested over 400 times would continue to live around 
Patriots Park. 
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Second, police were not able to make Phoenix downtown unprofitable to 
homeless people. In contrast to prostitution, it is not a crime for the employers coming to 
the downtown gathering place of homeless people to search for cheap laborers. These job 
offers were usually the service type, such as yard work, menial filed labor, dishwashing, 
and other maintenance jobs (Bernstein, 1972, p.52). In this process, the labor contractors 
knew that they could gather enough very cheap laborers easily, while the homeless 
people knew that downtown Phoenix was the place to find some temporary working 
positions. That also reinforced downtown Phoenix’s traditional role while the city 
attempted to run homeless people off the downtown, other newly developed high-class 
business districts did not have this tradition of job markets for cheap labor. For example, 
John, a Hopi transient from northern Arizona, who lived in Patriots Park in 1983, said:   
“The downtown area is where we look for work. If they (social service agencies 
and shelters) moved, I would never use it. I would be here”(Flannery, 1983, p.B2). 
The survey report of Phoenix South Community Mental Health Center (1983, 
June), The Homeless of Phoenix: Who are They and What Should be Done, provided a 
more quantitative examination, which to a large extent verified John’s words. According 
to this survey, only 26% of single adult homeless people were receiving any type of 
public assistance or food stamps; to the older, over sixty age sample, the proportion of 
those receiving public assistance was only 13%, including combination. Correspondingly, 
the proportion of the economic support through regular, part-time and occasional jobs 
was 39% for single adults, while 11% lived by donating blood or collecting cans (p. 44, 
45). In contrast to the stereotypes that homeless people gathered downtown merely 
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because of the public assistance and welfare, the traditional cheap labor market in 
downtown Phoenix was significant for the homeless people.     
In this vein, although the old block 77 was torn down and the new Patriots Park 
was built, the traditional gathering place of homeless people for work did not change. The 
homeless people who wanted to earn dollars still gathered in the new downtown park, 
since it was a public space where they could stay and was close enough to the potential 
job opportunities (Flannery, 1983). 
The redevelopment planning that expelled homeless people through tearing down 
pawnshops in block 77 was ineffective, because it misinterpreted the logic of homeless 
people’s practices. Moreover, according to Bernstein’s field research, homeless people in 
downtown Phoenix rarely frequented pawnshops. They most likely frequented the used 
clothing stores to trade for cash, rather than pawnshops (Bernstein, 1972, p.49). 
The practice of homeless people reshaped the meaning of the park. 
Although the design of Patriots Park was a new attraction of downtown Phoenix, 
the gathering of homeless people used it as a shelter, rather than a park. The spatial 
practice of homeless people gradually reshaped the meaning of this space. 
The designed purpose of the park was to attract people to rest and recreate as well 
as honor the Patriots of Arizona through granite plaques in the walks, which were 
inscribed with names of Arizonian patriots. Its original design won the Environmental 
Beautification Awards in 1976 (Arizona Republic, 1976c, pp.K9, K10) with its 120 trees, 
several small grassy knolls, and a modern designed fountain at its center surrounded by 
flowerbeds (Arizona Republic, 1976d, p.1).  
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As Talton (2015, p.108) criticizes, Patriots Park, lacking any delightful magnets, 
eventually became sunblasted and dehumanized. However, this outcome was by no 
means derived from the designers’ oversight. From the beginning of the design process, 
beautifying a green public space had been central to the plan: The 120 trees comprising 
pine, olive, palm, and evergreen pears were selected to provide sufficient shade in the 
park. A 16-foot stainless steel structure sculpture was placed in the central fountain as the 
centerpiece of the park. Water was re-cycled through the sculpture and provided a 
waterfall effect (Parks and Recreation Board, 1976). The City Council also approved 
street vendor sales of food to make Patriots Park a “favorite luncheon spot for the 
downtown office crowd” (Bommersbach, 1976, p.B1). In the park, there were musical 
performances usually during lunchtime.  
 Theoretically, the original design of Patriots Park had considered almost every 
element of a successful park: green shade, beautiful sculpture with small waterfall, 
fountain, musical performance, and the special meaning for memorizing local heroes. 
However, the design overlooked the spatial history and the traditional practice of 
homeless people’s practice at this location. Thus, the real practice was extremely 
different from the design on paper.  
While homeless people camped in the park, the green shade became natural tents. 
Even worse, homeless people used the fountain for bathing without cleaning up. 
Drunkards used it as an icebox by putting numerous bottles in it (Crooks, 1979). While 
the musical band was playing, drunks slept in the grass leaving empty bottles of cheap 
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port wine on the curb (Ives, 1980). The environment of the park thus became filthy, even 
though the park department cleaned Patriots two or three times a day (Manson, 1982).  
A planning paradox was created: on the one hand, a public space should be 
inviting, which means it should provide a comfortable space to attract people to gather in 
the space. However, on the other hand, if a public space is beautiful, accessible, and 
comfortable to rest, it also attracts homeless people to gather and camp in the space, who 
gradually change it into a shelter. In other words, the paradox created a tricky situation: a 
public space should be not so inviting, otherwise it would be a shelter but no longer a 
park.   
Therefore, a strange phenomenon occurred: the park management agencies had to 
intentionally downgrade the condition of the park, rather than keep it in a good form. In 
1981, the fifth year of the park, the fountain, which was used as bathtub by homeless 
people, had been dry with a sign on it warning “No Trespassing Viewing only.” Park 
hours also had been restricted. No one was allowed to enter from 12:30 a.m. to 5 a.m. 
(Hille, 1981).               
 A typical example of the lowering of the conditions of the park was the use of 
sprinklers. Craig Clifford, a tax auditor for the city, wrote a letter to the city employee-
suggestion committee, recommending that the sprinklers be operated only during the 
early morning or late evening, because the temperature was 114 degrees. “Hot-weather 
sprinkling not only would burn the grass, but also waste money because the water 
evaporates much too fast to do much good.” Then, the committee replied that: 
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“The sprinkler system is operated for short periods of time to make the lawns 
uninhabitable for transients. A use of the sprinkler system is a much more economical 
and effective method of control than utilizing a policeman’s valuable time to move 
transients along” (Arizona Republic, 1981, p.A13). The anonymous interviewee #2 (2016 
October 19) recalled that because park rangers had no weapons, turning on the strong 
sprinklers was the most efficient way to temporarily drive homeless people away. 
In a normal situation or common sense, park management means maintaining the 
fountain, rather than causing it to dry up; opening the park, rather than closing it; taking 
care of the grass, rather than burning it. However, in the contradiction between the 
planning of the park and the practice of homeless people, the meaning of the space was 
distorted.  
However, the strategy of lowering the conditions in the park succeeded only in 
expelling the “legitimate users” of the park rather than the homeless people. A wet park 
with glaring lights could still not stop homeless people from sleeping in it at night. As a 
result, the park management agencies had to further lower the quality of the park and 
make it more uninviting; the purpose is ironically to decrease the numbers of homeless 
people and prevent the park from completely becoming a shelter for the homeless.  
While the design and original meaning of the space was totally distorted, a home 
for the homeless was created. 
Dealing with a hot potato: The practice of the police.  
As another side of the coin, the police practices also promoted the spatial 
evolution of Patriots Park’s meaning. In this process, Patriots Park was changed from the 
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downtown revitalization to a great homeless shelter, and policemen experienced an 
embarrassing situation:  
On the one hand, the public, including local residents, merchants, and city 
officials, criticized the police, because they believed that the only reason why homeless 
people could stay in Patriots Park was because the police were not tough enough. 
According to their role, the police department could not debate the public and deny that 
tough policing could protect the public and solve the problem. On the other hand, the 
police knew that actually resolving the homeless people problem was a “mission 
impossible,” not possible merely through the policing activity. Arresting a drunkard over 
400 times could not stop him from returning because the public space in downtown 
Phoenix seemed to be the only option available to him.  
In such a circumstance, the practice of the police was very subtle. It was a type of 
art, rather than merely a professional activity, because the public’s top concern was not 
the police’s authority or at least not the top priority: police needed to concentrate their 
efforts on solving crime cases and dealing with dangerous people because they should 
maintain public security, but to the people who focused on the business interests of the 
Patriots Park project, removing homeless people from sheltering in the park was much 
more important than the crime cases, because they had paid the increased sales tax for the 
park. If the gathering of homeless people drove the potential customers away, Patriots 
Park would lose all its business meaning to the surrounding merchants who once 
supported and paid for it. 
As Sgt. Corcoran, who then patrolled Patriots Park pointed out, 
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“A police officer’s No. 1 concern is catching dangerous people, such as the man 
who stabbed two people in the YMCA parking lot. But downtown Phoenix business 
owners and their employees have different priorities. (Although) we’re looking for 
someone who stabbed two people, for the businesses, the main priority is the mentally-ill 
person dancing in front of the store front” (Doerfler, 1983b, pp. Extra 1, 3).       
The contradiction between the public’s concern and the real responsibility of the 
police was the main theme that shaped the downtown police’s subtle practice.   
Crime control related to the gathering of homeless people.  
From any perspective, crime control was the core of policing activities in Block 
77 both before and after the construction of Patriots Park. As a traditional gathering place 
of homeless people, crime issues were by no means uncommon in downtown Phoenix, 
albeit nostalgic thinking might imagine Deuce neighborhood as being brighter than it 
truly was, such as “the people are too poor. There’s nothing to steal” or “if the people 
there had knives, they would exchange the knives for wine”, but if we examine the 
reports of these downtown skid rows at that time, the public security around Block 77 
was far from safe. Along with the gathering of homeless people, criminals hid in these 
areas and threatened both local residents and homeless people’s security.  
Before the construction of Patriots Park, local residents had serious complaints 
about the illegal activities related to the group of derelicts, according to the then 
interview of Arizona Republic: 
“There was a drunk trying to lift my lawn mower over the fence…  
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They (derelicts) have actually threatened me. Women on the block have been 
backed into buildings by these men who put their arms around them. They’re always 
stealing items from around the houses… 
I have four locks on my door. They’ll even take the clothes off your clothesline. 
The city should do something” (Morin, 1974, p.A12). 
At the same time, the crimes also or even more seriously threatened street people. 
Remember Benny Begay, the drunkard who had been arrested over 400 times and lived 
in Block 77? After he spoke of his appreciation on the opening of the new Patriots Park 
to the reporter of Arizona Republic, saying that “it was good and people had fun,” later 
the same day, he was murdered and was found nude with his throat slashed (Arizona 
Republic, 1976b, p.B1).  
Perhaps street people knew better than most how dangerous downtown Phoenix 
was, in particular at night when other groups of people left. For example, Melvin Willis, 
a street person, who lived in Patriots Park with his girlfriend, described a murder 
occurring in the park at 12:30 a.m., and his quick report to the local police. In this 
situation, the police were the only group that street people could rely upon to protect 
them (Crooks, 1979).  
Therefore, street people in Patriots Park had an ambivalent attitude to the police: 
on the one hand, they paradoxically despised police harassment because they thought the 
police were wasting the precious policing time on them, rather than on the real criminals; 
however, on the other hand, they were staunch supporters of the police enforcement 
ability to “root out the ‘the real criminals’,”because street people were often the easiest 
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victims for being beaten, robbed, and even murdered (e.g. the interviews in Flannery, 
1983; Kelly, 1980). 
Meanwhile, the street-patrolling police also had an ambivalent attitude to the 
homeless people. In contrast to the local residents, who would usually consider the 
criminals on the street and other homeless people as the same group, police definitely 
observed the difference between “safe” and “dangerous” street people. On the one hand, 
when homeless people camped in Patriots Park, they of course violated the regulation of 
the park and illegally used the park. Therefore, policemen had the responsibility to expel 
them from the park. However, on the other hand, among the street people, there were Jail 
Trustees (Arizona Republic, 1976b), people who were keeping the peace in the park 
(Crooks, 1979), and others who had very good connection with the local policemen. 
These people indeed helped the police with security. Although ordinary residents usually 
did not distinguish these people from the criminals, the police did.  
In this regard, the walking-beat police officers had conflicting feelings about their 
practice. In terms of ethics, police could easily be tough on the real criminals. However, 
they were also more or less sorry for other street people. When speaking of a one-legged 
street man who received a 10-day jail sentence, Sgt. Corcoran said that “we in the 
walking beat feel caught in the middle” (Doerfler, 1983b, p. Extra 3). Therefore, while 
some people’s solution of the homeless problem was “running them out of town,” the 
police could never be as tough as those people expected because this solution was 
normatively unacceptable to the patrolling police. As Sgt. Corcoran expressed, “what if 
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one of these people was their dad, their uncle, their grandfather, their son?” (Doerfler, 
1983b, p. Extra 3).  
In this vein, the relation between the police and homeless people in practice 
should not be oversimplified as merely the oppressor and the oppressed. Rather, this 
relationship is dialectic. On the one hand, they have contradictions. The police were 
indeed sending the homeless people in the park to jail, but, on the other hand, they also to 
some extent had close and not always bad connections with each other. Treating 
homeless people as tough as arresting prostitutes was impossible for the police. 
It should be emphasized here that although the first design of Patriots Park did not 
revitalize the downtown exactly as the city officials and planners expected, the 
construction of Patriots Park and the related urban renewal project did contribute to crime 
control, from both the perspectives of homeless people and the police. 
Regarding the homeless people, replacing the old town block with a public open 
space decreased their risk of being crime victims. While many homeless people gathered 
in Patriots Park, if a crime issue regarding any person occurred, others could immediately 
call the police. The police could thus come to save the victim in time. In contrast to the 
common stereotype, camping in Patriots Park with other street people had a lower risk of 
being robbed and beaten than living in a cheap SRO hotel. Therefore, some street people, 
such as Benjamin Avila who actually could afford the SRO hotel for $5 a day, would like 
to sleep in Patriots Park in their workless days, because the park was a cooler and much 
safer place (Flannery, 1983).  
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As for the police, the construction of Patriots Park simplified the old town block 
into an open space, which was much more convenient for the police to keep surveillance 
in the whole block and control the crime immediately. When the police stood in the 
center of the park near the fountain, the police could clearly see any corner of the park. 
They could reach any place of the park very quickly (Anonymous interviewee #2, 2016 
October 19).      
The improvement of crime control after the urban renewals was also emphasized 
in the reported comparison of walking-beat officers’ jobs before and after the 
redevelopments: 
“Since Sgt. Wayne Corcoran started on the walking beat in 1966, the downtown 
and its clientele have changed. In the late 1960s, ‘We had more people in one block in 
one bar than we have people walking around in all downtown,’ he said. Corcoran’s squad, 
which includes the sergeant and seven officers, now makes about 150 arrests a month. On 
one eight-hour shift in 1968, he and his partner arrested more than 160 people ‘and hardly 
made a dent in the problem,’ he said” (Doerfler, 1983a, p.Extra 4). 
In other words, if we merely consider the issues of crime control, Patriots Park 
worked. However, policing was a social issue much more than simply crime control. As 
Downtown Walking-beat officer Rod Payton said, 
“We actually don’t have high crime down here. What we have is public nuisance” 
(Doerfler, 1983a, p. Extra 4).  
The campaign of “Downtown is fighting back.” 
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In contrast to police, merchants and residents around Patriots Park regarded 
“nuisances” as crimes or even felonies. Since merchants paid the specific sales tax for the 
development of Patriots Park, they would naturally hope that the park could pay for it. 
Further, the merchants believed that customers, conventioneers, and tourists would want 
to stay in their rooms, rather than spend money in downtown businesses, if the homeless 
people and some real hooligans were walking the streets and inhabiting the public space. 
In the opinions of the merchants, the real meaning of “being tough” was cleaning up the 
public spaces by running the homeless out. For example, an owner of a smoke shop said 
to the reporter that “police should make full use of nuisance ordinances and arrest 
transients who won’t move on” (Harris, 1979, p. A1). 
Were the police able to do that? The answer is yes and no. Of course, if a 
homeless person merely sat on the bench in the park as other park users would do, there 
was no law against the person’s sitting there because Patriots was a public park that 
belongs to everyone. In this regard, the police could say that they had no legal authority 
to “run homeless people out.” However, the particular and historical background of 
Patriots Park was that the gathering of homeless people in Patriots Park was not for 
recreation or park activities. In other words, at least most of the homeless people who 
camped in the park would violate its regulations. For example, drinking alcoholic 
beverages in a public park, carrying an open glass container, begging for money, or 
sleeping on a sidewalk were all unlawful. Thus, the police were armed with sufficient 
ordinances and laws. They would have the sufficient legal authority to arrest these people 
in the park, which was in fact the everyday practice of the downtown police. As Chief 
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Charles Strong said, “the policy of the department is to arrest beggars when they are seen 
or when citizens complain” (Harris, 1979, p.A1).    
The discussion of law enforcement practice with homeless people in the 1970s 
and 1980s is usually related to the revision of anti-vagrancy laws. However, the written 
laws were merely a related issue. The intention of police was more significant in terms of 
the policing practice. The understanding of the policing practice should not ignore the 
subjective attitudes of the Phoenix police. 
Since the police were in the middle between the direct critics and pressures of 
surrounding taxpayers and the de facto impossibility of cleaning up public space merely 
through policing or arresting, the downtown police were in a delicate situation: on the 
one hand, they did hope that Phoenix could have the reputation of being a “tough town” 
so that at least some potential incoming homeless people would feel dissuaded from 
coming to downtown Phoenix. Otherwise, if every homeless person believed that 
camping in public spaces in downtown Phoenix was a feasible option, the job of the 
downtown police would be even harder. 
However, the police did not want the surrounding merchants, local residents, and 
the public misunderstanding the complexity of the homeless problem. In particular, the 
police did not want the public to have an unrealistic expectation that the “tough police” 
could solve the problem by merely being tough because this expectation was not only 
impossible but also would attract more critics for the Phoenix police. 
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If we examine the police’s discourses in public reports, interviews, and speech at 
that time, we will find that these contradictory attitudes shaped the policing practice. The 
nuanced handling of police practice made them both tough and benevolent.     
With regard to the tough side, the changes in the laws did not really block all 
approaches for police to “run the homeless people out.” Although the Phoenix police 
could no longer arrest people for being intoxicated in public after 1973, the downtown 
walking-beat officials sent chronic street alcoholics to the local Alcohol Reception Center 
(LARC) and arrested those carrying bottles of wine or liquor (Doerfler, 1983a, p.Extra 4). 
Of course, LARC was about sending chronic street alcoholics into treatment rather than 
jail, although there is a rumor that the treatment was not always benevolent, particularly 
in the process of enforcing bodily hygiene. Regarding the people who were merely 
concerned about “running them out,” sending “them” to LARC or jail did not matter, as 
the alcoholics were soon back in public spaces from either LARC or jail.  
The further plan was that after five days of treatment at LARC, the alcoholics 
would be sent to the aforementioned “work farm for drunks” far from downtown Phoenix. 
Those who had been committed by the court would spend 28 days in this remote farm 
(Doerfler, 1983b, p. Extra 1). 
In this regard, the laws indeed were no-nonsense and authorized sufficient legal 
power to the Phoenix police to control the “unacceptable behaviors.” Although being 
intoxicated was no longer a crime, “panhandling, public drinking of alcohol, trespassing, 
littering, assault, sleeping or lying on public property, disorderly conduct” were still 
illegal (Hille, 1983, p.A14).  
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In addition to the established approaches to get homeless people out of public 
spaces, the City of Phoenix spared no effort to shape the atmosphere that Phoenix was a 
tough place for the homeless. In the 1983 the campaign called “downtown is fighting 
back” was launched with the police chief’s speech, with some 300 people in Patriots Park. 
This campaign held by the Downtown Crime Task Force aimed to “rid Phoenix of law-
breaking vagrants,” and Police Chief Ruben Ortega said his department backed it 
(Arizona Republic, 1983). The campaign generally intensified downtown policing and 
aroused social attention to the vagrant problem and the related policing activities. The 
number of policemen on the downtown walking-beat had been doubled during the 
campaign, while the downtown had already obtained the best police coverage before the 
campaign (11 officers on duty during the day and 15 during peak night hours) (Hille, 
1983; Hrnicek, 1981). Moreover, the police department advocated and provided publicity 
for the “get-tough” attitude. The Downtown Crime Task Force of Phoenix started an 
advertising campaign by printing twenty thousand brochures. 
The red cover of the brochure proclaims in bright white letters, “Why are 31,000 
people afraid of this man?” The photo is of a disheveled figure, back to the camera, lying 
in the grass beside a sidewalk. The answer to the question printed inside is, “Because his 
behavior is unpredictable” (Hille, 1983, p.A14). 
This was a significant change in the police’s discourse. The underlying 
implication of this advertising campaign was that the police would follow the local 
merchants and residents’ preference of tough treatment for public nuisances, rather than 
attempting to distinguish “dangerous” transients from other homeless people. If 
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someone’s behavior was “unpredictable,” it meant that he or she was “dangerous” and 
scaring other legitimated users of public spaces. As Sandy Ravel, the then chairman of 
the task force’s public relations subcommittee expressed, the task force’s theories were 
based on “tough love,” which was an increasingly popular philosophy for parents with 
“intolerable” children (Hille, 1983). Homeless people were understood as another form of 
problem children. As Dennis Mitchem, the head of the Downtown Crime Task Force, 
said, “by ‘getting’ tough with vagrants, their behaviors eventually will change” (Human 
Rights of Arizona, Inc. ,1983 ). 
Whether police should treat homeless people differently based on their different 
cause of being homeless was a longtime contradiction between the police and the local 
merchants. To the local merchants, laws should be enforced based on people’s behaviors, 
while the police believed that without well-directed policies, policing the downtown 
public spaces would be a relentless mission. However, the campaign of “downtown is 
fighting back” was a typical case that the police almost completely duplicated the 
discourses of downtown merchants, rather than attempting to explain the particular 
difficulty of everyday policing. The idea of this campaign was encouraging people to 
change their attitudes of apathy and sympathy. As the supporters of the campaign said, 
this campaign hoped people could contribute to a “turn your head and hope they’ll go 
away” outlook (Murphy, 1983a). 
However, although the downtown police fulfilled and responded to the 
requirement and concerns of local merchants and residents through presenting and 
advertising its getting-tough attitude, the campaign of “downtown is fighting back” did 
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not actually respond to the causes of homeless; more importantly, it did not reflect the 
actual everyday policing practice of patrolmen in public spaces.  
Law enforcement was still an expensive revolving door, involving the LARC, 
county jail, and the Patriots Park. The walking-beat officials could technically extend the 
length of this cycle because they were familiar with who was staying in the park, but they 
could not stop the cycle. For example, an official named Casillas usually ticketed the 
homeless people with open bottles in Patriots park, rather than arrest them, because:  
“Ninety-nine percent of the time, they won’t appear in court, the judge will issue a 
warrant and we can keep him in jail for a longer time than on the original incident” 
(DeUriarte, 1983, p.B1).  
However, after the extended detention, the previously detained person would 
come back to Patriots Park and commence another new cycle of the expensive revolving 
door. In this regard, changing homeless people’s behaviors by the so-called “tough love” 
was almost impossible. As Sgt. Corcoran said, “when you arrest the same man 70 times, 
it’s not the law that’s at fault” (DeUriarte, 1983, p.B1):  
“(Sgt.) Corcoran and Officer Rudy Casillas find Elwood Hunter passed out on the 
grass (in Patriots Park). ‘What are you doing here, Elwood,’ Cocoran said. ‘Last time you 
promised me you wouldn’t come back here.’ He helps Hunter to his feet, then calls the 
Local Alcoholism Recovery Center truck” (Hille, 1983, p.A14).  
That is the reason that the number of homeless people seemed to be constant 
despite the campaign, albeit the homeless man who was sitting in Patriots Park said 
“Yeah, there are cops all over” (Hille, 1983, p.A14). In this vein, the intensifying policing 
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and advertising the “getting-tough” attitude was more a response to the surrounding 
taxpayers, rather than a real solution. This campaign was ended very soon after Mr. 
Goddard becoming the new Mayor of Phoenix in 1984, but the reason why the police had 
to show their toughness in this campaign was rooted in the longtime public perception 
around Phoenix.   
The Public Perception: Another Face of the “Eyes on the Street” 
In 1979, the City of Phoenix did a study of a 15-year plan for downtown Phoenix, 
in which the consultants pointed out that “crime is more a perception than a reality in the 
downtown area, but we do suggest more and more visible beat policemen” (Wilson, 1979, 
p.A1). The meaning of a space is not merely derived from the physical reality. The 
perception also shaped the downtown space, and thus created the associated demand of 
spatial practices. 
From the analyses of the planning ideologies and spatial practice in Patriots Park, 
public security, in particular the problems related to the homeless were the main 
contradiction related to the park. Although geographically simplifying the old town block 
into an open space technically reduced the crime rate, the publicization of the old town 
block as well as the construction of the park intensified local merchants and residents’ 
worry regarding the potential danger, rather than form a healthy atmosphere of citizen 
vigilance. As interviewee #3 said, 
“I do know many small businesses moved because of weak city response to the 
vagrants. This abandonment by business cost ‘eyes on the street,’ to use Jane Jacobs’ 
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term, and contributed to downtown’s decline” (Anonymous Interviewee #3, 2017 January 
10). 
The idea of “eyes on the street” comes from Jacobs’ (1961) influential study, The 
Death and Life of Great American Cities. The key idea of this phrase is that the 
shopkeepers and local merchants could form an intricate and unconscious network of 
voluntary controls, because they take an active interest in the surrounding public security. 
Moreover, local small businessmen would be strong proponents of peace and order, and 
would enforce the standard by themselves, because they hate broken windows or having 
customers made them nervous about safety.   
However, we should not take the “eyes on the street” for granted, when we 
examined downtown Phoenix’s history. If we apply Jacobs’s theory of “eyes on the street” 
in the case of Patriots Park, we will find that this theory could not interpret the history of 
Patriots Park, due to the different perception of “safety” among different groups. 
In Jacobs’ theory, public security is a general concept. This theory does not 
distinguish crime, public nuisance, inadequate hygiene, and even the hate against specific 
groups of people, under the superficial advocacy of peace and order. This ambiguity of 
security blurs contradicted perceptions of security from diverse groups. Thus, it runs the 
risk of taking an organic vigilance network for granted and underestimating the difficulty 
of forming such a network.  
As the analysis of spatial practice in the last section explores, the police, city 
officials, and local business owners actually had different priorities toward the project of 
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public space construction. Without understanding these different themes in the public 
perception, we cannot understand their practice. 
In any historical study, examining public perception is always a difficult element. 
The numbers of people who could speak out in history were usually limited. Thanks to 
the intensive interviews and reports related to Patriots Park in Arizona Republic, we can 
still summarize the main themes of different groups’ concern in the 1970s and early 
1980s. Because the perception summarized here is not derived from a random sample, we 
cannot generalize them to the all Phoenix residents at that time. However, since these 
perceptions actually existed at one time, to use Lefebvre’s term, they had the “real 
content” of different themes related to Patriots Park (Lefebvre, 1968, p.42). 
In terms of the city officials, the perspectives related to the Patriots Park project 
could be categorized into four themes: the advocacy of publicizing property ownership, 
the rationales of downtown redevelopment, the meaning of the landscape design, and the 
security issues.  
Changing the space’s property into a public ownership was supported by three 
elements of concerns. Downtown revitalization was widely believed as a government 
responsibility. The city officials also believed that the city government should upgrade 
the downtown areas to help it win the competition between other suburban business 
districts. Therefore, government-owned property was an appropriate way for government 
to implement the redevelopment policy (Turco, 1982c). This idea was not constricted to 
the discussion of Patriots Park. Even regarding other nonpublic space, such as office 
tower, garage, hotels, and other related downtown redevelopment projects, the city 
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government would need to buy back the new developed facilities in case the development 
was unsuccessful was a common concern (Turco, 1982a). Moreover, the spatial 
publicization was also considered as a powerful approach to bring public funding 
investment into the downtown real estate market (Arizona Republic, 1982) as well as 
speed up the redevelopment project by using eminent domain power (Reeson, 1980). 
In addition, the redevelopment was based on the belief that after demolishing the 
downtown skid rows, more people would come to the downtown and that the downtown 
business atmosphere would thus be enhanced in account of more customers. Then, the 
investment of public funding would result in a significant capital return (Arizona 
Republic, 1971b; Morin, 1974; Price, 1981). 
To finish such a redevelopment cycle, beautifying the downtown and expelling 
homeless people were necessary. Otherwise, the downtown investment would be not 
financeable. It would take a risk of the investing money, “because of poor access and 
limited parking” and “derelicts lounging in the parks” (Sowers, 1982, p.A1). 
In contrast to the city officials, the surrounding merchants and residents were 
discontented with the city government related to the downtown redevelopment. The local 
business owners believed that the revitalization of the downtown business atmosphere 
was based on the local small businesses, rather than the office tower or luxury hotels 
(Prins, 1980). In this regard, the local business owners had different opinions toward the 
business revitalization with the city government. 
 More importantly, the local businesses felt discontented that the public space of 
Patriots Park attracted more homeless people from elsewhere (to some extent, they are 
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right), while the business owners in the downtown had to pay the special sales tax to 
cover the cost of the downtown redevelopment project including Patriots Park (Harris, 
1979). The increased numbers of the homeless population in Patriots Park made the local 
business owners upset, feeling that the city government merely forced them to address the 
transient problem (Hrnicek, 1981). This belief also created several strategies in expelling 
transients and even fighting with them. Enforcing some standards to decrease the crowd 
in the stores, such as “no more than 3 in a group” was another important strategy (Harris, 
1979, p. A1). 
The most important reason for the local business owners having an aggressive 
attitude to the homeless people was that the homeless people staying in Patriots Park 
damaged the business benefit of the local merchants, especially in the 1970s and 1980s 
while the customer loss was also increased due to the decrease in the downtown 
residential population (Morin, 1974). The homeless people did not bring many criminal 
cases. However, the vandalism and theft significantly hurt local business, albeit some of 
these people also spent money in the surrounding shops to buy foods and necessities 
(Hrnicek, 1981). Moreover, a shopkeeper would face a significant profit loss if transients 
with mental illnesses hassled customers and women who were passing by their shop 
(Harris, 1979). 
More importantly, the local business owners also disagreed with the police in 
terms of surveillance. As the previous section mentions, regarding local business, public 
nuisance created more damage and cost the business owners more than violent crimes, 
albeit the police obviously concentrated more on real crimes. Because of public nuisances, 
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theft, and vandalism occurred more frequently than more serious crimes, for which the 
cost to business owners was more, but to a large extent, because these cases were not 
very serious compared to real crimes, calling the police would not always help. In some 
cases, calling the police would cost business owners more time and money. For example, 
Gary Rickles, owner of Gary and Sue’s Smoke and Gift Shop, said vandalism and theft 
were his most common problems. However, he did not contact police when a person 
vandalized or stole because of the time involved in filing a report. “People here have 
given up with telephone calling,” he said. “It doesn’t do anything for us” (Hrnicek, 1981, 
p.A2). Then, this situation created a vicious cycle, and created a chaos atmosphere. As 
Rickles said, his customers observed many of the transients across the street at Patriots 
and thus were afraid to “walk half a block” to his store (Hrnicek, 1981, p.A1).  
However, despite the discontent, the local business believed that the walking 
patrols and the appearance of walking officers in the streets were effective to control the 
potential disorder, vandalism and theft (Hrnicek, 1981). Thus, the local shopkeepers, on 
the one hand, appreciated patrolling officers’ help. However, on the other hand, 
shopkeepers were not happy to form a voluntary surveillance network as “eyes on the 
street.” They attributed the problem of security to the insufficient police patrols, after 
building the Patriots Park: “we need more police down here to do a job rather than to pick 
up on parking meters. As a shop owner, I have to be on the lookout all the time” (Hrnicek, 
1981, p. A2). 
In terms of public security, the police had different perspectives from the local 
merchants. First, the crime rate in the downtown areas was not high. Although walking at 
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night might be dangerous, the public security of Phoenix was not worse than other 
metropolis’ downtowns (Whitney, 1981). Moreover, there was sufficient police coverage 
in downtown areas (Hrnicek, 1981).  
However, the gathering of homeless people could not be changed merely through 
policing. The problem of homeless people was a social problem with diverse causes. As 
officer Bud Vasconcellos, who knew most of the downtown transients by sight, said that 
most of the downtown transients had drinking or mental problems. If the government did 
not provide sufficient funding for relocating previous Deuce residents or providing more 
medication for people who had mental problems, policing would not be able to reduce the 
homeless population in Patriots Park (Hille, 1983, p. A14).  
Then, although these people usually did not bother anybody, potential customers 
would feel scared because of the terrible hygiene of the transients and the unpredictable 
behaviors of the mentally ill. As Sgt. Corcoran pointed out, 
“You have people who have communicable diseases, tuberculosis, amputees, very 
old. You have people... who have lice, crabs, body fleas. You think they’re wearing shoes, 
when, in fact, it’s dirt. They may scare them (business owners and employees) because of 
their smell, their looks or their manners, but it doesn’t mean they’ll hurt them,” (Pointing 
to a drunk sitting under a tree in Patriot Park) “ ‘That’ scares an awful lot of people. ‘That’ 
couldn’t take your purse if he wanted to” (Doerfler, 1983b, p. Extra 3). 
However, the police knew that the local businesses cared about customers being 
scared away more than they cared about crimes. However, without a significant 
improvement in the social relief and welfare, the only thing that the police could do was 
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to arrest the same transients again and again, until the walking-beat officers knew most of 
the downtown transients. “When you arrest the same man 70 times, it’s not the law that’s 
at fault” (DeUriarte, 1983, p.B1).  
In this regard, from the police’s perspective, closing Patriots Park would be the 
easiest way to control the gathering of homeless people and fulfill the requirements of 
local business owners (Manson, 1982). Since the city officials and park board did not 
want to close Patriots Park, increasing patrols and teaching downtown business 
employees self-defense techniques were another solution. 
“The officers explain to business owners how to react to burglaries and how to 
secure their buildings. Some stores have added metal gates that extend from the ceilings 
to the floors, preventing transients from entering the doorway and urinating—a common 
practice” (Doerfler, 1983b, p. Extra 1). 
In terms of public security, the perspective of homeless people in Patriots Park 
was similar to that of the police. Homeless people also focused on the violent crimes, 
rather than public nuisance. In this regard, homeless people believed that Patriots Park 
strengthened the local security and helped to control the crime rate (Crooks, 1979). 
However, homeless people also complained about the public space as a business-oriented 
redevelopment. The city government demolished the old block and replaced it with 
expensive office towers, rather than paying more attention to other residential amenities: 
“It’s getting more and more like a business town. It’s nothing like it used to be, with all 
these business people around, since they tore out everything” (Hille, 1983, p. A14).    
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In this regard, the perception of different groups of people toward a public space 
could be diverse. Different groups of people might understand the same Patriots Park 
from different angles. More importantly, there was not any taken-for-granted “ally” 
across groups. Although business orders were related to peace and order in the street, it 
did not mean that they would understand the so-called “peace” and “order” in the same 
way with the local police, as the theory of “eyes on the street” supposes. In addition, the 
police were not only the law-enforcement machine of the city officials. They had their 
specific understanding of the space, during their everyday interaction with homeless 
people and local merchants around the space. The assumption that everyone will benefit 
from peace and order is not sufficient to prove that all related groups would voluntarily 
cooperate with each other to form a vigilance network, because the meaning of Patriots 
Park to different groups was different. 
In terms of the downtown revitalization, the city government actually understood 
Patriots Park and its parking garage as the supporting facility to the surrounding office 
towers. The business revitalization here was defined as the replacing the old structures 
with high-rise skyscrapers as well as attracting more big companies located in downtown 
areas. However, as for local business owners, residents, and homeless people, an 
authentic downtown revitalization meant more residents, residential amenities, grocery 
stores, and more customers for the local small businesses. Homeless people and residents 
needed residential amenities for their everyday lives, while local merchants needed more 
customers living there, rather than working people who just leave at night, making 
140 
 
downtown Phoenix a ghost town. In this vein, homeless people and merchants stood 
together.  
However, in terms of public security, the local merchants and the city officials 
held the same stance in that they did not distinguish homeless people from criminals, 
because the appearance of homeless people scared others. Regarding the local businesses, 
the public nuisance was more dangerous than violent crimes because it drove customers 
away. However, the police and the homeless people in Patriots Park understood the 
diversity among people who camped in the park. Both of them took arresting the real 
dangerous violent criminals as the top priority, rather than arresting the mentally ill. This 
difference led to the merchants’ complaining that the police did not help and wasted time 
and resources, although the police were effectively controlling the violent crime rate, 
rather than merely concentrating on parking meter violations.  
Therefore, the theory of “eyes on the street” faced a great paradox in the case of 
Patriots Park: if we understood the concept of “peace” and “order” according to the crime 
rate, the homeless people in the park actually were a group of these “eyes.” They saw the 
crimes, reported to the police, and sped up the police’s response. However, if the “peace” 
and “order” was defined as expelling homeless people from downtown Phoenix, the 
downtown policing could not fulfill this requirement because the gathering of homeless 
people was a social problem, rather than one of violent crimes. The homeless people still 
came back in front of the merchants’ stores after being arrested over 400 times. Then, 
without the substantial support from public policies, the “eyes on the street” did not 
create the peace and order atmosphere as the merchants wished. 
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At the end of day, the “eyes on the street” was based on the same identification of 
crimes and the substantial policing surveillance. If the threat of public security is not a 
crime, but a social problem, the “eyes on the street” will not work. 
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CHAPTER 9 
TRANSITION PERIOD: FROM PEOPLE PLACE TO LOST SPACE 
This chapter focuses on the history of the second Patriots Park from 1988 to 2007.  
The history of the spatial evolution in this period represents the dynamic of a space: after 
the park to a large extent played the role of a “people place” in its first four years, the 
park degenerated back into a camping place for homeless people. As Lefebvre 
emphasizes, space is not stable or an unchangeable physical “container.” A space is 
constantly reproduced, distorted or displaced (Lefebvre, 1991, p.42). While the space is 
distorted, the ideology of the original plan is not necessarily wrong or false. But rather, 
the internal contradictions within the space drive the spatial evolution into a different 
track from the official plan.  
Similar to the first Patriots Park, which had a long planning process since 1957, 
the second Patriots Park was conceived as early as in 1981, seven years before the second 
Patriots Park’s grand opening. The historical background of the 1980s was significantly 
different from the era of Urban Renewal. In terms of downtown revitalization, the 
officials and planners in the 1980s were not so tightly associated with publicization and 
real estate condemnation. More importantly, gentrification had a great influence to the 
downtown public space redevelopment in the 1980s to 1990s in the United States, such as 
the cases of the Lower East side of New York City (Smith, 1996), the fan area of 
Richmond, and Georgetown in Washington, D.C (Hutter, 2007, p.264 ). The economic 
logic became an important standard to evaluate the rationality of a redevelopment plan. 
Stimulating downtown economy, bring rich customers back to downtown, and leveraging 
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private investment to increase downtown tax base and business values were important 
concerns. 
Within this historical background, the city of Phoenix in the 1980s on one hand 
attempted to construct a “people place” to resolve some social problems, such as 
decreasing the population of street people in Patriots Park, relieving the tension between 
urban cruisers and downtown residents, and so on. However, on the other hand, the park 
was legitimized by economic rationality. The city government persuaded the surrounding 
business owners to support the redevelopment project by the political promise that the 
growth of business would cover the cost. Then, while the political promise did not come 
true, the abandonment of the park became a rational strategy to stop loss. This 
abandonment directly reshaped the practice within the park, and fostered the discontent to 
government-owned public space. 
This chapter describesa full process of the spatial distortion of the second Patriots 
Park. In this process, the tiny details of practice and people’s perception continuously and 
cumulatively influenced and reshaped the space before a dramatic policy change, and 
then founded the basis for an even greater future change.               
Planning Ideologies: The Influence of Jacobs’ Theories  
As the previous chapter described, the tension between homeless people and the 
downtown merchants and workers was aggravated by the construction of Patriots Park, 
while the downtown police were trapped in an endless cycle of arresting homeless people, 
sending them to jail or remote work farms, and then seeing the same homeless people in 
the park again and again. Under these circumstances, the claim for closing the park or at 
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least redeveloping it had appeared as early as 1981, although the park had been used for 
only five years, since 1976. Almost everyone said the park should be improved and 
redeveloped, but what should be the new direction of the redeveloped Patriots Park was 
the key question.    
In the early 1980s, the perspectives of city officials and urban planners were still 
formed by the demolition-oriented and economic-central planning theories, evidenced by 
the planning documents of Patriots Park passed in the early 1980s. For example, the Park 
Board Report on February 3rd 1982 identified the following improvement direction as 
“improve design for better use by performing groups, special events, etc.,” through 
improving “staging area or amphitheater for large gatherings” (Parks and Recreation 
Board of Phoenix, 1982, p. 12). It did not respond to local merchants and residents’ 
concerns about the homeless people issue regarding the park. 
On April 6th 1982, Mayor Hance and the city council passed the Patriots Park 
Redevelopment Plan (Resolution No. 15815), which represented the prevalent urban 
renewal thinking in the 1970s. In this plan, there are eleven “objectives and principles” of 
the “Patriot’s Park Redevelopment”: 
“a. Eliminate and prevent the recurrence of substandard and obsolescent buildings, 
slum conditions, and environmental deficiencies which detract from the functional unity, 
aesthetic appearance, and economic welfare of this important section of the city. 
b. Provide a hospitable and secure environment for continued private investment 
and thus maximize opportunities for such investment. 
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c. Strengthen the basic attractiveness, efficiency and effectiveness of the economy 
of downtown Phoenix and the city of Phoenix. 
d. Increase and improve the quality and accessibility of job opportunities in the 
city and for residents of the downtown area. 
e. Strengthen the tax base of the City and the fiscal condition of public agencies 
serving Phoenix. 
f. Create a sense of community and neighborhood within the downtown area to 
enhance its attractiveness as a place in which to live, work, and play. 
g. Help build a sense of regional identity and community. 
h. Protect, improve, and make effective use of desirable natural and man-made 
environmental features and conditions to enhance human comfort and economic activity. 
i. Provide the highest possible levels of opportunity and amenity for pedestrian 
movement throughout the downtown area, especially in the most densely occupied 
activity areas. 
j. Reflect high standards of appearance in building design, landscaping, lighting 
treatment, and sign control. 
k. Strengthen and expand Downtown’s role as the major office center of the state” 
(City of Phoenix, 1982, p.5). 
Among the eleven objectives and principles of Patriots Park redevelopment, six 
objectives are directly related to the economy (economic activity), investment, and the 
tax base, with an objective that was to strengthen the downtown’s role as the major office 
center of the state. Another objective referred to the sense of community and 
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neighborhood, but the purpose of creating the sense of community was still attracting 
people to live, work, and enjoy themselves downtown. None of the objectives were 
related to shaping Patriots Park as an authentic inviting public space, albeit it is the 
Patriots Park Redevelopment Plan. It is clear that in this plan, the concerns of economic 
stimulation outweighed the thinking for shaping the park as an inviting public space. 
Although the objectives above might sound different from the plan for a park today, they 
represented the planning understanding of the original Patriots Park as well as the 
supposed functions of a public space under the leadership of Mayor Hance’s 
administration. 
Additionally, in this plan, the building condition of Fox Theater, directly east of 
Patriots Park, was identified as beyond repair. Eventually, Block 22, the site of the theater, 
was torn down completely as a part of the Patriots Park redevelopment project. 
As Talton (2015) summarizes the downtown redevelopment in this period,  
“As the economy recovered from the 1974 recession, Hance easily got behind the 
growth machine. Her leadership looked a lot like the CGC’s6 ‘businessmen’s 
government’—only without the CGC... while Phoenix grew north and west, Hance 
presided over considerable damage downtown and in the central core. Jane Jacobs’s 
teachings were far from her skillset” (p. 108). 
However, the re-thinking of the downtown redevelopment project, such as 
Patriots Park occurred in the 1980s. Then, the subsequent Mayor Goddard administration 
changed the guiding theory of downtown redevelopment; or in Talton’s (2015) words, 
                                                 
6 CGC here is for Charter Government Committee. 
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“Goddard was the most urban-savvy mayor in the city’s history; he had read and 
absorbed the lessons of Jacobs” (p. 110).  
The redevelopment planning of Patriots Park under Mayor Goddard and his city 
council’s leadership had a hefty dose of Jacobs’ planning theories. However, the park’s 
redevelopment did not achieve the goal as Jacobs supposed. The redeveloped Patriots 
Park, a supposed “people’s place” finally became a downtown “lost space” that was de 
facto abandoned by the city government. This chapter will explore this process and 
explain why the evolution of the space departed from the planned track. It will begin 
from the review of planning re-thinking in the 1980s. 
“Crowd control,” rather than “fighting back”: the new identification of the 
homeless people problem 
The gathering of homeless people was the most prominent problem of the first 
Patriots Park. While every city official and urban planner considered the redevelopment 
of the first Patriots Park, reducing the population of homeless people camping in the park 
would always be an important assignment of the city government. From the perspectives 
of Mayor Hance’s administration and her city council, the gathering of homeless people 
was derived from the lack of tough policing, and thus, the police should correct the 
inappropriate behavior of homeless people though the “tough-love” approach. The 
campaign of “Downtown is Fighting Back” was the result of such belief. The advocacy 
of tough policing believed that once the police became tough enough, the homeless 
people in Patriots Park would flee. 
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However, Mayor Goddard and his city council did not agree with the perspective 
of “tough-love” or the oversimplification of homeless people as naughty kids with 
inappropriate behaviors. As early as becoming the mayor-elect, Goddard criticized the 
belief of “tough-love” and more importantly noted that the blind belief of tough policing 
was aggravating the problem, rather than solving it. 
“The main thing we’ve done here is pass tough laws on the one hand and haven’t 
taken care of the responsibility generated by the tough laws on the other hand,” then 
Mayor-elect Goddard said, who believed that the obligation of taking care of homeless 
people arose from the city’s tough ordinances on vagrancy (Hall, 1983, p. C2).  
Specifically, in terms of the homeless people in Patriots Park, the then mayor-
elect criticized the policies and decision of the previous administration after a meeting 
with Police Chief Ruben Ortega.  
The new mayor agreed that a massive rise in police officers assigned downtown 
in the campaign of “Downtown is Fighting Back” had increased the safety of workers and 
conventioneers, and would not reduce the downtown patrols. However, the improvement 
in public security failed to address the real issue of the homeless problem. 
First, in contrast with Mayor Hance’s administration, Mayor Goddard believed 
that the gathering of homeless is “not a police problem, ” but rather a “crowd control 
problem. ” Goddard supported the perspective of the downtown police officials that if 
police had to arrest the same street people over 40 times and still found them in the same 
downtown place, it was no longer a law no matter how tough the written law was. As 
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Mayor Goddard summarized, “it’s a crowd control problem that they (police officials) 
have, not a law enforcement problem”(Hall, 1983, p. C2). 
While the city advocated the tough policing and the campaign of “Downtown is 
Fighting Back”, the city government in fact forced the police to do the jobs that social 
services were supposed to do. “They’re (police officials) becoming counselors on the 
street, they’re jollying along alcoholics and trying to keeping them from hurting 
themselves. That’s not their job” (Hall, 1983, p. C2). 
In addition, the taxpayers’ burden was increased, while the city forced the police 
to do the social service jobs, because the cost of policing was usually more expensive 
than a new shelter or public facilities for homeless people. The Homeless should be “the 
burden of social-service agencies rather than the police. That means that much more 
police power gets back out in the rest of the city. It’s a savings of our public money. Cops 
are very expensive social workers” (Hall, 1983, p. C2). 
More importantly, Mayor Goddard believed that the phenomenon that society 
would like to pay more for the policing and passing further tough laws than constructing 
necessary facilities for street people was emotional, rather than rational. Society, on the 
one hand, would not like to help homeless people, but on the other hand, fear homeless 
people occupying their public facilities. Thus, closing the necessary public facilities or 
downgrading the quality of public facilities so that homeless people would not use them 
became a logical result, which was exactly the witnessed change of Patriots Park. As 
Mayor Goddard said,  
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“One of the problems is that we’ve gotten so paranoid about the homeless that 
we’ve denied a lot of public facilities for the benefit of everybody. That means that all of 
our quality of life is suffering, because of a real worry that somebody might use them 
who doesn’t look quite right. And that’s serious” (Hall, 1983, p. C2). 
The new Mayor was not the only person who criticized the oversimplification of 
the homeless issue as a law enforcement problem. The Arizona Coalition for the 
Homeless estimated approximately 1,200 to 1,500 residents of SROs lost their homes 
between 1975 to 1985 because the city tore down three SROs to build Patriots Park and 
five to make way for the Phoenix Civic Plaza Convention Center (Patterson, 1985). 
While these people lost their homes because of the city’s redevelopment project, they 
were not able to find alternative residential options to $ 160 a month in 1985 (the average 
rent charged by a Phoenix SRO). As Fred Karnas, the then co-chairman of the coalition 
for the homeless, said, “I’m comfortable in saying there are no alternatives at this point” 
(Patterson, 1985, p.S20) More than one thousand people lost their homes and did not 
have any alternative options, and the hope that tough policing and arrests would make 
this group of people able to afford a more expensive residential lease did not make sense. 
Similar to the previous SRO residents, another significant group who camped in 
Patriots Park was also the victim of the change in public policy: the mentally ill. There 
were 7,800 people in Arizona who were considered chronically mentally ill in 1985 (La 
Jeunesse, 1985). Before the implementation of the policy of “deinstitutionalization,” the 
mentally ill were treated at the Arizona State Hospital, albeit many such patients could 
only be treated but could never be cured. However, the policy of “deinstitutionalization” 
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pledged to shift the burden from the state hospital to a community-based mental health 
system, which in fact drove thousands of the mentally ill to the street. These people could 
see things that were not real and hear voices that did not exist. For example, Jeff Hawn, a 
then 30-year-old paranoid schizophrenic, who thought he was guarding a military base 
and stashed his food in the bushes in city parks, was unfortunately killed in 1982 when 
police mistook his pellet gun for a revolver (La Jeunesse, 1985). Gradually, society 
realized that replacing social services by policing was not right. The policy of 
“deinstitutionalization” was criticized by the Arizona Senate by both parties: Senate 
Majority Leader Bob Usdane, a Scottsdale Republican, criticized that “Arizona doesn’t 
have a system to care for the mentally ill. What we did with deinstitutionalization was 
open the doors of the state hospital and tell them to get out.” Senate Minority Leader 
Alfredo Gutierrez said “the system is in a shambles, and as far as I’m concerned, we’re 
all culpable” (La Jeunesse, 1985, p. A14). 
Then, while society gradually changed its attitude and the belief that tough 
enough policing could simply scare off homeless people, attracting more people to 
downtown public space became the most prominent belief that could decrease the 
homeless population in Patriots Park. Encouraging more residents other than homeless 
people to gather in the park became a new planning ideology in this period and took the 
place of the “tough-love”.   
“People place,” rather than “office center”: The new identification of public 
spaces’ functions. 
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The aforementioned quote of the objectives and principles of the 1982 Patriots 
Park Redevelopment Plan presents how seriously the economic-oriented thinking once 
dominated the city’s plan of a public space redevelopment. A public space was 
understood as a tool for attracting investment, expanding the tax base, and stimulating 
economic activities, rather than as a necessary public facility contributing to people’s 
lives other than merely through the market. 
However, in the 1980s, the claims of “people place” gradually became significant. 
The city officials, planners, scholars, and ordinary residents started to evaluate public 
spaces through a different standard. Under these circumstances, the concept of “people 
place” emerged in the discussion of Patriots Park and related downtown redevelopment. 
In terms of Phoenix downtown redevelopment, perhaps one of the most early uses 
of the concept “people place” in local mass media is found in the interview of Richard 
Counts, the then City Planning Director, and Architect George W. Christensen in 1983 
(Rigberg, 1983).  
 Although Counts believed in centrally situated high-rise buildings in downtown 
Phoenix, because that would utilize to the fullest extent the infrastructure the city has 
provided, Counts also admitted that downtown Phoenix was not what one would call a 
“people place,” which should be “a place for friends and lovers. It is that simple. It’s a 
place where you can have a sandwich or a drink with a friend, or take a stroll with a girl, 
or take the kids shopping,” as Christensen described (Rigberg, 1983, p.5). 
Specifically, in terms of the downtown redevelopment projects, Christensen 
criticized that “it (Civic Plaza) is primarily a hardscape. A hardscape is concrete, 
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fountains, walls, steps. But there is no place to take off your shoes and run in the grass. 
We had the experiment of Patriots Park, of course, and I am glad it was tried, but ...” 
(Rigberg, 1983, p.5).  
The central idea here of the concept of “people place” is humanizing the city and 
giving the outdoor areas the allure of people places. The objectives of Patriots Park, a 
public space, should be identified as a process to humanize the downtown, rather than 
merely being an unnecessary amenity of the surrounding office towers under the planning 
objective of “strengthen and expand Downtown’s role as the major office center of the 
state” in the previous park redevelopment plan (City of Phoenix, 1982, p.5). 
Developers of Phoenix in the 1980s also started to emphasize the significance of 
people and people’s lives, as important as the consideration of real estate investment. A 
space should be humanized and attractive to the tourists and residents alike. 
Phoenix developer Julian Blum explained the meaning of making downtown a 
“people place” even at nights and on weekends in this way: “Today, people coming to 
conventions, when it’s over in the evenings, get on buses and go to Scottsdale. What we 
intend is to have buses in Scottsdale bring them back into Phoenix” (Shanahan, 1984a, 
p.A1). 
Similarly, the city officials, such as James Forsberg, the director of the Central 
Phoenix Redevelopment Agency, also appreciated the idea of “people place,” which 
means the mixed-use business, cultural and people center that would “foster a lively 24-
hour core” (Schwartz, 1984, p. V18). 
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To summarize, although the exact content of “people place” might be nuanced 
among planners, developers, and city officials, compared to the public space planning in 
the previous downtown redevelopment periods since the 1950s, the role of Patriots Park 
was no longer understood as a stimulation of the real estate investment for the 
surrounding office towers. People’s use, interaction, and activities within the public space 
were the cause of increased concerns. City planners hoped a public space could provide 
an open space for outdoor activities and strengthen the social interaction and integration. 
The developers hoped a “people place” could be a magnet that attracted more people and 
customers to downtown Phoenix, while city officials expected the mix-use center could 
shape the identity of downtown Phoenix as the core of the metropolitan areas. Creating a 
public space that people would want to come to and use became the new standard to 
evaluate the public space redevelopment project.    
“Market failure” rather than “skid rows”: The new identification of the 
cause of downtown decline. 
In the 1950s to 1970s Phoenix downtown redevelopment had wiped out the skid 
rows as the central concern of the project. At that time, people believed that once 
downtown Phoenix eliminated its skid rows, its existing facilities and amenities would 
automatically make the city competitive with the suburban areas again. Publicizing 
downtown space by eminent domain power was a necessary step to guide the city 
development into the right track without the historical skid rows. In other words, the 
market mechanism and its logic would stop the downtown decline, because without skid 
rows downtown Phoenix was supposed to be profitable and attractive to private business. 
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However, the policy practices of the urban renewal in the 1970s show that urban 
renewal was not so automatic and could not be taken for granted. In the 1980s, especially 
in Mayor Goddard’s administration, the decline of Phoenix downtown was considered the 
result of “market failure,” rather than simply the outcome of the existence of skid rows.  
As Jim Forsberg, the downtown-redevelopment director, explained, “central 
Phoenix has been a failure of the private sector and, therefore, needs government 
intervention and assistance” (Shanahan, 1984a, p.A1). Merely demolishing old structures 
was only one step. The city government should have done much more and played a 
deeper role in the downtown revitalization than merely demolishing the old town blocks 
with its bulldozers. 
However, it should be clarified that “market failure” in the planning ideology of 
the 1980s does not automatically mean that government would be more successful. 
Rather, it means without rational and comprehensive governmental planning, the market 
system would not automatically revitalize downtown Phoenix or overcome the absence of 
the city government. In this regard, the fate of downtown revitalization depends on the 
city government, rather than private sectors. If a city government does not fulfill its 
responsibility, the market system will not work. As Mayor George Latimer of St. Paul, 
Minn. summarized this perspective in discussing Phoenix downtown revitalization, “the 
people have to gather together and act. There is not an invisible hand that will do it for us” 
(Lobaco, 1989, p.B2).  
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Specifically, in the 1980s planning perspectives, there were three main reasons 
why the market could not automatically revitalize downtown without good government 
assistance and leadership:  
First, careful planning is the city government’s responsibility and is significant for 
downtown revitalization. If the government merely relies on the market signal and 
follows the short-term demand in the market, the downtown construction might be 
disordered. In this regard, the government should provide a foreseeable future to the 
private investors. A comprehensive, and more importantly, stable plan for the downtown 
redevelopment is necessary and was lacking in the previous Patriots Park development. 
For example, Professor Bernard M. Boyle, then chairman of the Arizona State University 
department of planning summarized the short-sighted planning of Patriots Park:  
“Back in 1968 they decided to put a public facility where there were no support 
services. They had to go around destroying all the adjacent buildings in order to create 
support services which were not planned in. They arranged to have hotels built downtown 
and then they discovered there were no restaurants. They also discovered there wasn’t a 
transportation nexus there. So they tore down a building they didn’t like the look of and 
they built a bus station on that site. Then they discovered there wasn’t any entertainment 
there. They needed a movie house or something. The movie house had been the building 
on the site they had cleared for the bus station!” (Rigberg, 1983, p.5) 
This is a fair review of the disorder and short-sighted redevelopment in the 
Patriots Park areas in the 1960s to 1970s. At first, Patriots Park was constructed to be one 
of the “support services” to the new convention center by completely demolishing old 
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structures. The Fox Theater, directly east of the park, was considered antiquated and was 
replaced with a bus station. Then, people found that entertainment was also necessary as 
a support service.   
Subsequently, a vicious cycle was created by the chaos of planning. The private 
businesses had been reluctant to invest downtown because of “iffy plans and surrounding 
condemnations” (Shanahan, 1984b, p.A2). As Carmen Rios, the owner of Seibert’s 
Catholic gift shop, complained, she had to move once due to the project of downtown 
redevelopment, but the building she left still remained standing seventeen years later 
(Shanahan, 1984b, p.A2). Clearly, if the government did not plan the redevelopment 
carefully, the market system itself would not be able to comprehensively plan the 
redevelopment and change downtown Phoenix. 
In addition, in the 1980s, Phoenix city officials and the academic community 
believed that private real estate investors might have different individual interests from 
the commonwealth of the entire city. The private property owners would choose the way 
that maximized their private interests, although it would intensify the decline of 
downtown Phoenix. For example, while many street people needed houses to live in, 
numerous landlords wanted to keep their lands vacant for a potentially more profitable 
use in the future. As Mayor Goddard summarized, “people would rather keep their land 
as parking lots and hope eventually to develop it for commercial. So many people are 
speculating, they don’t think what the immediate needs are” (Hall, 1988, p.C1). More 
directly, Dennis Burke, the then leader of the Arizona Contractors Association, criticized 
that the city should not rely too much on the construction of owner-occupied homes in 
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terms of downtown redevelopment, because “most people don’t want to risk the biggest 
investment of their lives on political promises. The rental market really is the way to 
blaze the trail for downtown” (Hall, 1988, p.C2). 
Since downtown revitalization did not always represent the private interests of 
real estate investors, to guarantee the public interest in redevelopment projects, a city 
government should not only be a regulator, but should be deeply involved in the projects 
at the outset, when major development decisions are made. In this way, the city could be 
in a much better position to protect public interests, because it would have “a seat at the 
bargaining table.” This was exemplified when the city government heavily subsidized 
downtown redevelopment (Turco, 1984, p.D1). 
Last but not the least, the real estate market in the downtown was still not 
competitive with suburban Phoenix, even after the city government demolished the skid 
rows. Or in Forsberg’s words, “it has nothing to do with intentions, only economic 
realities” (Shanahan, 1985a, p.B1). For example, Renaissance Square, the 26-story office 
tower in downtown Phoenix with its garage under Patriots Park, was opened in 1987. 
This office tower was the first and only high-rise building in downtown Phoenix built 
since 1976 (Thurber, 1986), that is, in over 10 years. Trammell Crow Co. of Dallas, the 
developer of Renaissance Square, provided reasons to invest in downtown Phoenix: 
blocks in downtown Phoenix were relatively cheap, mostly vacant, close to a giant 
convention center, and supported by city subsidies. In addition, financial infusion, a 
psychological boost to downtown Phoenix, the increasing downtown businesses and 
people who needed office spaces, and the 60% of the offices that were pre-leased before 
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the construction of the tower were also considered in the evaluation of the project 
proposal (Thurber, 1986). In this regard, it seems that the real estate market of downtown 
Phoenix could stand on its own feet.  
However, when a journalist asked Trammell Crow whether the company would 
have built the $180 million Renaissance Square without city subsidies, “Trammell 
Crow’s Barker answers with an emphatic ‘No’” (Hall, 1988, p.C3). Without millions in 
public subsidies cast into downtown Phoenix, the year 1986 would still be the same as 
any other year since 1976. All the economic potential of downtown Phoenix in the 1980s 
would be meaningless, because “you could get a cleaner, bigger, nicer parcel in the 
suburbs than you could downtown”. In addition, downtown Phoenix was not very 
accessible and as dense as other downtowns (Hall, 1988, p. C3). 
Activities-oriented planning and economic stimulation.  
Compared to the urban renewals from the 1950s to the 1970s, when downtown 
Phoenix redevelopment was rationalized by the skid row demolition, the planning 
theories in the 1980s constructed the planning rationales of redevelopment based on a 
different theory. 
“And why should Phoenix officials focus on downtown after decades of neglect? 
Jane Jacobs, author of The Death and Life of Great American Cities, put it this way in her 
classic 1961 book on urban planning:  
‘When a city heart stagnates or disintegrates, a city as a social neighborhood of 
the whole begins to suffer: People who ought to get together, by means of central 
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activities that are failing, fail to get together. Ideas and money that ought to meet, and do 
so often only by happenstance in a place of central vitality, fail to meet.  
Without a strong and inclusive central heart, a city tends to become a collection of 
interests isolated from one another. It falters at producing something greater, socially, 
culturally and economically, than the sum of its separated parts’” (Hall, 1988, p. C3). 
If the reason for downtown revitalization was defined as constructing social 
integration and the city as a social neighborhood, a public space would play a role as a 
public gathering place and the anchor of social interaction, rather than an amenity as an 
associated premium for downtown real estate investors. In other words, activities in the 
space were more important than the park being viewed from the windows of the 
surrounding offices. Therefore, activities became the new center of the new Patriots Park 
redevelopment planning. This planning perspective had a hefty dose of Jacobs’ planning 
ideologies. 
First, the design of a nighttime center;  
Although in the 1970s Phoenix witnessed the great urban renewals, to most of the 
Phoenix residents, particularly women, downtown Phoenix was a place to avoid at night. 
As the 1982 Patriots Park Redevelopment plan presents, the previous downtown 
redevelopment attempts focused on expanding and strengthening Phoenix’s role as an 
office center. On the one hand, the newly built offices, with no doubt, brought white-
collar workers to downtown Phoenix. The office crowd as well as civil officials and 
people who worked in or visited the nearby governmental buildings in the Governmental 
Mall district turned the original Patriots Park into a popular lunch-hour hangout. In this 
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regard, the original park design worked as the then City Manager John Wentz’s plan in 
1973: the park will be the “focal point” of downtown Phoenix as the “anchor” for the 
entire Governmental Mall district (Arizona Republic, 1973a, p.B1). 
 However, on the other hand, the original planning did not realize that such 
people left downtown at night. After all employees left, and Patriots Park became a 
magnet for homeless people and created a vicious cycle with the camping of transients 
and the departure of working people reinforcing each other. Using a downtown park as a 
shelter for homeless people was definitely not the planned purpose of the city planners 
and officials.   
Therefore, the design of the redeveloped Patriots Park highly emphasized the role 
of the park as a “day-and-night activities center” (Broderick, 1987b, p. B1), in which 
more lights at night were the most important component. Downtown redevelopment was 
not understood as a skid row elimination. More importantly, reshaping Phoenix’s 
downtown into a cultural and nightlife center was considered one of the ten key 
achievements in Mayor Goddard’s record (Arizona Republic, 1988a, C2). As Jim 
Forsberg and other city officials and planners believed, more lights and activities at night 
would “brighten up not only downtown, but its image as well” (Luptak, 1983, p.G4). 
Patriots Park thus was decided as the place for the Fiesta of Lights, which was a 
downtown show organized and funded by the city, including entertainment, food, and of 
course a display of lights.  
Within this perspective, it was hoped the redeveloped Patriots would become a 
bright, shining and attractive park. The design of the original Patriots Park, which was a 
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simple and traditional open space with trees, lawn, a few benches and a fountain at its 
center, was believed not appropriate for nighttime entertainment and activities. Planners 
and officials hoped the redeveloped Patriots could have multicolored lights, laser 
equipment, a concert amphitheater, or more to the point, a place appropriate for nighttime 
parties.   
The activities-oriented planning ideology formed the new features of the park, as 
architect Ted Alexander designed it: 
All of the trees in the park have Christmas lights strung up them and are covered 
with tiny white sparkling lights. Forty-foot light sculptures adorn each corner of the park, 
and the street lamps are lit with clusters of round bulbs. Thus, the scene of the park was 
supposed to be that the 800 seats amphitheater and six fountains would have “too many 
lights to count” (Jorden, 1987, p.B1). 
In addition, columns, pedestals and pillars made of reflective glass blocks were 
designed to glow at night, like giant ice cubes (Patterson, 1989). In Alexander’s plan, the 
park should act as a sort of beacon in the center of the city, giving off light in glass-block 
pillars, in the fountains, on the brick planters and from the twisted glass light poles 
(James, 1988a). 
More importantly than the decorative lights scattered everywhere in the park, the 
laser beam equipment was the centerpiece for the new nighttime activities center. 
Specifically, the lasers were divided into two light sources: 
The main laser equipment emitted a giant blue-green aerial laser beam up to 8 feet 
in diameter (Broderick, 1987b). According to Alexander’s design, this giant laser beam 
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was designed to shine into the night sky as far as the eye can see and be visible for six to 
ten miles (Patterson, 1989; Jorden, 1987)
7
.This equipment was set up in a 115-tall steel 
spire flanked by skewers of white light globes and woven fabric discs (Patterson, 1989). 
As a Phoenix resident recalled, this scene of the laser beam looked similar to the light 
beam at the Luxor in Las Vegas (Jonas, 2007). From the perspective of the park designer, 
this huge laser cylinder from the heart of downtown Phoenix would play the role as a 
beacon for downtown activity (Walker, 1989).  
In addition, there were two other coin-operated multicolored laser kaleidoscope 
operators located on the north side of the park. Park visitors, particularlly kids, were able 
to project images onto large translucent, salmon-colored fabric screens across the dome 
underneath the spire, creating their own light shows or switching on pre-programmed 
shows with a joystick
8
 (Broderick, 1987a; Patterson, 1989; James, 1989). As Mike 
Whiting, an administrator with the Phoenix Parks, Recreation and Library Department 
who oversaw the project introduced, “on those screens you’ll see some abstract images 
and some realistic patterns that are programmed on a computer module on the ground. 
You’ll be able to manipulate the image in intensity, the complexity of the image or its 
rotation or its velocity, how it moves on the screen” (Walker, 1989, para.3).The price was 
merely one quarter for the 90-seconds laser control (Kwok, 1988).  
Shaping Patriots Park as a new night-activity center is the main theme of all the 
aforementioned designs. As Jane Morris, park project manager for the Economic 
                                                 
7 Alexander convinced the Federal Aviation Administration that the light from the lasers would not be strong enough to 
interfere with traffic at Sky Harbor International Airport and agreed to obey the city’s dark-sky ordinance by turning off 
the lasers at 11 p.m (Jorden, 1987June 14). See more security information of this laser equipment in the appendix. 
 
8 Finally, the operator was controlled by a touch screen. 
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Development Department, and Mike Whiting, administrator for the central-parks district 
noted, the park and the underground garage would be welllit and patrolled round-the-
clock by security personnel and police. “Once people learn it is a safe place, Patriots will 
begin attracting entertainment, festivals or other activities” (Broderick, 1987b). In this 
way, the park could become a night-activity center even without the laser, and thus truly 
revitalize downtown Phoenix. 
Second, futuristic theme as a self-identity; 
In Kunstler’s (1994) famous book Geography of Nowhere, he criticizes that the 
“man-made” landscapes in the U.S have ignored and departed from the local tradition. 
Then, the cookie-cutter planning and one-size-fits-all architectural standards damaged the 
self-identity of the local culture, and finally created the geography of nowhere. In 
Phoenix’s planning history of the 1980s, the lack of theme was a large problem and 
raised great concern among urban planners.  
An architectural theme is not only an aesthetic issue. More importantly, it is 
related to the basic planning ideology of a city, particularly in terms of the downtown 
redevelopment. From the perspective of Phoenix planners in the 1980s, the previous 
demolition-oriented planning and the ignorance of historical perseveration were at least 
partially derived from the lack of an architectural theme in downtown Phoenix. 
As Boyle, the chairman of the planning department of Arizona State University, 
summarized in a 1983 interview, 
“People tend to feel about their environment according to what it is like when 
they grow up in it. If you lived in New England, you wouldn’t dream of building a house 
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of adobe and covering it with stucco or painting it brown. You would build a house out of 
wood, or whatever fits in. Well, the trouble is, if you come out here to Phoenix, what do 
you do? If we don’t have an indigenous tradition, then some people build houses out of 
stucco and some out of brick and some have flat roofs and some have pitched roofs. 
Some are even building what we call in New England, ‘Garrisoned Colonials.’ What you 
see in Phoenix is what Phoenix is. Phoenix is a city made up of immigrants, and the 
people who lived here originally did not set out to consciously establish a physical sense 
of community. So subsequent settlers trampled all over earlier history”(Rigberg, 1983, 
p.5). 
Even worse, this problem was prominent in downtown Phoenix, even when 
merely comparing the city of Phoenix with other cities in the valley of the Phoenix 
metropolitan areas. For example, in 1988, the cities of Tempe and Scottsdale had 
previously required that downtown development conform to certain themes that reflected 
a Southwestern flavor. Other cities in the valley required developers to place retail shops 
on the first floor of all new downtown high-rise buildings to help brighten up the bland 
street fronts characteristic of downtowns (Hall, 1988).   
However, as Mayor Goddard explained, because it was difficult for the city of 
Phoenix to lure developers to its downtown (consider Phoenix’s 10 years with no new 
high-rise building in its downtown), it was also difficult to apply strict design standards 
in such a situation. If the standards of the theme would scare builders off, then the 
standards would be meaningless. Or in the mayor’s words, “We frankly haven’t felt like 
we’ve had the leverage to put too many restrictions on (developers),” even though he 
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directly described that some new privately constructed buildings were as ugly as 
“garbage.” (Hall, 1988) 
At that time, the theme of public space became extremely important, because it 
was directly under the control of the Phoenix city government. However, Phoenix public 
space developments in the 1970s lacked a theme. As Boyle pointed out, “architecturally 
speaking, the buildings are just indifferent, not good or bad. Just enclosure is all they are. 
In terms of land use, they are woefully incompetent” (Rigberg, 1983, p.5). 
From the perspective of the planner in the 1980s, the original Patriots Park also 
lacked a theme. The simple design of lawn, trees, benches, and a central fountain did not 
distinguish the uniqueness of Phoenix from other cities. The park was generic and could 
have been placed in any other city without confusion. However, that was no longer the 
architectural preference of planners in the 1980s. 
Alexander, the designer of the redeveloped Patriots Park, emphasized that the 
design of the new park should be unique and different from traditional urban parks. 
However, he did not want to apply the Southwestern theme in Phoenix as the cities of 
Tempe and Scottsdale had done (Novotny, 1988).  
From Alexander’s perspective, the unique theme of Phoenix could not be based 
on the tradition of the city, because Phoenix was a relatively new and growing city. As he 
said, “you go to many towns and you see town squares with statues of horses rearing up 
and bronze plaques, It wouldn’t have been appropriate for Phoenix. This isn’t a city that’s 
looking backward”(Novotny, 1988, p. MS22). 
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In contrast to the traditional statues and bronze plaques, Alexander identified the 
theme of the redeveloped Patriots Park as a futuristic town square, where “kid who comes 
down here to play with the laser will suddenly have the feeling that there’s something to 
do here, that we’re in a city that’s moving into the 21st century” (Novotny, 1988, MS22). 
Alexander believed that a high-technology, futuristic city should be the theme of 
downtown Phoenix. Consistent with the futuristic identity, the designer installed a 
futuristic-appearing steel spire, dome, red brick and laser system in the redeveloped park. 
These features were uncommon in previous Phoenix downtown buildings.  
From Alexander’s perspective, this was an attempt to shape a new theme for a 
city, although it would take some time for Phoenix residents to become used to it. “We’re 
trying to create a symbol here that reflects Phoenix’s growth. And anytime you make a 
bold statement for a community, there’s no way to please everybody. They wanted to tear 
down the St. Louis arch for two years after it was built. The Eiffel Tower was the same 
way” (Broderick, 1987a, p.B4). Alexander believed Patriots would be Phoenix’s Eiffel 
Tower with a futuristic theme. 
Alexander’s futuristic theme was generally controversial. His supporters believed 
that the avant-garde park design broke through the aesthetic conservatism of the 
nondescript skyscrapers of Phoenix’s downtown. Although architects and corporations 
were reluctant to offer an innovative design for fear of losing a commission, the design of 
Patriots Park was a positive attempt at change (Lessner, 1988, p.A10). However, other 
people felt differently about the futuristic park design. For example, Nilsson, the 
columnist writer of Arizona Republic, believed that although the original park was the 
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home of vagrants, it was nevertheless a park, whereas the futuristic space was not a park, 
but a new blight because it was ugly and should be destroyed by lasers (Nilsson, 1987, 
p.A8). Mayor Goddard chose a half-joking manner in which to refer to the new theme of 
a jumble of brick, wrought iron, concrete and glass blocks: “the Martians landed and left 
something at Patriots Square” (Arizona Republic, 1987, p.A2). In other words, the new 
theme of the park was in fact identifiable and definitely not undistinguished.  
Third, attract people and encourage participation;   
Homeless people camping in the park was the most prominent problem in the 
original Patriots Park; thus, how the new design of the redeveloped park could prevent 
the same result was a key concern in society. Alexander believed that transients would 
not be a big issue following the redevelopment (Patterson, 1989, p.S12). Phoenix 
architect Peter A. Len-drum also held a similar perspective: “everybody talks about the 
bums, but the bums don’t show up in crowds” (Patterson, 1984, p.S4). Then, the problem 
was how to draw crowds to Patriots Park by a systematic planning associated with 
physical design, regulation policy and the city’s management of activities. 
In terms of the design, the basic idea of the design was creating a “non-rigid park 
on top of a very rigid parking structure” (Patterson, 1989, p.S12). As Alexander 
introduced, 
“I spent six months researching what make public space work... I learned that 
what it takes is food, water, shade, lots of place to sit, entertainment, sun—depending on 
the time of day—and an element of discovery or surprise” (Patterson, 1989, p.S12). 
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Therefore, the redeveloped park replaced the few wooden benches with an 800-
seat amphitheater. Moreover, every horizontal surface in the park from the planters to the 
fountains to the grass that surrounded the amphitheater was designed for walking or 
sitting, with no “keep off the grass” signs (James, 1988a, p.B2). 
By contrast to the single fountain as a centerpiece, fountains were scattered 
throughout the redeveloped park. According to the designer, “Bubbling fountains will 
soothe the frayed nerves of office workers, and a waterfall will spill into a moat that lines 
the amphitheater’s semicircular stage” (Nolen, 1988b, p.B1). In this way, the sound of the 
water was supposed to draw people to this public space. The fountains and the waterfall 
thus created visual and audible sensation as soon as visitors entered the park (Nolen, 
1988b, p.B1). 
The numerous fountains, 144 trees and lawn were intended to cool the public 
space. The ultimate goal of the design was shaping the park into “the great outdoor café 
of Phoenix” (Broderick, 1987, p.B4).  
Alexander believed that the free-to-walk-on lawn, sufficient seating, scenery, and 
the laser equipment operated by visitors would encourage people’s participation in this 
public space and encourage them to interact with one another. “Rather than a bronze 
statue of a horse with a man on its back, you’ll have something that’s interactive that 
involves the public,” he said (Michaelis, 1987, p. B1).  
The city also contributed to the attempt to attract more people to this downtown 
park. Two copper-topped concession kiosks (one on Saturday) served foods in the park 
(James, 1988a, p.B2). The idea of serving food in Patriots Park had a long history. As 
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early as in 1976 the first year of the original Patriots Park, the city council considered 
allowing food vendors inside the park. Nearby restaurateurs, however, fought against this 
idea (Bommersbach, 1976, p.B1). In the 1980s, learning from the lesson of the original 
park, the city council insisted on allowing the food vendors in the park. 
Further, the city funded musical performances at noon on weekdays. These free 
lunchtime concerts included multiple types of music, and focused on holiday music 
through December (James, 1988a, p.B2). The music was an important component of the 
plan to attract people to the park. 
More important than the lunchtime performance, the evening musical concerts 
were used by the city government as a tool to help solve the city’s problems. For example, 
in the 1980s, Phoenix was a traditional gathering place for the cruisers of the valley. 
Cruisers came from as far as Goodyear and Avondale, flocking to central Phoenix, after 
Metrocenter was closed to cruisers at the request of the mall’s owner (Newberg, 1989, 
p.B2). However, the business owners and residents of downtown Phoenix complained 
that cruisers made excessive noise, snarled traffic and littered (Leonard, 1989, p.B4).  
To address this situation, the city provided free night parties at Patriots Park on 
weekends. The parties featured bands, disc jockeys from local radio stations, food and 
beverage booths (no alcohol), and car contests in which trophies and gift certificates were 
awarded to the best-looking vehicles. The city paid $3,500 to $4,000 per weekend for the 
parties and established these alterative activities for the cruisers and others (Leonard, 
1989, p.B4). In the city’s plan, these activities would attract more people to Patriots Park, 
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revitalize the nighttime atmosphere of downtown Phoenix, and thus be good for 
everybody. 
The Distortion in Spatial Practice 
Although Jacobs’ theories are directly opposed to Le Corbusier’s, whereas Jacobs’ 
theories were practically applied in the plans of Patriots Park redevelopment, the 
redeveloped space experienced a similar distortion: the meaning of the space deviated 
from the expectations of the city officials and planners, and evolved in a real spatial 
context.    
Generally, Jacobs (1961) indeed emphasized social interaction, public 
participation, and public space, particularly in terms of constructing a sense of 
community. Although the superficial outlook of a city’s old town might not be as clean 
and ordered as a modern “radiant city” from urban planners’ perspectives, the activities 
and people’s connections within the public space increase the commonwealth of the city. 
Or in Zukin’s (2010) terms, people’s interaction and participation shape the authenticity 
of a public space. At least in the plans, the design of the redeveloped Patriots Park 
emphasized people’s participation. The city planners and officials attempted to resolve 
the social tension among different groups, such as the homeless and working people, 
residents and cruisers, and so on, by inclusive public activities, rather than excluding the 
less desirable groups (e.g. the homeless and cruisers) by tough policing. In the 1980s, city 
officials and planners had great expectations for an inclusive Patriots Park at the heart of 
the city center. In this regard, Talton’s (2015) comment that Mayor Goddard had “read 
and absorbed the lessons of Jacobs” (p.110) was consistent with the history of Phoenix 
downtown redevelopment in the 1980s.  
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 However, the city of Phoenix included some features that were different from 
Jacobs’ case. The economic reality as well as its underlying rationales and mechanism 
were important issues in the case of Phoenix’s downtown redevelopment. To a large 
degree, Jacobs’ theory did not focus on economic reality or economic stimulation. In her 
works, the vitality of the old town blocks was based on traditional social connections, the 
existing sense of community, and the specific identity of local culture. None of these 
features was associated with public funding. However, the situation of downtown 
Phoenix in the 1980s was different. Although the redevelopment project was mostly 
supported by governmental funding, legitimizing public spending on public space was 
necessary to persuade taxpayers to pay for the park. Constructing the rationale for 
economic stimulation became the necessary condition for the legitimacy of the Patriots 
Park redevelopment plan. The contradictions between Jacobs’ theory and economic 
reality were gradually shaping the meaning and evolution of the public space. While the 
city government implemented the redevelopment plan of Patriots Park, the reality of park 
construction and management did not always work in the manner that Jacobs suggested. 
The disputes between the city and the builder.  
The plan of Patriots Park’s redevelopment was largely rational, although the 
practice of the plan was not automatically smooth. In fact, the redevelopment of Patriots 
Park encountered great difficulty in its construction in terms of the cooperation between 
the city government and the developer. The disputes between the builder and the city 
government postponed the reopening of the park for two years, and required another $3.1 
million to solve the problems. In addition, the opportunity cost was high because all other 
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completed facilities to generate income, such as the underground garage, could not be 
used until the disputes were resolved.     
As a component of the large redevelopment project, the redeveloped Patriots Park 
was atop the garages connecting Renaissance Square. Patriots Park and Renaissance 
Square were begun at approximately the same time in 1986. The redevelopment of the 
park was supposed to be completed on July 17th 1987 (Broderick, 1987a, p.B5).  
However, whereas the privately owned office towers were finished as designated 
by the plan, the people of Phoenix witnessed the dispute between the government and 
developers for more than two years during the construction of Patriots Park. 
According to the park design, trees should be planted in waterproof tree wells. 
Thus, large shade trees rather than decorative trees could be planted in the park. In 
addition, the water for the trees and fountains would not leak into the underground garage 
(Nolen, 1988b). However, the general contractor, Mardian Construction Co. encountered 
a number of problems during the construction. These problems created a dispute among 
the contractor, the consulting engineers, and the city. 
Whereas the people of Phoenix waited during the two-year delay for the 
reopening of the park, they witnessed the contractor and the city continually blaming one 
another. Mardian Construction Co. alleged that the city of Phoenix and the engineering 
consultant were negligent and required Mardian to perform “unreasonable and hyper-
technical tests and inspections of the work performed” (Nolen, 1988b, p.B3). From the 
perspective of Mardian President Dick Rizzo, waterproofing the fountains based on city 
specifications did not work, and the city opposed Mardian’s finishing the job with 
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different waterproofing materials (Nolen, 1988b, p.B1). Thus, according to Mardian, the 
city government should take responsibility for the delay.  
 Conversely, city officials, such as the then consulting engineer Ron Brenner, 
blamed the delay on Mardian’s inappropriate construction and their cheating on the work. 
“After discovering cracks in several fountains, city engineers broke open and inspected, 
four of the nine in the park. In each, they discovered that structural steel was left out or 
inappropriately installed,” as Brenner said (Nolen, 1988b, p.B3). A city report criticized 
the contractor’s failure to accelerate the schedule by an extended work force, hours, 
and/or work days as the government had requested. Then, the faulty waterproofing of the 
park’s concrete did result in leaks (Arizona Republic, 1988b, p.B3 ).  
 Thus, a $ 3.1 million bond of city’s direct investment was later paid to fix the 
failed waterproofing system in Patriots Park (Phoenix Business Journal, 2005), albeit the 
park had already cost $ 15 million ($ 12 million by the city, and $ 3 million by the 
Trammell Crow Co.) (Arizona Republic, 1988c, pp.C4,C5). This steep financial overrun 
turned the dispute into a lawsuit (James, 1988b). 
 Mardian filed suit in May 1988 against Read Jones Christoffersen Inc., an 
engineering consulting company hired by the city; and the City of Phoenix Civic 
Improvement Corp., a non-profit organization responsible for building the project. The 
suit alleged a loss of time and materials because of the delay, whereas Mardian and Read 
Jones argued over the proper waterproofing material and how to apply them. Finally, 
both sides agreed to a sticky sheet product applied to the surface of the decking and used 
fiberglass to seal the leaking fountains (Patterson, 1989, p.S12). 
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The problem of leaks deeply influenced the history of Patriots Park. The poor 
performance and the prevarication during the project intensified people’s doubt that the 
city government had the ability to efficiently and effectively redevelop downtown 
Phoenix, particularly if government redevelopment appeared always to require more 
public investment rather than less in its associated projects. Thus, the disputes over 
waterproofing generated a sense of distrust in the government. In addition, whether a 
park with trees and fountains should be placed atop an underground garage was seriously 
questioned. The bitter memory of the leaking fountains and tree wells of the redeveloped 
Patriots Park also influenced the associated planning of Patriots Park in the future. These 
details are analyzed in the following sections.     
The park management and the later de facto abandonment. 
If a visitor had visited the redeveloped Patriots Park during its first four years 
(1988-1991), he might have seen it as an example of Jacobs’ public space. The free 
lunchtime musical performances every weekday, the free night parties with lights and 
auto shows on weekends, and the multiple festival events and activities in Patriots Park to 
a large extent fulfilled the expectations of the redevelopment plan: allow the inclusive 
activities within the space to resolve the tensions among different groups, and form an 
integrated atmosphere in a public space. The coin-operated laser kaleidoscope brought 
children (and thus their parents) to the amphitheater. As columnist writer Montini (1988, 
p.B1) described, finally, Patriots Park, the previous de facto shelter of homeless people, 
worked as a park, while children were playing and dancing on the stage and the waterfall, 
flower stands and red brick formed a scene in the park .  
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The problem of homeless people taking baths in the park’s fountains appeared to 
be solved by the redesign of the park including more activities and police patrolling on 
bikes (Frauenheim, 1989, p.D8). A security service was hired specifically to patrol the 
park. This arrangement created a better feeling regarding safety within the park (Arizona 
Republic, 1989, p.B3). Ordinary people liked to come to the redeveloped park to 
experience a pleasant lunch hour listening to local musical bands (Secrest, 1989). An 
editorial in Arizona Republic appreciated the park “with its myriad activities” as the 
community’s focal point (Editorial, 1989, p.A12). 
However, the changes in the space were not the automatic results of the park 
design, but the result of continual funding by the city government. Of course, the city 
government received private donations from multiple sources. For example, $ 186,000 in 
private donation was raised for the park redevelopment, including $ 100,000 from Valley 
National Bank. Phoenix Newspapers Inc., donated the equipment for the three lasers, 
worth $ 106,000. Although the private supporters invested a large amount of money in 
the park redevelopment, maintaining the laser scene nevertheless cost the city more than 
$ 57,000 of the bond money (James, 1989). 
As Bill Shover, Phoenix Newspapers public-affairs director, pointed out, although 
his company donated the necessary laser equipment, the city could no longer merely rely 
on private funding to support and maintain a public space with multiple activities: “It’s 
just that the public sector has not been able to come through like it used to because the 
economy’s down. It’s for public use, just like you use public funds for slides and 
bleachers at parks” (James, 1989, p.D2). Another main donor, Valley National Bank, also 
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supported the idea that the city should use bond money to maintain the scenery of the 
park.   
Public space studies sometimes imply that public space is a location, rather than a 
social space that is created by people. Discussions regarding the cost of public space 
maintenance generally focused on privately owned public space. In terms of the public 
space owned by the government, people generally assumed that public funding would be 
reliable and stable: taxes are more stable than business profit, and a government would 
maintain a public space based on social interests rather than an economic cost-benefit 
analysis. Thus, the discussions regarding government-owned public space focused more 
on the social contents and relations within the space than the existence of the space.  
Within this perspective of government-owned public space, the abandonment of 
public space by a city government because of economic profitability is nearly irrational. 
Public space is a type of public goods that serves everyone and is funded by taxes 
regardless of individual citizen willingness. As long as a public space fulfills its planning 
purpose, the survival of a government-owned public space does not rely on its 
profitability. 
However, although a public space is maintained by the government, that 
maintenance is not free. The budget for public spaces should not be taken for granted. A 
public space might be the most vulnerable to budget cutting: citizens would not 
immediately complain about cutting the budget for public space maintenance. They might 
nevertheless be able to come to the public space without appropriate maintenance, albeit 
the numbers of people who choose to visit the space might decrease. The decrease in 
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visitors, however, would be a lengthy and imperceptible process, as well as reinforcing 
the indifferent feeling toward the public space. Such a process is a type of the “tragedy of 
the commons”: no one assumes the maintenance of public space as their top priority 
although everyone can use the space. The history of Patriots Park is such a case. 
In addition to the potential indifference to a public space, the economic rationales 
might be a significant motivation for taxpayers to promote the abandonment of 
government-owned public spaces and stop funding public space maintenance. Public 
space is free to the users, but not to the taxpayers. Regardless of the original Patriots Park 
in 1976 or the redeveloped park in 1988, sales taxes from the surrounding businesses, city 
bonds, and other governmental subsidies remained prominent during construction. Based 
on the fact that the city government paid $ 12 million for Patriots Park redevelopment 
and $ 3.1 million for the waterproofing, Patriots Park was definitely not cheap for 
taxpayers.  
More importantly, the payers of the sales tax did not evaluate the public space as 
the urban planner did. The urban planners had great expectations that the redeveloped 
Patriots Park would resolve social tensions related to the homeless, downtown auto 
cruisers, and other undesirable groups of people by creating an activities-oriented and 
integrated public space. However, few payers of special sale taxes evaluate a public space 
according to the improvement in social well-being. Whether the increased turnover from 
the customers attracted to the park could pay back the special sales tax was the most 
important issue.         
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Although the government heavily promoted the redevelopment of Patriots Park, 
the city government did not persuade the downtown business owners to support the 
project by the social values of the redeveloped park, but by the profitability of a public 
space project. Or in Mayor Goddard’s words, the city “must leverage limited city 
resources with private funds”(Thomason, 1985, p. B5): 
“By concentrating our development efforts in areas of chronic underemployment 
and areas which have been slow to participate in the city’s prosperity, we will add to the 
tax base and accomplish our employment and revitalization goals. In this way, we built 
and will maintain a homeless shelter. The same technique will build Square One (a 
downtown retail development), a downtown parking garage at Patriots and new housing 
downtown” (Thomason, 1985, p.B5). 
In other words, a public space would be good, because it would not only revitalize 
the downtown landscape, but more importantly it would also improve the tax base. When 
more people came to downtown, the money they brought to downtown would cover the 
cost of public space maintenance. The millions the government invested was intended to 
start this virtuous cycle. 
It would have been good, if the history of Patriots Park had worked as the 
planners and officials had expected it to. However, the reality did not follow this path. In 
1990, city officials projected a $ 13.7 million shortfall for the 1990-1991 fiscal year, 
because of a slowdown in the development industry and lower-than-anticipated sales tax 
collections (Baker, 1990). The direct result was that after the four percent budget 
reduction of the parks department, the Phoenix Parks, Recreation and Library Department 
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experienced another 2 percent cutback in their budget for the 1990-1991 fiscal year 
(Baker, 1990).  
Although the sale tax collection could not demonstrate that a park was profitable 
by collecting sufficient sale taxes, the government-owned park and its public values were 
also abandoned by the economic logic of the market system. In 1990, Mayor Johnson and 
his city council guided the practice of park management in a new direction. The mayor 
and city council members declared that the redevelopment of downtown Phoenix was 
completed in 1990. As then Vice Mayor Linda Nadolski said, “it’s time to recognize our 
job in downtown is culminating. The majority of the council believes we’re almost 
finished now that the projects are in place” (Valdez, 1990, p.C1). The redevelopment of 
Patriots Park areas was no longer the key concern of the city council. The Parks and 
Recreation Board then increased the park rents in an attempt to maintain the park’s 
sustainability (Arizona Republic Northwest Community, 1990, p.8 ).  
In general, the year 1991 was an important turning point in the history of Patriots 
Park. On the one hand, the redeveloped park experienced its final glory. The laser 
equipment was finally installed and able to create the futuristic scene in the park on 
December 8, 1990 (James, 1990, p.A1).Every Friday and Saturday night from 6-11 pm, 
Patriots Park had its laser show with free on-street parking after 5 pm and on weekends 
(Arizona Republic, 1992, p.E5). The weekday lunchtime live musical performances and 
the food vendors created a great atmosphere for people’s lunchtime relaxation. The 
visitors who came to the park as well as the police officers on bicycles outnumbered the 
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homeless people in the park (Heroux, 1991). Everything appeared to be working 
according to the planners’ expectations. 
The belief in the completion of downtown revitalization and the unprofitability of 
public spaces began to emerge in 1991. Although the laser equipment was approved by 
the city council, it was by a 5-3 vote. Three council members insisted that “the money 
could be spent on other endeavors during tough economic times” (James, 1990, p.A1); 
the funding for the free daily Patriots lunchtime entertainment program that had been 
proposed by James Colley, the director of the park department, was eliminated to reduce 
the budget (Baker, 1990, p.4). Only several months after the first laser show, city officials, 
including Mayor Johnson, began to consider shutting off the laser display in Patriots Park 
(Brings, 1991, p.A14; Unger, 1991, p.2). All of these plans and perspectives were 
indications of the future sharp changes, although the specific policies had not yet been 
implemented in 1991. As Penny Howe, the then chairwoman of the Phoenix Parks, 
Recreation and Library Board, commented on the budget plan of 1990-1991 fiscal year, 
“we were lucky this year... I don’t think we’ll be as lucky in the future” (Valdez, 1990, 
p.C3).            
To a large degree, she was right. In early 1992, the city of Phoenix started to 
prepare a budget cut; “no one was exempt, and at the same time, the cuts seemed to be 
spread throughout all the departments,” Mayor Johnson said (Saavedra, 1992, p.B3). 
On June 19th 1992, the budget cuts were announced. The laser display in Patriots 
Park reached the end of its short life of nearly 18 months, and was finally turned off. The 
laser display generally attracted 1,000 to 1,200 people on Friday and Saturday nights. As 
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architect Ted Alexander said, “it (the laser display) does exactly what it’s supposed to do: 
bring younger people, families and kids downtown”(Cordova, 1992, p.B3); but 
eliminating the show saved $10,000. Although a citizen raised the question that since the 
city and private supporters spent $3 million to install the laser system, why abandon the 
system to save a mere $10,000 repair fee (Bethel, 1995, p.3). However, the laser display 
and the entertainment program in public spaces were not pressing needs to most people. 
As Joe Niccoli, who owned food kiosks at Patriots park, said, “The sad part of it is, when 
it’s gone, nobody is going to complain. It’s not something they’ll call the City Council 
about, but they’ll miss it” (Cordova, 1992, p.B3). Therefore, the funding to maintain a 
government-owned public space was not necessarily more stable than a privately owned 
public space.   
Moreover, the budget of the Phoenix Police Department was cut drastically. In 
other words, the strategies to maintain the space by activities and by policing were finally 
discarded, since late 1992 (Cordova, 1992, p.B3).  
The evolution of Patriots Park after abandonment.  
The deterioration process of an abandoned public space is slow and gradual. 
However, although scarcely any Phoenix residents called the city council to complain 
about the abandonment of the park, the quality of the park was indeed being changing 
during this time.  
Then, in 1996, the downtown merchants and city officials observed “beggars and 
street hawkers” occupying Patriots Park and the associated downtown areas again. 
Because of this situation, the downtown business owners “persuaded the city’s economic-
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development staff that it’s time to get tough”. Policeman Lt. Terry McDonald, who then 
supervised this downtown area, said, “it’s probably getting to a point where it’s out of 
control” (Wagner, 1996, p.B1). 
Ironically, after years of redevelopment in Patriots Park areas, park regulation and 
management appeared to have returned to the starting point. The city officials and 
merchants in 1996 thought they were pushing for new jobs; however, what they said, 
what they did, and what they thought mostly echoed their predecessors in the 1970s. 
First, the downtown merchants complained that the policing and law enforcement 
were not sufficiently forceful to expel the beggars, who scared their customers. 
Then, Margaret Mullin, then executive director of the downtown Phoenix 
Partnership, led a cleanup campaign to “crackdown” on the undesirable beggars in the 
area. Although the cleanup campaign in 1996 did not call itself “downtown is fighting 
back,” it had the majority of the features of its predecessor: people were requested not to 
give money to vagrants; police handed out information on social services available in the 
city; and police began warning sidewalk solicitors that they were in violation of vagrancy 
laws: “A second offense would earn a misdemeanor citation, and a third would require a 
court appearance” (Wagner, 1996, p.B1). 
More importantly, the not-tough-enough policing was again interpreted as the 
reason for the accumulation of homeless people in Patriots Park. For example, Mullin 
said “ordinances have been on the books for decades, but city officials failed to enforce 
them ‘to the detriment of citizens’”. Mullins also reeled off “horror stories” about beggars 
threatening downtown visitors and street vendors causing traffic hazards (Wagner, 1996, 
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p.B1). Then, her summary to the situation was that “the homeless problem is not just a 
threat to business, but to the security of average people” (Wagner, 1996, p.B1).       
Michael Ratner, co-owner of Tom’s Tavern, recalled that his “patrons gawked 
while a homeless man stripped and bathed in the fountain at Patriots Square” (Wagner, 
1996, p.B3). 
Then, the various attitudes toward public nuisances and the real crimes that 
created so much tension between police and local merchants in the 1970s reoccurred in 
1996. At that time, the city abandoned park maintenance and its designed plans for 
nighttime activities. 
For example, Kathy Lubay, then bureau chief in the Phoenix Prosecutors Office, 
said “the misdemeanor laws are almost never enforced unless some more serious crime is 
also involved. Her office prosecuted just three panhandling cases last year (1995) in the 
downtown area” (Wagner, 1996, p.B3).     
In addition, when the city severely cut the budget for public services and park 
maintenance, the paradox of the homeless problem of the 1970s reappeared in 1990s 
Phoenix: people required tough policing to expel homeless people from the park; 
however, there were no alternative places homeless people could move to, because the 
budget for public services had been cut. As Mary Orton, executive director of central 
Arizona Shelter Services, the then largest downtown homeless refuge, said, “If we’re 
going to get tough on enforcement, we better make sure there are other opportunities 
available. And right now, we’re full” (Wagner, 1996, p.B3).   
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Therefore, in a re-enactment of the deadlock in the original Patriots Park of the 
1970s, the redeveloped Patriots Park that was designed by Jacobs’ planning theories 
unfortunately ended up in the same place in 1996. On September 29th 1997, city 
spokeswoman Marie Chappie Ca-Macho noted that after seven years of non-maintenance, 
the abandoned $355,000 lasers, which had once drawn hundreds of people downtown, 
had “fallen into such disrepair that it’s not worth exploring the idea of restarting them” 
(Arizona Republic, 1997, p.B1). Regardless of the planning theories of Le Corbusier or 
Jacob that the planners applied, both the original and the redeveloped Patriots Park 
became an urban “lost space” or the “home of homeless people”. 
Social Perception: The Increase in Discontent toward Public Space 
As the methodology chapter of this dissertation reviews, contradictions are the 
primary force promoting the evolution of a space. Within the history of the redeveloped 
Patriots Park, the underlying contradiction between the revitalization and the profitability 
of Patriots Park deeply influenced the legitimacy of the space and people’s perception. In 
essence, this contradiction was derived from the planning rationales for redeveloping the 
space: the city officials and planners, on the one hand, promoted the redevelopment of 
Patriots Park by an approach to building a more integrated and inviting public space 
based on Jacobs’ theories; however, they advocated for and rationalized the millions 
spent on public investment and subsidies, using the economic logic that public 
investment would leverage private investment, then bring in more sales taxes to pay back 
the park.  
Under such a plan, the legitimacy of the park had two contradictory evaluation 
standards from the inception of the redevelopment. This contradiction finally bred 
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discontent toward government-owned public space in the public perception and created 
the abandonment of the planning purposes of the redeveloped Patriots Park. This section 
reviews the process of how the discontented perception was increasing and its underlying 
logic.      
The Worry over the Overproduction of the Downtown Revitalization Project.    
First, the most prominent representation of the contradiction was the absence of 
“equilibrated demand”: combining the legitimacy of spatial integration and profitability, 
blurred the equilibrium between production and demand. According to market system 
logic, the production of goods (say a public space, such as Patriots Park) should be 
controlled at the equilibrated level, which means that the economic benefit could repay 
the cost. Within the economic discourse, investment in a public space would have a clear 
appropriate point. If the government invested more funding than the sales tax could repay, 
this investment would be irrational and should be terminated. This is the discourse of 
profitability that the city officials implied to persuade the taxpayers and collect the 
special sales tax.  
However, the city government did not consider the redevelopment of Patriots Park 
only as a business promotion strategy. More importantly, the city planners and officials 
used the park as a focal point to draw people downtown and released the intergroup 
tensions, such as among homeless people, cruisers, white collar workers, and surrounding 
residents, by integrated activities. However, the contradictory point was that although 
reinforcing social integration is an outstanding social benefit of public space that is 
intensively referenced by urban scholars, such as Harvey (2003) and Jacobs (1961), this 
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social benefit cannot be completely evaluated by tax income. Thus, an important problem 
for the people who advocated integrated public space was the extent to which the city 
government should continually invest in downtown redevelopment. Since the benefit of 
social integration cannot be appraised by the market index, how can they identify the 
“equilibrated demand” of public space and prevent overproduction paid for by 
governmental investment? 
The perception related to the risk of overproduction had a long history in terms of 
Patriots Park redevelopment. Prominent perspectives and policies generally garnered the 
majority of the attention. However, to a great degree, although the perspectives that were 
opposite to the publicized policies were not as obvious in the early decades of Patriots 
Park’s history, these perspectives were growing and influencing policy. Punctuated 
policy changes generally do not arise out of the air or by accident. Rather, urban policy 
changes, particularly planning policies, are the result of a long-term competition among 
different planning perceptions. During the downtown redevelopment movement that 
reached its peak in the 1980s, the mass media intensively introduced the urban policies of 
Mayor Goddard’s administration. However, the worry about the abuse of governmental 
investment in downtown Phoenix had also been growing. The archives of the closed—
door meetings of the city government indicated the existence of worry regarding 
overproduction.        
For example, in the 1985 meeting discussing the downtown redevelopment plan 
that included Patriots Park redevelopment, Newton Rosenzweig, the then president of the 
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Phoenix Civic Plaza Building Corporation seriously challenged the redevelopment plan 
by asking “do we really need additional downtown attractions”: 
“It is time that we end ‘alibing’ the disappointing percentage of Civic Plaza 
bookings with such excuses as (1) Insufficient nearby hotel rooms, (2) more convention 
space so that can have two major conventions at same time (we now have), (3) now need 
another downtown hotel (which city will subsidize), (4) saying now Civic Plaza needs 
museums, streetscapes, Mercado, to develop greater use of Plaza facilities—such as 
repeat conventions. Yet, other cities have far less to offer than Phx” (Rosenzweig, 1985, 
p.2). 
The most important concern related to ending this unceasing redevelopment cycle 
was that the redevelopment projects would request additional governmental 
redevelopment in the future to help the existing redevelopment. Because the government 
subsidized these types of redevelopment, they were not restrained by market conditions 
and eventually would create overproduction of the redevelopment. 
In addition, the overproduction of downtown redevelopment project would send 
the deficits out of control:  
“Budget request for Herberger Theater now 30% higher than 1983—and who 
underwrites deficits? … When the current bonds are paid off (1994), Phoenix taxpayers 
will have provided well over $100 millions in sales tax revenues for the construction of 
the Civic Plaza, land acquisition, huge annual deficits, interest charges, etc., since this 
project got underway some 17-18 years ago” (Rosenzweig, 1985, para. 5). 
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More importantly, based on the idea of budget restraints and governmental 
overproduction, the subsidized cultural activities were assumed to be unnecessary if they 
could not repay the tax increase: 
“And isn’t it odd that various public and private groups saying that Phoenix will 
not be great city unless it does more culturally—for in about past 40-45 years we have 
come from 99th city in the U.S. to the NINTH LARGEST city. Who can say we would 
have been even larger if we had more cultural and scientific activities?” (Rosenzweig, 
1985, p.2). 
Therefore, in responding to the governmental overproduction, the rational strategy 
should be that “Hold up additional C.P Bond until city agrees to keep ‘hands off’ C.P 
‘earmarked’ sales tax fund—if ‘excess’ council will—1 pay off bonds ahead of schedule 
thereby saving heavy interest—or 2 reduce sales tax rates—or 3 eliminate home buyer 
sales tax” (Rosenzweig, 1985, para. 4). 
Although the city council in 1985 did not accept Mr. Rosenzweig’s idea, he was 
not the only person with this perspective. For example, on behalf of the Home Builders 
Association, Bixler also recommended to “establish a target date for the removal of the 
sales tax that currently supports the Civic Plaza funds” and establish “a broad base tax 
supported by the general taxpayers of the City of Phoenix,” so that “this new tax would 
step in and take over the continuing obligations of the Civic Plaza fund” (Rosenzweig, 
1985, p.4). 
The abrupt cessation of all Patriots Park’s publicly subsidized activities in June 
1992 when budget cuts eliminated funding for park maintenance was not, in fact, abrupt 
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at all. The perception that subsidized cultural activities were overproduced and wasting 
the precious public funding existed during the entire 1980s redevelopment although these 
discourses were covered by the advocacy of downtown redevelopment and were defeated 
by city council voting. Because the city government used economic rationales to 
legitimize the park redevelopment planning and the special sales tax at the inception of 
the park, the contradictions of the spatial legitimacy were introduced. Then, in 1991 when 
the sales tax increase did not reach the expected level, the contradiction of Patriots Park’s 
legitimacy was “transcended” and caused the complete collapse of the legitimacy of the 
park activities based on Jacobs’ planning theories.       
The Unstable Political Promise. 
During the downtown redevelopment in the 1980s, it was common for citizens not 
to believe in the stability of the political promise. The unstable promises of the city 
government also intensified people’s distrust of the governmental park redevelopment. 
That is why “most people don’t want to risk the biggest investment of their lives on 
political promises” (Hall, 1988, p.C2). 
This type of perception was common among Phoenix residents in the 1980s. The 
unstable political promise of urban planning was criticized as a common phenomenon in 
Phoenix redevelopment.  
As downtown merchant R. Scott Smith, operations manager for Switzer’s, 
summarized: 
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“It’s a typical approach: Kick the people out and clear the land with no 
commitment, and end up worse off than you were before. Look at the blocks all over 
downtown that are just leveled flat and clear”(Shanahan, 1984b, p.A2). 
That was also the complaint of Carmen Rios, the owner of Seibert’s Catholic gift 
shop, who had to move because of the downtown redevelopment project; however, the 
building she vacated remained standing after seventeen years (Shanahan, 1984b, p.A2). 
All these problems were finally attributed to the city government. As the owners 
of the downtown shop Switzer’s and Jutenhoops criticized, “downtown’s problems of 
deterioration have come partly at the hands of the city. The tearing down of flophouses in 
the name of redevelopment has resulted in streets filled with homeless people, and 
businesses have been reluctant to invest in improvements because of iffy plans and 
surrounding condemnations” (Shanahan, 1984b, p.A2). 
More importantly, the distrust of political promises not only occurred in the 
process of implementing redevelopment but also in maintaining public space. The people 
who worked against the downtown redevelopment projects were not the only group who 
distrusted political promises. The groups of people who were excited about the 
redeveloped Patriots Park also felt sad about the unstable policies (Bethel, 1995, p.3). 
The laser system of Patriots Park was a typical example. 
While the city government advocated the lasers, Kaye Settle, who headed the 
fund-raising effort for the Phoenix Parks Foundation, said “This park is being built for 
the people, so we wanted to give the people an opportunity to support it” (Nolen, 1988a, 
p.B1). Moreover, because of the intensive controversy over the park redevelopment plan, 
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the final installment of the lasers was mostly paid for by public donations and private 
companies. However, after the private sector and ordinary citizens donated the $ 350,000 
to implement the park redevelopment plan, the city council abandoned the park and the 
lasers after only two years to save the $10,000 repair fees. Thus, all previous private 
donations were wasted. The city government had ignored the needed repairs for the 
privately donated laser system for 5 years until the system was not repairable and had to 
be dismantled. Even for people who admired the idea of Patriots Park as a people’s public 
space, the unstable political promises damaged the reputation of the city government’s 
ability to manage a public space. In a letter to the editors of Arizona Republic, a Tempe 
resident wrote : 
 “I see the darkening of Patriots as another example of the shortsighted, hick-
town mentality of Phoenix city government, and it further establishes a record of 
shortchanging the private sector that makes such public projects possible”(Brings, 1991, 
p.A14). 
In addition, the lack of governmental maintenance made the park a campsite for 
homeless people again. Everything returned to point zero. Millions in city bonds and 
privately donated money had been spent for the park redevelopment; however, the 
homeless problem in the park did not change.  
Thus, people who either liked or hated the redeveloped park believed 
governmental redevelopment and management of Patriots Park to be inefficient and 
ineffective. 
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People who hated the park believed that the public investment in Patriots Park 
wasted taxpayers’ money and partially caused the deficit. The groups who appreciated 
the redevelopment plan believed that governmental ownership meant that the integration 
planning of the park would be considered with the risk of political considerations: 
“The designers of the projects should be proud of their efforts, as the basic 
premise of creativity is to provide something that stimulates the senses. These designers 
have achieved that goal. 
 It is a shame that the value of their contributions is not recognized. The idea that 
future projects, once commissioned, be reviewed or censored by political elements is 
absurd” (Kovach, 1992, p.A8). 
Although urban planning required stability and long-term vision, governmental 
promises might be even more risky and unstable than private strategy. As a Phoenix 
resident criticized in the newspaper:  
“Must the roof cave in before the Phoenix City Council and city staff officials 
recognize the lurking dangers and wisely plan otherwise and reverse decisions made 
previously?... 
The City Council, led by Mayor Paul Johnson, indicates that the plug on the once 
much-publicized Patriots Park with its laser setup, which by Terry Goddard’s 
pronouncements was to receive worldwide fame, will be pulled to save money.  
And there are other poorly conceived projects, now regretted, costing taxpayers a 
bundle” (Unger, 1991, p.2).   
The Market Rationality. 
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After the combined legitimacy of the integration and profitability of a space was 
dismantled, economic logic gradually dominated the legitimacy of planning policy. A 
space’s legitimacy was evaluated by profitability, analyzing the correlation between the 
cost of public funding and the sales tax increase. The perspective that public space was 
irrational became a logical result of this evaluation. Specifically, there were three main 
threads of public perception that negated the meaning of public space during the 
evolution of the Patriots Park redevelopment.  
First, developing a park is “a course of action that costs money instead of a course 
that would earn money” (Lindholtz, 1991, p.A14). Thus, the opportunity cost of the park 
would be very high. “If it is used for a park, the real cost of the decision would be the 
cost of development plus loss of the revenue” (Lindholtz, 1991, p.A14). Developing a 
public space is generally less profitable than selling the plot of land for development that 
could produce revenue from the sale and from taxes. Although a park is owned by the 
city government, if it is not financially self-sufficient, it is an irrational expenditure 
according to economic and market-centric legitimacy. 
Second, because solving the problem of the homeless people in the park was a 
significant concern of the redevelopment plan, the long-existing perception that public 
funding should not be used to benefit homeless people also emerged and worked against 
the redevelopment of the public space. If the downtown redevelopment was interpreted 
merely as a commodity to exchange taxpayers’ money, the redevelopment would be 
considered a manner in which to specifically serve “customers”. Otherwise, the public 
investment would be considered inefficient. As a Phoenix resident wrote in a letter to the 
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editor of Arizona Republic, “I, for one, find the teapot much more pleasing to the eye 
than the winos draped so tastefully around Patriots waiting for their free lunch” (Dearing, 
1992, p.C4). 
Finally, public space is not absolutely irreplaceable in terms of the majority of the 
Phoenix residents. For example, during the public hearing process, the cutbacks of 
Patriots Park had aroused much less backlash, compared to the proposal that suggested to 
close or reduce hours at some city-owned swimming pools (Baker, 1990, p.4; Cordova, 
1992, p.B3; Valdez, 1990, p.C1). This feature not only rendered Phoenix public spaces 
vulnerable to the unstable political elements but also created the belief that public space 
is less important than other spending that could directly help. Even a person who truly 
cared about the homeless problem of Patriots Park may nevertheless consider the park to 
be an irrational public investment: “If Phoenix wants to be a beacon to other communities 
and visitors, why not use the $309,000 to help the homeless? It is too bad that the 
generosity of so many has to be wasted on the ill-taste of so few” (Putt, 1987, p.C4). 
Indeed, when the Phoenix economy declined, the voices advocating abandoning Patriots 
Park grew.       
None of these perspectives was independent of another. Rather, they interacted 
and intertwined during the entire history of the abandonment of the redeveloped Patriots 
Park. These perspectives are both the product and the cause of the city’s practice that de 
facto abandoned the park management and ceded the redeveloped Patriots Park to the 
homeless for a campground again. Jacobs’ planning theories that the park designers 
applied did not attain the outcomes the planners expected. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE LEGITIMIZATION OF PRIVATIZATION 
After the de facto abandonment of Patriots Park, the loss of subsidized public 
nighttime activities and the lack of maintenance led to the continual decline of the park’s 
quality. In 2003, the long-standing agreement between the city and a concession operator 
who ran a food, beer and wine business in Patriots Park ended. As park maintenance 
declined, the food kiosks also suffered from the declining business and revenue loss. 
Although the Parks and Recreation Board had agreed to close the concession stands in 
July and August to help mitigate the loss, the food kiosks could no longer maintain their 
business in Patriots Park in 2003 (Yvonne, 2003). By 2004, the management practices of 
Patriots Park had almost completely deviated from the designers’ plans to attract people 
with activities, foods, scenery and entertainment.  
More importantly, the city officials believed that without the careful maintenance 
and regulation of the space, public security within the park declined steeply. From 2004 
to 2007, what police had encountered at Patriots Park were: “19 assaults; 85 calls to 
check on the welfare of someone in the park; 12 cases of domestic violence; 18 drunk and 
disorderlies; 56 fights; 11 cases of indecent exposure; 38 reports of a suspicious person; 
and 19 thefts”(Gordon, 2007, p.29). Mayor Gordon recalled the security situation of the 
park that “during a ceremony that I participated in, the Thai ambassador to the United 
States was attacked. He wasn’t hurt, but a Phoenix police officer who came to his rescue 
was hospitalized” (Gordon, 2007, p.29). 
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In addition, the problem of mentally ill homeless in Patriots Park was even worse 
after budget cuts in maintenance According to an Arizona Republic article in 2005, 
Patriots Park sheltered anywhere from 10 to 20 mentally ill homeless people on any given 
day. These people made the park unusable, because they “sleep on benches, wash in the 
bathrooms and frighten families with their unfortunate appearance and often bizarre 
behavior” (Hermann, 2005, p. A1).    
Thus, few people, except the homeless ones, wanted to use the park. When the 
park had no maintenance, activities or security regulations, there were “far more pigeons 
than people” even during lunch hours (Gordon, 2007, p.29). On May 18th 2004, in 
Mayor Gordon’s “The Future of the City Address,” he suggested bulldozing Patriots Park. 
After nearly 30 years, Patriots Park, which once was the reason for bulldozing 
downtown eyesores, became the eyesore itself. The urban problems that beset Block 77 
in the 1970s, such as homeless people, badly maintained structures, lack of security and 
crime, emerged again in Block 77 within Patriots Park. Without appropriate maintenance, 
all of the park facilities suffered. For example, the underground garage, which, it was 
assumed, would bring business interests to the city, was in terrible condition because of  
the lack of maintenance: the leaks had reoccurred without being repaired. Homeless 
people used the underground garage as a toilet, leaving human excrement (Arizona 
Republic, 2004, p.6). The garage was thus called “a scary, concrete rainforest” 
(MacEachern, 2007, p.V1). If a garage, a profitable facility, was in a poorly maintained 
condition, consider other free facilities in the park. The deplorable condition of the park 
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eventually led to complete demolition in 2007. As Journalist Reaves summarizes the 
history of Patriots Park:  
“For a third of a century, Gordon’s predecessors struggled with how best to make 
something special out of the heart of the city. Most agreed the best way was to build a 
great park. The problem is no one seems to agree on what that is. So they all seem to 
want to keep starting over” (Reaves, 2004b, p. B1).        
The Phoenix city government in the 2000s had similar similar redevelopment 
plans in the 1970s: demolishing the existing structures before having a clear plan for what 
will replace them. However, in the 2000s Phoenix chose a different way: privatization, 
rather than publicization, became the solution for downtown revitalization. 
First, the concept of privatization should be clarified. In the practices of the real 
estate market, the situation of property ownership might be more complex than pure 
private or public ownership, especially when the property owners of the land and 
structures are different. For example, if the city government owns the land but leases it to 
a specific business developer to build private structures with low rent price, this is a 
publicly owned land in name but not in fact. Such tactics are merely a strategy of 
governmental subsidies to waive business owners’ property taxes rather than change the 
spatial features (cf. Shanahan, 1985b, pp.B1,B6). Because the majority of the areas in 
Block 77 have thus far been commercial, this dissertation identifies the redevelopment as 
privatization although the exact property owner of the land is the city of Phoenix. 
The organization of this chapter will be different from the previous chapters. As 
of the writing date of this dissertation, the second Patriots Park has been demolished for 
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10 years. However, redevelopment was not yet completed in 2017. Block 22, which is an 
important portion of the general Patriots Square/ CityScape redevelopment plan, remains 
vacant. There are 50,000 square feet of public space that have not yet been built on. More 
importantly, the city government and the private developer RED do not as yet have an 
exact schedule delineating when the entire redevelopment project will be completed. 
Therefore, it is impossible to analyze the contradictions among the spatial design, 
practices, and social perceptions in terms of the third redevelopment of Patriots Park. 
According to the Lefebvrian methodology, it is inappropriate to comment on the spatial 
design and its internal contradictions before the city finishes the project (the plan might 
also be changed in the future). Therefore, this chapter focuses on how the privatization 
was legitimized as the final result of the long abandoned second Patriots Park.  
Privatization as Legitimacy 
At the original suggestion of Mayor Gordon, the only clear idea was bulldozing 
the second Patriots Park because it was an eyesore. However, he did not indicate what 
should replace the park: 
“Let’s replace it with something that is worthy of the Patriots we wanted to honor 
in the first place. Its design didn’t capture either the future or the past. It was simply the 
architectural style of the day—which didn’t last. Let’s find our defining amenity. Let’s 
build something worthy of Phoenix, unique to Phoenix, that IS Phoenix” (Gordon, 2004, 
para.78).  
Mayor Gordon’s words suggested, at least in the beginning, that the mayor and  
the city government shaped the legitimacy of bulldozing the second Patriots Park based 
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on its architectural design and amenities. Property ownership was not a redevelopment 
issue at that time. Therefore, regardless of the supporters and critics of the mayor’s 
suggestion, the discussion about redeveloping the second Patriots Park focused on 
whether the second Patriots Park was an architectural masterpiece. The critics of the 
second Patriots Park and park designer Alexander’s response also focused on the 
supposed architectural design of a public space (Carroll, 2004, p.2; Reaves, 2004a, p.1). 
In the ensuing news report, the replaced signature landmark was supposed to be similar to 
“Big Ben in London, the Eiffel Tower in Paris and the Space Needle in Seattle” (Mattern, 
2004, p. D2). Thus, at that time, the redevelopment idea of the second Patriots Park did 
not include changing the property ownership, simply redeveloping a new public park. 
Typical evidence was the report of revisions to the downtown Phoenix master plan 
announced in 2004 November: 
“Officials hope to develop an urban design plan that incorporates a new, grand 
civic space, as well as reinvent current civic spaces like Patriots Square. The areas could 
be used as gathering places for outdoor concerts or events, for example”(Richardson, 
2004, p. B4). 
At least in 2004, privatizing Patriots Park from a public to a commercial space 
was not the plan of the city government. The original plan of city officials was to reinvent 
the space and render it more appropriate for outdoor concerts or events rather than having 
it remain an urban lost space. If everything worked toward this goal, the third Patriots 
Park redevelopment would repeat the same redeveloping track as the first and second 
Patriots Park with a similar governmental discourse: the existing space is an eyesore; 
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therefore, let us bulldoze it and replace it with a beautiful landscape. The examples that 
Mayor Gordon used, such as Big Ben and the Eiffel Tower, were the identical examples 
used in the plan of the second Patriots Park. 
 However, the problem was that since Patriots Park was abandoned because of 
the shrinking of public budget, the policy of reinventing Patriots Park did not have 
sufficient legitimacy. The critics of public spending funds appeared almost immediately 
after the mayor’s address. For example the following one: 
“As usual, the ‘vision thing’ requires spending lots of other people’s money. 
Gordon wants to bulldoze Patriots and replace it with something that’s a signature 
symbol for Phoenix, like London’s Big Ben and Paris’ Eiffel Tower. And what might that 
be? Gordon didn’t say. Apparently not enough of us have the right ’tude yet” (Robert, 
2004, p. V5).      
 Compared with the 1970s and 1980s, the planning legitimacy has changed in the 
new century. Merely demolishing a downtown eyesore is no longer a sufficient planning 
legitimacy and removing an eyesore is no longer considered a taken-for-granted job of a 
city government. The redevelopment plan had to construct a different legitimacy for its 
planning. Thus, privatization, the new legitimacy to support redevelopment, gradually 
appeared in the planning discourses, particularly after the three-block CityScape project 
was proposed. 
Privatization Legitimizes Governmental Interference  
On October 5th 2006, Councilwoman Peggy Bilsten talked about the 
redevelopment of Cityscape/Patriots Park project, “today is a really huge day for our 
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downtown’s development, (This project) complements everything we’ve done so 
far”(Duckett, 2006, p. B1 ).The city council and city officials attempted to persuade the 
public that CityScape was “the last remaining piece in their ongoing effort to rebuild the 
city’s core. It will bring more residents, housing and office space to the area, plus a 
much-anticipated AJ’s Fine Foods, the first downtown grocery store in nearly 25 years” 
(Duckett, 2006, p. B1 ). 
After the deficit and budget shrinkage in the early 1990s, downtown 
redevelopment was no longer taken for granted. The general political atmosphere in 2006 
was different from the period of “we don’t want to be another Los Angeles” movement 
after the war. In 1990, Vice-Mayor Linda Nadolski announced, “it’s time to recognize 
our job in downtown is culminating,” and the city government began budget cutting. 
After a mere 14 years, rationalizing redevelopment was again requiring a new spatial 
legitimacy (Valdez, 1990, p.C1). Otherwise, according to the groups of people who either 
loved or hated the second Patriots Park, there would be no reason to bulldoze or rebuild 
the park. For example, the second Patriots Park designer Alexander criticized that “I 
would hate to think that every time we have a new mayor, we have to rebuild the city 
center” (Reaves, 2004a, p.1). To the longtime opponents of the Patriots Park, decreasing 
the maintenance funding for the park was a reasonable solution to saving the precious 
public budget. The redevelopment of the park would repeat the previous mistake again: 
“If there truly is demand for this type of development in downtown Phoenix, developers 
will build it with their own funds. If it cannot be done without city subsidies, perhaps it 
should not be done” (Arizona Republic, 2006, p.2). 
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Thus, the political atmosphere from 2004 to 2006 did not allow city officials to 
begin a redevelopment project under the same planning ideology as what guided the 
previous officials in the 1970s and 1980s. In this situation, privatization became the new 
bolster of redevelopment legitimacy. Privatization rationalized governmental subsidies.  
The combination of privatization and governmental interference is a result of 
interaction among multiple stakeholders.  
First, regarding the developers, spatial privatization plus governmental subsidies 
were always the goal of the developers. For example, on the open park board meeting in 
2006, the developers of the Patriots Park/ Cityscape project emphasized the incorporation 
of the commercial elements of the redevelopment plan “while still maintaining some of 
the public space that the park currently offers”; At the same time, the developers insisted 
that they “will need Phoenix’s assistance to make the deal financially feasible” (Alonzo-
Dunsmoor, 2006, p. B4). From the perspective of the developers, this was a financially 
feasible manner in which to bulldoze the downtown “eyesore” under a specific economic 
reality. Changing public space into commercial space with governmental subsidies was 
an economic rationale for the private developers. Thus, they wanted to invest their own 
money in the redevelopment project (MacEachern, 2006, p. v1).   
Second, for the city officials, privatization was a manner in which to persuade that 
the public the space would be financially self-sustainable. More importantly, this may 
have been the only possible approach to bulldozing the abandoned Patriots Park and 
promoting the progress of the redevelopment project. Mayor Gordon’s attitude change in 
terms of whether to include a hotel in Patriots Park redevelopment is an example. He was 
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“tepid in his support” at the beginning. However, after no one else submitted bids, Mayor 
Gordon changed to firmly support the CityScape plan. David Cavazos, the acting deputy 
city manager in charge of downtown development, discussed the subsidies with the 
developers, “the role of the city is to only do what is necessary if the benefits are there. 
At this point, our goal is not to estimate what their request is for assistance” (Harris, 2006, 
p. D1)
9
. 
To the residents of Phoenix, privatization was at least a possible approach to 
changing the de facto abandonment of Patriots Park. As a resident of downtown Phoenix 
pointed out directly, “the city has abandoned the property and there are no public funds to 
‘Save Patriots Park.’ The CityScape proposal is a win/win. The developers will pay for 
the park, pay to program the park and pay to maintain it” (Greenberg, 2007, p.2).  
The lesson of the budget cutting in 1992 had revealed the paradox of the park. 
Although people indeed admired public space, government-owned public space is the 
most vulnerable to the budget cutting because no one is directly and instantly affected by 
the lack of maintenance. Particularly in terms of the downtown economic reality, this 
problem was prominent at Patriots Park. As the editorials of Arizona Republic directly 
noted, 
                                                 
9 Phoenix’s financial contribution to CityScape would take several forms: 
“First, a property-tax abatement. Phoenix, which owns the titles to the land, would sign a long-term lease with the 
developer. Then, using a state law called the Government Property Lease Excise Tax, it would take the development 
off the tax rolls for eight years. After that, the project would be taxed but at a lower rate. The tax relief would be worth 
about $26 million. The project is expected to generate more than $200 million in tax revenue over 20 years, developers 
said. 
Next, Phoenix would buy the project’s new underground parking garage and pay for repairs to the existing garage 
under Patriots Square Park. This will cost $96.5 million. The city would not turn over the money until 2009 when the 
development’s first phase opens. 
The money would come from a variety of sources, including the planned sale of a city-owned parking garage and 
revenue from construction and sales taxes generated by the project. No General Fund revenues would be used. 
Finally, Phoenix plans to use 2006 bond funds to make improvements to the streets surrounding the development.” 
(Richardson, 2006b, p. A1) 
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“In a sense, the decision has already been made—by two decades of disrepair. 
Patriots is not the town center. The parks department has no money to preserve or 
upgrade that land, or even repair the parking garage underneath. If CityScape is scrapped, 
or fails, there is no Plan B for preserving Patriots Square” (Editorials, 2007a, p. B4). 
Therefore, although the public ownership of a public space is generally 
considered the basis of spatial democracy, the public ownership of Patriots Park reached 
the dark side of democracy: the people used their voice to keep the park. However, their 
voices were not sufficiently loud to force taxpayers to pay for the park rather than for 
other perhaps more necessary public services. The de facto meaning of spatial ownership 
was distorted: public ownership means no maintenance as a democratic result whereas 
private ownership means private maintenance because of the private interest. Or in 
Talton’s (2006) words, “this is a bizarre situation”: No privatization of the public space 
(e.g. changing a park into a shopping mall) in downtown Phoenix was “not a triumph of 
preservation. It’s a vote of no confidence by private capital. Great preservation comes to 
center cities that are magnets for investment” (p. V5). This special situation rendered the 
case of downtown Phoenix different from other cities with economically competitive 
downtowns, such as Denver, San Diego, Seattle, Charlotte and so on. 
In addition, because many vacant lands held by private owners in downtown 
Phoenix were priced too high for development, privatizing public space appeared to be a 
feasible manner in which to remove the roadblocks of downtown revitalization. As 
Talton (2006, p.V5) said, “If the city throws in Patriots Square, CityScape could work”. 
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Privatization became the new basis of legitimacy for the downtown 
redevelopment project. In contrast with the common stereotype that privatization always 
works against government or public subsidies, in the case of the third redevelopment of 
Patriots Park, privatization even legitimized the public subsidies and the associated 
downtown revitalization project. Privatization became an ideological binder of 
developers’ business interests, city officials’ eagerness to bulldoze the downtown eyesore, 
and people’s desire for financially and politically feasible maintenance of the space. 
The Construction of the Legitimacy of Commercial Spaces 
The spatial legitimacy of commercial space competing with public space was a 
new thread in the planning ideology during the 2006 planning processes. In the thirty 
years since former Mayor Driggs proposed changing the entire block of old town 
commercial facilities into a park, the belief that a public space at the heart of the city’s 
downtown could attract people and revitalize the downtown area was an undoubted belief 
to the majority of the city planners, officials, and ordinary residents. Therefore, although 
Patriots Park was designed twice during this period, the legitimacy of public space had 
not faced any significant challenges. The disputes and debates were generally associated 
with architectural style and aesthetic issues rather than the rationales for having a public 
space. 
After the long period of poor maintenance, during the planning from 2004 to 2006, 
significant doubt arose regarding whether a public space, particularly a traditional public 
open space without commercial elements, could be an inviting space. 
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Some criticism was based purely on architectural reasons and the specific 
geography of Phoenix. For example, the editorials of Arizona Republic openly noted that 
“We should take a critical look at proposals for grand public places,” because “large open 
spaces here tend to turn into griddles in the summer” (Editorials, 2004, p.B8). 
Unfortunately, Patriots Park was a typical case in which the heat became a prominent 
barrier to the effective use of public space. In addition, the memory of the leaking 
fountains and the three wells reinforced this perspective. Because Patriots Park was atop 
an underground garage, many people worried that planting large trees or constructing 
large fountains would cause the garage to leak again. Even the later design of water 
landscape atop the garage was adopted carefully with controlled size (Anonymous 
interviewee # 1, 2016 April 17). The developers’ planning proposal to divide a large open 
space into scattered publicly accessible spaces including retail and other commercial 
facilities obtained some support based on the considerations of heat and possible leakage 
problems.  
More importantly, the significance of the commercial space was emphasized  
more in the 2006 plan than in the plans from the 1970s or 1980s. Commercial spaces 
were considered a more important component than public spaces to attract people to live, 
relax, and entertain in downtown areas: “Americans value their leisure time, and a big 
part of it is played out in shopping” (Editorials, 2007b, p. B4). If the image of 
commercial facilities at Block 77 was the habitat of a bad atmosphere in the eyes of 
planners from the 1950s to the 1970s, in 2006, shopping areas were appreciated as 
“modern town centers, as central to the community, its economy, its life, as a 
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neighborhood park, a theater, a senior center, even a library” (Editorials, 2007b, p. B4). 
In other words, commercial space was considered more important than public space as a 
focal point to attract people to downtown. In Mayor Gordon’s terms, beyond Patriots 
Park, the city of Phoenix had always lacked the “defining amenity” that all great cities 
have (Gordon & Richards, 2007, p. 26). Developing commercial space, particularly a 
potential grocery store, was always emphasized as a significant rationale to redevelop 
Patriots Park. For example, John Bacon, a RED (the developer of CityScape/Patriots Park 
project) spokesman said, “everyone has said that there needs to be a grocery store 
downtown. And we agree with that. It’s going to be the key” (Richardson, 2006a, p. B1). 
Of course, as in other periods, the ideologies related to the spatial planning were 
very diverse. Many people, opposed to the legitimacy of privatization, attempted to 
protect the park although the status quo of the park was not satisfactory. The most 
important criticism was that the scattered publicly accessible space would no longer be a 
public space, but a retail courtyard. The opponents considered that changing a public park 
into a greenbelt for retail was corporate theft and would damage the democracy 
(Richardson, 2007, p. B1). 
However, although privatization was not the sole legitimacy, it promoted the 
redevelopment plan of CityScape/Patriots Park. Block 77, which was once the location of 
Patriots Park, was changed into a mixed-use center: specialty stores, boutiques, 
restaurants and entertainment venues surrounded a small open space with a cooling 
splash pad and chairs. As a response to the ten-year abandonment of Patriots Park, 
privatization practically shaped the new legitimacy in the planning ideology of the 
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redevelopment in 2006 although the actual plan has not yet been completely implemented 
after 10 years. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION 
In essence, urban planning is a normative activity of city government. Compared 
with other governmental services, planning is not directly serving citizens’ instant needs 
or demands, but rather constructing spatial norms by identifying a bright future. Because 
planning focuses on a future that has not yet occurred, the design and discussion of 
planning is de facto based on imagination and current public normative beliefs, that is, 
ideology. It is impossible to define or evaluate the influence of property ownership on 
public space by a value-free functional analysis. All planning activities are automatically 
associated with normative values. Thus, the analysis of the meaning of property transfer 
should always be based on the comprehensive and contradicted spatial norms.  
By a comprehensive review of the history of Patriots Park, this dissertation 
challenges the current study of public space privatization by breaking through the 
prevalent stereotype of property ownership. This stereotype assumes that public 
ownership means inclusiveness, social integration, and democracy, whereas private 
ownership means exclusiveness, financial self-sufficiency, and “revanchist city.” By and 
large, Patriots Park’s thirty-year history illustrates the complexity beyond these 
stereotypes.  
Public ownership could be used to exclude poor people, and condemning existing 
buildings to create the park demolished all affordable housing in an entire block. Public 
ownership may also intensify the tension among multiple groups of people, such as when 
the homeless people transformed the park into a shelter and law enforcement became an 
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expensive cycle between jails and parks. The democracy associated with governmental 
ownership may also make a park vulnerable because a public park may be weak in the 
political competition for public funding. Simultaneously, privatization may be used to 
support the legitimacy of governmental intervention and attract and invite more people to 
the space. 
The meaning of property ownership is embedded in society. No meaning can be 
separated from social contents or abstracted as an absolute and independent feature. In 
terms of a public space, no supposed characteristic can fix the meaning of property 
ownership, whether the supposition is derived from laws, plans, or economic theories. 
Regardless of the theories from left or right-wing politics, the attempts that mechanically 
and functionally summarize all general features of privately or publicly owned space are 
trapped in endless inconsistency because the social contents, planning ideology and 
purposes are not identical in different cases. 
This dissertation reached the following conclusions regarding the interpretation of 
the meaning of property ownership: 
First, the meaning of property ownership encompasses diverse but understandable 
values;  
In urban studies, there are generally two opposite implications: on one hand, 
scholars usually imply that the urban planning of a city government is derived from 
economic rationality. The motivation to maximize economic interest determines the track 
of urban landscape and development. For example, public space redevelopment is 
interpreted as a “revanchist” activity, because the current economic income of a public 
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space is lower than the business value of the potential commercial redevelopment (Smith, 
1996). On the other hand, if scholars are not convinced by the model based on economic 
rationality, they usually imply that the evolution of urban landscape is a random result, 
such as the postmodern urbanism assumption that the locations of different urban spaces 
are similar to the results of a KENO gambling game (Dear & Flusty, 1998). According to 
this assumption, whether a place becomes a public space or a commercial space is a 
random result. There is no logical approach to understanding or estimating the changes in 
landscape. These two intellectual threads are directly opposed to one another. However, 
this dissertation challenged both threads using the case of Patriots Park. 
The development/redevelopment of Patriots Park cannot be sufficiently 
interpreted merely by economic rationality, which renders it impossible to understand 
why the city planners and officials would prefer vacant land to the existing pawnshops, 
SRO hotels, low-class bars, and other old downtown structures in the old town block. 
Although these structures may have been out of date, all of these commercial facilities 
generate sales and property taxes. Why did a capitalist city government demolish all of 
these private commercial buildings and change them into government-owned vacant land 
with no tax income at all? Because planning is a normative activity, diverging from social 
norms in understanding urban plans runs the risk of distorting the real rationales of urban 
plans. Planners did have their reasons and normative beliefs when they attempted to “get 
rid of the pawnshop atmosphere for a whole city block of blight” by publicizing the 
center of downtown Phoenix (VanderMeer, 2010, p.273). However, normative judgement 
is not entirely related to economics, but derived from Le Corbusier’s planning theory and 
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the identification of city government’s role during periods of urban renewal. Although 
capitalism has great influence on the urban landscape, city planners, officials, and police 
officers are not completely passive gears in the big capitalist machine. Overestimating 
economic influence or attributing all planning decisions to economic interests is not 
correct. 
Conversely, although urban planning is continuously changing, it remains logical, 
not arbitrary. The span of history is extremely important in understanding urban planning, 
because the process of planning generally covers fifteen to twenty years or even longer. If 
we use a snapshot view to concentrate on the functionalist analysis at a specific time 
point, many planning decisions superficially look as arbitrary as a KENO gambling game. 
For example, because Mayor Driggs proposed a town square park, the previous plan for a 
golf course was changed into the later Patriots Park. Although Democratic Mayor 
Goddard won the election after Republican Mayor Hance, the Democratic mayor stopped 
the campaign of “downtown is fighting back” and advocated to revitalizing the park with 
nighttime activities. Then, after Mayor Goddard resigned to run for governor in 1990, the 
proposal to reduce Patriots Park’s budget was submitted almost instantly in the next year. 
Then, in 2004, Mayor Gordon took “let’s bulldoze Patriots Park” as one of the most 
significant components of his first address to the city of Phoenix.   
 Because urban planning is a type of public administration, it is indeed influenced 
by city officials and political leaders. Because no one can anticipate the result of a 
mayoral election or what a mayor will propose, all of these dramatic changes in Patriots 
Park’s fate could be misunderstood as random results from a snapshot view.  
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However, if we analyze a history span that is long enough to cover the full 
evolution of an urban space, we observe the rationales behind the superficial 
“randomness.” Without a review of the previous Phoenix downtown square in the 1880s, 
we cannot understand the longtime collective memory and the public anxiety connected 
to rebuilding the town square and revitalizing downtown Phoenix in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Looking back to the downtown geographical history of Phoenix during World War II 
demonstrates that the war and the military bases in Arizona intensified prostitution in 
downtown Phoenix and greatly increased the density of downtown hotels, which later 
degenerated into SRO hotels for poor people when police cracked down on prostitution. 
Downtown Phoenix then became a traditional gathering place for homeless and poor 
people because people who camped in Patriots Park believed their lives in the park were 
cooler and safer. It was easier to find a job than in uptown SRO hotels. Even the stringent 
law enforcement could not immediately eliminate the influence of the history. 
Superficially, the budget cutting of Patriots Park occurred suddenly after Mayor 
Goddard’s resignation. However, if we examine the historical archives carefully, we 
observe that the abandonment of Patriots Park was the result of the longtime efforts of 
surrounding merchants who paid for the park with their special sales tax. The origin of 
the abandonment is derived from the fact that city government constructed the legitimacy 
of the park on its tax profitability at the very inception of the park. 
After extending the history span, the historical contents in the analysis present a 
more comprehensive view than a snapshot functionalist analysis. Although mayoral 
election results are to some extent uncertain, the logic of the planning and landscaping of 
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a city is rooted in its history. Before any dramatic events in planning, there are always 
numerous tiny changes behind the superficial “always-similar” routines. Urban planning 
has no punctuated equilibrium, but will always be a continuous evolving process. For 
example, the policy of completely demolishing Block 77 was implemented during Mayor 
Hance’s administration. The policy thus had a hefty dose of her planning ideology, 
particularly in terms of the underestimation of the preservation of historical buildings. 
However, the demolition-oriented planning was by no means Mayor Hance’s personal 
idea. The archives and historical documents have demonstrated that as early as 1957, 
approximately 19 years before Mayor Hance’s term, the plan to demolish Block 77 was 
made public before any specific reconstruction plan had been developed. Over 19 years, 
the plan was gradually adjusted and legitimized during multiple terms of numerous 
mayors and city officials, including adjusting the plan from building a golf course to a 
public park or from applying Federal Urban Renewal Fund to a special sales tax. In this 
process of legitimatization, all steps are logical, not random. The 19 years of planning 
shaped the meaning of public ownership into a manner to exclude poor people and 
demolish lower-class facilities. This was definitely not an arbitrary decision of any 
individual mayor.  
Therefore, if an analysis covers a sufficient span of the planning process and 
carefully organizes the “indistinguishable” changes, the majority of the results of urban 
planning are logical, albeit not always in the logic of economics.        
Second, the meaning of public space ownership depends on the planning ideology; 
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Because urban planning is normative, continuously changing, logical, and beyond 
economic rationality, it is impossible to abstract an absolute meaning of property 
ownership of a public space. Current public space studies generally assume the existence 
of the universal norms of all public space. For example, a public park should be good for 
gathering and entertainment, accessible, inviting, democratic, etc. In addition, the 
influence of property ownership is assumed to be an issue of law that applies to all public 
spaces. These assumptions intellectually separate the significance of specific contents 
from the functionalist analysis of property ownership. However, real urban planning is 
not implemented in this manner. The planning ideology, the defined purposes, and the 
spatial norms of the same public space, such as Patriots Park, are different during 
different periods: 
 At the inception of Patriots Park’s history, publicization was for condemnation 
and demolition rather than developing the supposed universal features. The planning 
purpose of demolishing the old town block was clear as early as 1957. The city planners 
and officials at that time believed that demolition could revitalize downtown Phoenix 
regardless of what would be built after the demolition. A golf course, a town square, or 
even a vacant lot used as a parking lot would all be acceptable as long as the blighted 
block could be torn down. During this process, the public ownership of the park was used 
to legitimize the condemnation of private real estate.  
Then, during Mayor Hance’s administration, public ownership of the park was no 
longer related to condemnation, but to a governmental real estate investment. Patriots 
Park was planned as an amenity and landscape to stimulate the surrounding real estate 
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market. In 1982, the Patriots Park Redevelopment Plan (Resolution No. 15815), not any 
planning objective of the park development, was related to shaping Patriots Park as an 
authentic and inviting public space, although it was called the Patriots Park 
Redevelopment Plan. If a public space can stimulate the downtown real estate market as 
an office center, it was a good public space in the eyes of city planners at that time. 
Public ownership was not related to considerations of democracy or integration, but to 
public investment. 
In the redesigned plan of Patriots Park in 1988, the meaning of public ownership 
was changed again to constructing social integration by publicly sponsored activities. 
However, in 1992, public ownership caused the park to become the victim of the first 
wave of budget cutting because of its vulnerability in the political competition of public 
funding.  
Finally, after a long abandonment, privatization became the legitimacy for 
governmental intervention although the city planners and officials believed that the 
commercial facilities could attract more private investment and entertainment and thus 
more people to downtown areas. More importantly, privatization could save the space 
from political competition for the public budget because the economic reality was that the 
city government had no financial plan to save the park. Assisting private developers and 
their commercial development was better than abandoning Patriots Park as a lost urban 
space.   
In the history of Patriots Park, there is no universal meaning of property 
ownership. All meanings are associated with specific planning ideologies and purposes. 
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Without these contents, no one would know what public or private ownership means to 
Block 77. Reviewing the related planning documents and planners’ speeches indicates 
that public ownership may be exclusive whereas private ownership may legitimize 
governmental subsidies in the specific social contexts. 
Assuming that all public parks have identical functions under similar evaluation 
standards oversimplifies planning practices. Different urban plans may identify a public 
space and its property ownership with different purposes and meanings. The most typical 
case is the plan of “Hobo Park” in 1982. A public park would have been intentionally 
designed to be an urban lost space without maintenance, regulation, or policing. In this 
manner, the Park Board of Phoenix assumed that homeless people would like to move to 
the “Hobo Park” from the expensive Patriots Park. The plan for “Hobo Park” was never 
implemented. However, what if such a “Hobo Park” were built? How would a 
functionalist analysis evaluate it? Can we identify such a park as a blighted space and 
criticize it as a bad park? Being bad, however, was its official planning purpose in the 
proposal by the Phoenix Parks and Recreation Board. In terms of a “Hobo Park,” being 
bad was good, whereas being good meant wasting public funds and failing to save 
Patriots Park, although theoretically, a “Hobo Park” is nevertheless a public park. 
Clarifying the planning ideology and purpose of a public space is extremely 
important to understand the meaning of its property ownership. The planning purpose of 
a public park should not be taken for granted. What urban planners define as the spatial 
norm of a public space is extremely diverse in real planning practices. Ignoring planning 
purposes and ideology in public space planning practices or foisting scholars’ beliefs 
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regarding spatial norms on a specific public space distorts the interpretation, a primary 
reason for the current theoretical inconsistency of public space studies. 
Hence, what is the meaning of property ownership of a public space? It depends 
on two important factors:  
The most significant factor is the real planning purpose of the public space; the 
reason why the city wants to build a public park is fundamental to the analysis. A city 
may have diverse purposes for building a park, such as a good reason for condemnation, 
creating a blighted area to channel street peoples or of course constructing an inviting and 
integrative space for entertainment. Without understanding the real and specific planning 
purpose, it is impossible to evaluate a public space.  
Another necessary factor is the legitimacy of the space; planning is essentially 
normative. Because a planning process generally covers a long period of time, it is nearly 
impossible for any individual, including mayors or council members, to suddenly have an 
idea and build a public space. The legitimacy of the space always relies on careful 
construction. The interpretation of why this proposed public space is necessary is always 
required.  
More importantly, the spatial legitimacy in urban planning is not always 
associated with the observable practice within the space. The design of the second 
Patriots Park as a center for nighttime activities is a typical case. The park’s legitimacy, 
based on profitability in terms of sales tax stimulation contradicted the park’s design 
according to Jacobs’ theory. The contradiction eventually led to the abandonment of the 
park. A good public space is never free and should not be taken for granted. Who pays 
220 
 
for and maintains the space, why they would like to pay for the space, and how the city 
planners and officials persuade the payers to pay and maintain the space are always 
crucial questions in understanding spatial legitimacy. The empirical observation of the 
space cannot take the place of legitimacy construction in planning discourse. A park with 
a professional design and entertainment activities did not guarantee that it would be free 
from the legitimacy crisis.  
Of course, not all public spaces have the contradiction between spatial legitimacy 
and the park design. In some cases, the high quality and good use of a public space is a 
sufficient legitimacy for the public to pay for and maintain the space. However, why a 
public space is necessary and should be paid for remain the sensitive and significant issue 
in the spatial legitimacy construction. Without a careful review of how the planners and 
officials persuade the public to support a park, we do not have an accurate understanding 
of spatial legitimacy. 
Thus, by the discourse of city planners and officials, the official purposes and the 
constructed legitimacy of the park formed the basis of planning ideology, which directly 
shaped the original meaning of property ownership. 
Third, practices and perceptions created the dynamic of spatial meaning by spatial 
evolution; 
Although the meaning of property ownership was originally designed by planning 
ideologies, the existing spatial meaning in practice depends on regulation practices and 
people’s (stakeholders’) perceptions of a space. In everyday language, the term “theory” 
generally assumes a causal relation and an expected outcome of supposed input. However, 
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in terms of spatial evolution, the space users and stakeholders are not passive. They have 
their specific angles of understanding and personal interests related to the space. A 
rational plan in the eyes of city officials may be completely irrational based on a specific 
stakeholder’s personal interests. The multiple contradictions thus promote the evolution 
of the space. In the case of Patriots Park, the real evolution of a space always diverged 
from the supposed track of the official plans regardless of the planning theories that the 
plans applied. 
Similar to many other downtown redevelopment plans in urban renewal periods, 
city officials and planners hoped to remove poor people by demolishing affordable 
housing and pawnshops. However, rather than being removed, homeless people occupied 
the park because there were no other options for them. 
The city then planned to solve the homeless problem by tough policing, creating 
complex influences on spatial contradictions: 1) to the homeless people, the tough 
policing meant a cycle between jails and parks; the policy did not change their lives in the 
park or provide other options; 2) as for the police, since their profession required them to 
pay more attention to real crime than public nuisances such as a mentally ill person 
dancing in the street, they could not satisfy the surrounding merchants or treat all 
homeless people as dangerous criminals; 3) in terms of the local merchants, because the 
mentally ill and homeless people threatened local merchants’ business interests more 
seriously than crime, merchants hoped that the police would protect their business 
interests. However, because the police focused on real crime rather than public nuisances, 
the merchants felt discontent and distrusted the police, complaining that the police were 
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not tough enough and did not help. Both the “toughlove” theory (Hille, 1983, p.A14), 
which assumed that tough police could forcibly adjust homeless people’s behaviors just 
as parents controlled their “intolerable” children and the “eyes on the street” theory 
(Jacobs, 1961), which advocated that the local merchants would form an intricate 
network of voluntary surveillance for public security, failed in downtown Phoenix. The 
primary reason for this failure was in fact based on the various perceptions of the police’s 
job. As long as the police focused on real crime rather than nuisance crime, neither 
“tough love” nor “eyes on the street” would work because the understanding of public 
security was different in different groups. Under tough policing, the park remained a 
campground for homeless people.  
Finally, whereas the city planned to solve the homeless people problem by 
nighttime activities and the sales tax, the long-standing discontent of the surrounding 
merchants, the deficit of public finance, and the vulnerable status of public space in 
political competition directly killed the park. Although millions in donations and public 
funds were spent on the park redevelopment and the laser equipment, after only two years, 
the lasers were abandoned, because the profitability of this public park could not cover its 
cost. Although the public perception evaluated a public space by its profitability, the 
design of the government-sponsored nighttime activity center lost its legitimacy. 
Because the city government had no other practical plans to save the park from 
abandonment, privatization became a critical support for government-sponsored 
redevelopment. The public perception was that the commercial facilities would be better 
for attracting people, efficiently maintaining the space, and creating economic interest. 
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Although the redevelopment was sponsored by the city government, the supposed 
profitability of commercial facilities reconstructed the legitimacy of the space. 
In the history of Patriots Park, the city government’s particular plans had never 
exclusively determined the track of the spatial evolution. In the contradictions among the 
multiple uses and perceptions of the space, the original planning perspectives were 
consistently distorted and transcended. Thus, no planning theory can fix the result of a 
public space development.  
After the planning ideology constructed the original meaning of the property 
ownership of a space, the practice and the perception were comprehensively reshaping 
the meaning: although the planner used public ownership as an approach to demolition 
and removal, the practices of homeless people changed the public space into a shelter. 
The plan for a nighttime activities center created integration; however, the sales tax 
payers maintained the perception of evaluating spatial norms by profitability and 
promoted the abandonment of the park by political competition. In contrast to the 
stereotypes, even privatization could form the legitimacy of government-sponsored 
redevelopment in a particular political and social atmosphere.  
Public perception and practice should not be understood metaphorically. The 
mechanical assumption that the local merchants would cooperate with the police and 
contribute to the public surveillance oversimplified the actual complexity of a public 
space, as does the assumption that privatization is the opposite of government 
sponsorship. In terms of practice and perception, several crucial factors promoted the 
evolution. 
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First, spatial history that influences people’s use of space and challenges planners’ 
ideologies; the influence of spatial history was not easily removed by a redevelopment 
project. Although the city demolished the flophouses and arrested homeless people, the 
history and tradition of downtown Phoenix nevertheless keep the street people there. 
Spatial history is a prominent factor in distorting supposed plans. 
Second are the various interpretations of public space’s features from different 
stakeholders: in the discourses of official planning, the features of public space are 
generally identified. For example, few public space development plans clarify the 
difference in public security between crime and public nuisance. Thus, the contradictions 
among the perceptions of the police, merchants, and homeless people may be easily 
overlooked. However, the opposite perceptions of public security directly led to the death 
of the first Patriots Park. Public space planning intensively discusses specific features, 
such as accessibility, public security, and entertainment. Then, the diverse interpretations 
of different groups of people are generally the primary force that changes the spatial 
meaning in the official plans. 
Third are the political competition and associated perceptions: taking the existing 
public space for granted is a common misunderstanding in functionalist analysis. 
Maintaining a public space is a continuous activity that is associated with labor, funds, 
and the use of numerous resources. Political competition is always related to the 
distribution of these resources. The design, function and quality of a public space cannot 
guarantee a victory in a political competition. Thus, the real track of spatial evolution 
may be correspondingly divergent from the original plans. More importantly, the political 
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competition reshapes the norms and the legitimacy of a space, directly reconstructing the 
meaning of property ownership of a public space. Public ownership cannot guarantee 
public space democracy and integration, and private ownership does not necessitate 
rejecting government or being financially self-sufficient.     
The meaning of property ownership of public space depends on the factors that 
are clarified in the table. The original meaning is constructed by the planning ideology, 
and the evolution is promoted by spatial practice and public perceptions. There is no one-
size-fits-all norm or feature to summarize the meaning of private or public ownership. All 
of the listed factors collectively determine the meaning of property ownership.  
The Meaning of Public Space Ownership 
The Initial Construction The Spatial Evolution 
Planning 
Ideology 
1. the real planning purpose 
2. the officially supposed 
legitimacy of the space 
Practice 
 and  
Perception 
1. spatial history 
2. the spatial features interpreted 
by different groups 
3. the political competition and the 
associated perception 
Table 1: the Meaning of Public Space Ownership 
Public space planning, as a specific public administrative activity, should not be 
considered as a black box or the individual directives of political leaders. The meaning of 
property ownership is constructed in a dynamic process that may only be examined by 
particular social contexts, as opposed to any mechanical or functionalist assumption.  
This dissertation breaks through the superficial metaphorical assumptions that 
public ownership creates democracy or that private ownership is financially self-
sustaining. Opening the black box of the planning process in a city government and 
understanding the real complexity of public space planning are primary concerns. 
According to Lefebvre’s methodology and framework, the meaning of a space is an 
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existing reality but also a social production. All of the planning ideology, practices, and 
perceptions contribute to the meaning of a space, among their contradictions. Therefore, 
no single dimension can accurately illuminate a spatial meaning in property transfer 
because the meaning is generated by the complex contradictions among all three 
dimensions. 
  More importantly, because a spatial meaning is always created in dialectic 
contradictions, no feature of publicization or privatization can be taken as an absolute 
truth or falsity. “If we consider the content, if there is a content, an isolated proposition is 
neither true nor false; every isolated proposition must be transcended; every proposition 
with a real content is both true and false, true if it is transcended, false if it is asserted as 
absolute” (Lefebvre, 1968, p.42). Similarly, no planning theory can be absolutely true or 
false. Although a public space is a manmade space, the meaning of a space is not under 
the control of its planners or applied theories. The history of Patriots Park is a typical 
case: although the planners demolished all historical structures within an entire block, 
they did not create the modern and orderly downtown that Le Corbusier foresaw. Then, 
the redevelopment plan that applied Jacobs’ theories created a campground for homeless 
people rather than a park. In this process, Le Corbusier and Jacobs’ theories were both 
true and false. They were right because these theories were once used as intellectual tools 
to understand and solve the real urban problems and then contribute to the dialectic 
evolution of a space. Without Le Corbusier and Jacobs’ planning theories, it would be 
impossible for us to witness a history such as that of Patriots Park. The theories are false 
if we assume that a planning theory can anticipate and determine the future of a space by 
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itself. In fact, however, no planning theory can do that because an outcome is the result of 
dialectic contradiction within spatial contents. 
We should stop placing an absolute meaning on public space privatization, such 
as order/serious regulation or efficiency/inequality, because we will find a 
counterexample in some other space with different spatial contradictions and contents in 
their evolution. In contrast, illuminating the spatial contents of all three dimensions and 
the evolution of these contents’ contradictions interprets the meaning of public space 
ownership beyond intellectually fixing the logic of property transfer in a rigid economic 
model (Harvey, 1985). This dissertation is such an attempt. It interprets the underlying 
rationales of “irrational” outcomes, such as demolishing old structures but leaving the 
land vacant, and complements current theories that are generally based on economic 
motivation in their interpretation (e.g. revanchist city theory). With the comprehensive 
review of spatial contents and evolution, the prominent logical problems in current 
studies of public space privatization, such as inconsistency and counterexamples, will, to 
some extent, be better interpreted. 
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APPENDIX A  
THE BACKGROUND OF ANONYMOUS INTERVIEWEES 
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Anonymous Interviewee # 1  
A member of Arizona Preservation Foundation who has been heavily involved in 
downtown planning efforts. (Interview date: 2016 April 17) 
 
Anonymous Interviewee #2 
A previous firefighter, who was lived across the street from Patriots Park (Interview date: 
2016 October 19) 
 
Anonymous Interviewee #3 
A scholar and famous writer of Phoenix local history (Interview date: 2017 January 10) 
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APPENDIX B  
SECURITY INFORMATION OF LASER EQUIPMENT 
 (WALKER, 1989 MAY 24, PARA. 18-23) 
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One major headache for the designers of the Phoenix show will be the vertical 
beacon’s effect on aviation in the area. The downtown park is located not too far from the 
flight path of airplanes headed for or leaving Sky Harbor International Airport, and the 
Federal Aviation Administration has some say-so on the kind of lights that may be 
shining near (or into) a pilot’s eyes. 
Whiting says the FAA is aware of the city’s plans, and that “all indications” from 
the agency are that the beacon will be approved. “The problem we have is that laser light 
itself does damage the human retina if it is viewed at less than 1,000 feet,” says Whiting, 
adding that ground-level observers won’t be looking at the laser light straight-on, which 
is how eye damage occurs, but from the side. “If a pilot is flying 1,000 feet above the 
ground in downtown Phoenix, he’s way out of the flight path. We don’t expect that’s 
going to happen.” 
Another concern is the extent to which a joystick operator will be able to control a 
potentially blinding laser beam. Apparently the vertical column itself will not be 
controlled by the citizen operator, who will only be able to alter the projected laser 
images on the fabric screens. 
The Center for Devices and Radiological Health regulates laser use. (The 
C.D.R.H., a division of the Federal Food and Drug Administration, is located in Silver 
Spring, Maryland.) City officials have consulted with Dale Smith, a consumer-safety 
officer with the C.D.R.H., regarding the safety of the interactive element of the 
downtown display. “I don’t see any problem in what they’re doing,” Smith says. “As 
252 
 
long as the projections are confined by the hardware, there’s not really any great problem 
for an audience member.”   
Two separate systems will be used to harness the laser light, Whiting says, one a 
physical barrier near the laser’s projection point onto which errant beams will be 
deflected, the other an internal barrier generated by the laser-controlling computer’s 
software. As an additional fail-safe measure, a city-employed operator will be on duty 
while the laser is active. “An operator should be ‘in control’, and should be able to shut 
the laser down when he feels that’s necessary,” Smith says. “He should have an 
emergency ‘off’ switch.”  
